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I. INTRODUCTION
The hypothesis of this thesis is that technology is the main factor that
motivates developing countries to require offset agreements for improving
indigenous arms industries. Offsets are those arrangements made whereby
recipient countries require compensation as a condition of purchase of military
related exports, with the intention of creating benefits for the buyer.
The most critical research lacunae in offset and technology transfer is the lack
of studies about the impact of these concepts in a recipient country. Many studies
have been developed by U.S. governmental agencies and industries associations
to identify the offsets' impact on the U.S. economy [Ref. 1 and 2]. Some internal
concerns are the negative impact on jobs in the supplier country, increasing foreign
competition and the long-term effect on its industrial base. External concerns rest
primarily with technology transfer to countries that do not have barriers to
retransfer this technology to non-allied countries [Ref. 3].
Some U.S. government officials and Congressmen are asking for a unilateral
supplier position which denies offset agreements, but they cannot agree with
defense industrial representatives who are concerned with continuing to sell their
products in a more and more competitive and unknown market where the buyer
has the power to negotiate conditions [Ref. 4].
In the middle of this debate are voices asking for a multilateral agreement
among nations, but the basis for negotiating this agreement does not exist because
the reasons for recipient countries requiring offsets are not well identified'.
The favorable voices for the multilateral approach come from recipient
countries. They say that offsets offered by the U.S. never represent technological
nor operational advantages and they do not include the systems Integration
work, so keeping for the U.S. the control and management of different subsystems
and also the total systems [Ref. 6]. They also say that most offset agreements
rarely meet expectations when implemented [Ref. 5]. But, what is the real
importance of offset agreements for recipient countries?
A. BACKGROUND
Brazil is the leading Third World* exporter and third-ranked arms producer
and is considered to have the greatest potential for growth in arms production
[Ref. 7], or with a chance to remain so [Ref. 8]. Specifically the Brazilian aerospace
industry has had great success in developing and producing aircraft and missiles
since the mid-1 970's, when it started exporting its products of high-quality,
medium-to-low technological range of weaponry at very competitive prices. The
Brazilian aerospace industry can independently design and produce light aircraft,
coproduce jet fighters, and produce tactical missiles under licensed production
[Ref. 8:p. 15].
'The 0MB study stated that the reasons for recipient countries seek for offsets
help explain the effect offsets have on the U.S. trade [Ref. 5].
*The term "developing" and "third world" are used to mean all nations except:
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, other European countries not belonging
to either alliance, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (see Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency - ACDA)[Ref. 8].
The lesser degree of sophistication of these systems, which do not demand
specialized operators or maintenance personnel, may well be appropriate to the
level of training prevailing in many third world countries [Ref. 8:p. 22].
Although its major aircraft still include imported components, Brazilian
designers and manufacturers have shown considerable skill in making well-
conceived aircraft. One example of these new products is the Tucano Turboprop
trainer aircraft that has found technically capable customers such as British Royal
Air Force (RAF) and U.S. Air Force (which was searching for alternatives after Its
Fairchild new trainer program was cancelled). The interesting fact is that RAF's first
order of 130 Tucanos call for a license production of the aircraft, a notable reverse-
flow of technology [Ref. 9].
Brazil founded its capabilities on licensed foreign arms designs, tooling,
hands-on-training, and joint ventures or partnerships with established producers.
As the industry has matured, it has gone on to develop Its own military systems.
It is therefore quite appropriate to select Brazil as the source of case studies.
B. PURPOSE OF THESIS
There are many aspects to an offset study - arms transfers policy,
international trade and competition, economic incentives, etc.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the way in which the Brazilian
government and industry decide about technology in negotiating these
agreements. Brazil has engaged in various joint projects to codevelop and
coproduce aircraft, assemble helicopters, license missiles and aeronautical
engines, and acquire satellite and rocket technology from different countries.
Relative success in absorption of technology by the aerospace industry has been
supported through a very detailed and particular Aeronautics Ministry policy inside
of the Brazilian government.
The goal of this thesis will be to determine the impact of the military offset
agreements on the technological process of developing countries and to draw from
the analysis of the offset decision process some broader theoretical implications,
especially for that body of technology transfer theory which purports to explain and
predict technological behavior of recipient countries.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
Brazil's arms production does not consist only of aerospace products.
However, analyzing the entire spectrum of lighter tanks, ships, submarines, and a
variety of other Brazilian made weapons is a topic that is much too broad for the
limited scope of this research^
Some explanation should be made about the choice of Brazil as a case study
even though other countries such as Canada, Australia, Israel, and NATO countries
have devised specific offset requirements and complex formulas for evaluating
offset packages, usually emphasizing technology transfer [Ref. 10]. So, why the
Brazilian case? First, the technological impact seems to be more evident in a New
Industrialized Country (NIC) than in Less Developed Countries (LDC) and
developed nations. Second, there are other countries similar to Brazil which could
share the knowledge as to how get most of the benefits from these offset
^For an overview of Brazilian arms products, see Brazilian Defence
Equipment 1988-1989 [Ref. 57].
negotiations and continue their process of development, in spite of the economic
problems caused by their high indebtedness. Third, the Brazilian government,
specifically the Aeronautics Ministry, is regulating the offsets for general aircraft
imports, applying models from other countries with the risk of misapplying
traditional recipes for different situations. Finally, the Brazilian aerospace industry
represents an example of survivability in a highly competitive and depressed
international market and most of this success is due to a synchronized Government
policy and well defined technology objectives.
D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis is purposely limited to four types of offset agreements
(countertrade, licensed production, technology transfer, and coproduction) made
in connection basically with military and civil aircraft and helicopters, and
telecommunications systems acquisition, most of the time involving government-
to-government transactions. The concentration on these offsets is done because
it is these that contain specific commitments for Brazilian government participation
and involve the application of technology as the main arrangement.
The research limitations of this thesis include the lack of previous academic
studies in this specific area and the problems in developing empirical indicators
which lend themselves to modeling and statistical tests.
Various other factors limited this research. Some of them were due to
distance, getting information which most of the time existed in Brazil but not
compiled in an adequately usable form. Some data are considered confidential or
proprietary, and young industries and a paternalistic Government will try to defend
a valued treasure from plunder*.
A complete search of the huge trade literature published in many magazines
and journals showed only the "tip of the iceberg", and from this point, we start this
research with some assumptions':
• It is assumed that the reader has a basic familiarity with international trade for
civilian merchandise. Therefore, specific economic aspects, also applied in
trading military products such as comparative advantage, economies of scale,
and multiplier effects are not covered*.
• It is assumed that an aerospace industry cannot be supported technically only
with military production and that producers of dual purpose equipment are
more affected by technological changes.
• It is assumed that most of the Brazilian government's decisions have strong
commercial influence. This is due to the peculiarly close relationship between
government and industry in government-owned companies ("estatais").
Therefore, decisions that some industrial managers make, even physically
outside the government, are considered government decisions, or at least
with government support.
• Some analysts object to the use of "contract" or "agreement" figures due to
the uncertainty and changes that they are subject to. For this study, it is
assumed that an offset proposal is a real indication of measurement of offset
and technology demand.
*Data collection will be discussed later in the methodology section.
'The assumptions are chosen for simplicity and clarity, and no attempt is made
at generality.
® For definitions see Economics; Principles and Policy [Ref. 58].
E. METHODOLOGY
This section examines the research method and Its applications in developing
the theoretical framework to analyze the technological impact of military offsets in
a recipient country.
1. General Methodological Theory
According to Earl Babbie [Ref. 11], we live in a world of two realities:
agreement reality, where the things are considered to be real because you have
been told they are real and experiential reality, where you know things are real
as a function of your direct experience. The problem is that both seem very real.
How can you really know what is real? Science offers an approach to both
agreement reality and experiential reality. Scientists have certain criteria that must
be met before they will accept the reality of something they have not personally
experienced. The special approach to the business of inquiry is called
methodology or "the science of finding out".
Other concepts inherent to human inquiry are causality and probability.
If you can understand why things are related one to another, why certain regular
patterns occur, you can predict even better than if you simply observe and
remember these patterns.
A distinguished historian of the Renaissance, Jacob Burckart, remarked
that the true use of history Is not to make men more clever for the next time but to
make them wiser forever. As we know. It is not an easy task to learn from past
experience. Some people disagree that this is not a correct lesson from a particular
case or if it is a correct lesson, people often misapply those lessons to a new
situation [Ref. 12].
But how can previous experience be applied to the decision making
process? The best way is converting the "lessons" of a variety of historical cases
into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity ofthe phenomenon
or activity [Ref. 12]. This is the approach chosen for this thesis.
2. Why Case Study Methodology?
Most of the case study methodology used in this thesis comes from Yin
[Ref. 13] and George [Ref. 12] whose works offer excellent guidelines in applying
this method.
Case study has long been stereotyped as a weak sibling among social
science methods. Researchers who do case studies are criticized because their
investigations have insufficient precision, objectivity, and rigor. In spite of this, case
studies continue to be used extensively in social science research. This thesis is
one example of the application of the case study method.
The case study method was chosen due to its facility in handling
complex problems about a contemporary set of events, over which the researcher
has little or no control. The method also fitted with the "why" and "how" type of
questions.
Some concerns in using this method were the inexperience of the
researcher, Its lack of rigor, the difficulty in making scientific generalizations from




The phenomena to be studied are the offset arrangements for arms
deals and their impact on recipient countries. Specifically, the research problem
identified is that there are many motives for recipient countries to enter into offset
arrangements. Many nations have devised specific requirements and complex
formulae for assessing the relative merit of offset alternatives, usually emphasizing
technology transfer [Ref. 10].
Specifically Brazil has evaluated favorably those offsets which provided
independent technological capabilities, enhance national security, and improved
economic benefits. These are the three outcome variables in this thesis. The major
hypothesis tested in this thesis that the most important factor correlated with offset
outcome, in terms of these three outcome variables, is technology.
There are two research objectives for this thesis: the scientific objective
is to acquire knowledge about how the technology factor determines the design
and effects of offset requirements in developing countries, specifically Brazil. The
policy objective of this research is to provide the Brazilian government and defense
industries with an analytical framework that facilitates the policy and decision-
making process concerning the technological requirements in future offset
agreements negotiations.
4. Definition of the Variables
After investigating and rejecting the feasibility of developing an empirically
based model, It became apparent that a more conceptual approach was required.
The following discussion explains how the initial framework was developed.
How does technology relate to offset arrangements in the arms trade?
This question is basic to developing a framework of independent and dependent
concepts and variables that can be used to describe the technological impact in
recipient countries.
a. Independent Variables
What are the independent variables which determine the offset
outcome? The remaining questions are about four basic independent factors and
its conception definition:
(1) Technological Factors
Q1) What type of technology is (was) being transferred?
This variable is used to define the various characteristics of product
design and the relative sophistication of production techniques.
Q2) What is (was) the technology transfer environment?
This includes the influence of stage of industrial development, sizes
of internal and external markets, policies of protection, and exchange controls.
Q3) What are (were) the recipient firms' characteristics?
This considers the technical absorptive capacity and potential in
competitive markets of the recipient firm.
Q4) What are (were) the supplier firms' characteristics?
This considers the technology capability, R&D position, and
corporate philosophy of the supplier firm.
Q5) Is (was) this technology integrated?
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This is aimed at evaluating the capacity of the recipient to absorb
and transform the technology.
(2) Economic Factors
06) Does (did) the offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
The conservation of foreign exchange is a measure of the economic
benefits in saving hard currency as the final balance of one offset transaction
("apparent savings"). It includes also the possibility of savings through future
exports ("future savings") and the absence of using hard currency in an offset
transaction, producing savings for other transactions that cash would be required
("opportunity savings").
Q7) Does (did) this agreement create jobs?
Each offset agreement should be evaluated in light of the job impact
its section will have on the labor forced
Q8) Does (did) this offset improve exports?
This attempts to measure if the offset agreement will (did) improve
the level of aerospace products exports.
Q9) Does (did) this agreement enhance the financial project
viability?
The objective here is to identify if the offset received some portion
of foreign direct investment or if it is being used as a financing tool.
^The employees shifting from other industries are assumed to be job creation
because of the difficult in distinguishing employee origin.
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(3) Socio-political Factors
Q10) What are (were) the internal and external political
motivations for this agreement?
This variable will emphasize the role that domestic and international
political priorities play in the ultimate contract and respective offset agreement
decision and selection.
Q11) How does (did) the government act in this offset?
In an offset agreement the recipient government's action is
fundamental. The direct role of the Brazilian government is identified as negotiation
assistance, support (financial, material, transport, incentives), and controller type
actions.
Q12) What are (were) the political and social pressures of this
agreement?
This variable evaluates the level of influence from the various groups
of the Brazilian society such as: Congress, Military, Industry, and Labor Unions.
(4) Military Factors
Q13) What are (were) the benefits of this agreement for Industrial
defense?
This variable measures the level of contribution that the offset
agreement added (will add) to Brazilian national defense industry.
Q14) Does (did) this agreement bring International prestige?
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International prestige represents the level of other countries'
psychological perception of the benefits obtained by Brazil as a result of this offset
agreement. How will the other countries interpret this offset?
Q1 5) How does (did) the technology embodied in this offset improve
the national military capability?
Military capability Is defined as the contribution of this offset
agreement is giving to improving quantitatively and qualitatively the Brazilian armed
forces inventory.
Q16) How does (did) this agreement contribute to the country's
independence and non-vulnerability?
This variable is intended to evaluate or to estimate if the level of
independence and non-vulnerability in arms production after the offset agreement
obligations completed were (will be) improved^
b. Dependent Variables - Offset Outcome
The following four questions deal with offset outcome:
Q17) What are (were) the offset agreement characteristics?
They are: type, direct or indirect, offset percentage, time of
implementation, method of enforcement, financial arrangements, and "end-user"
clause^
*For example Chile bought some F-5 fighters from the U.S some years ago.
Today, for political reasons, the U.S Government is not issuing Chilean export
licenses to the fighter suppliers [Ref. 57].
''"End-user" clause is understood to be when the offset agreement establishes
a legal constraint for future recipient countries exports connected with the
technology transfer.
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Q1 8) Does (Did) this offset agreement provide independent technologi-
cal capabilities?
The independent technology capability is understood to mean the
capacity to develop and produce better equipment with the technology transferred
through the offset agreement.
Q19) Does (Did) this offset enhance Brazilian national security?
This variable measures the level of contribution that the offset agreement
offers to reduce national insecurities and threat perception, as defined In the Basic
Manual - Manual Basico of the Brazilian National War College - Escola Superior
de Guerra (ESQ) [Ref. 50:p. 53].
Q20) Does (Did) this offset improve Brazilian economic benefits?
An attempt will be made to assess the potential or past positive effect on
the Brazilian economy.
The complete diagram of the framework can be found on Tables 1 and
2. The complete descriptions of the variables are presented in Chapter Two, within
the offset concept section.
These variables give the best approximation of what offset outcome is
from the economic, socio-politic, military, and technical point of view.
5. Case Studies
The cases were chosen from a long list of Brazilian offset agreements,
based on the following criteria:
First, cases should be related to the aerospace industry. The Brazilian
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engines. Second, the offset agreements should involve military products. The
thirdand most important criterion was to choose cases involving varying levels of
technology transfer. The last criterion was more flexible. Civilian cases could
reinforce the data if for some reason the previous cases were not supported by
data.
From Table 3, only the following cases were chosen to be analyzed:
a. Countertrade
(1) MD-11 Aircraft - McDonnell Douglas and EMBRAER production
of the outboard flaps in connection with VARIG Brazilian airline acquisition of 10
MD11 aircraft.
b. Technology Transfer
(1) BRASILSAT Program - Various U.S. and other countries'
industries offset proposals to TELEBRAS (Telecomunicagoes Brasileiras) and
Aeronautics Ministry for the acquisition of two satellites and launch services.
c. Licensed Production
(1) PIPER Models - PIPER and EMBRAER contract to assemble
knocked down parts of five models of civilian aircraft.
(2) Aerospatiale Helicopters - Aerospatiale (France) and HELIBRAS
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TELEBRAS CANADA SPAR/ARIANESPACE
CELMA UK/ ITALY ROLLS-ROYCE/FIAT
EMBRAER USA MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
ADS -
ATM - ANTI-TANK MISSILE
HEL - HELICOPTER
TRN - TRAINER AIRCRAFT
FTR - FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
TEC - TECHNOLOGY
ENG - ENGINE
COM - COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
TRA - TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
Lie - LICENSE PRODUCTION
COP - COPROOUCTION
TT - TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
CT - COUNTERTRADE
SOURCE: Louscher, David J. and Michael D. Salomone, Marketing
Security Assistance: New Perspectives on Arms Sales .
Lexington Books, 1987, pp. 118-119.
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d. Coproduction
(1) CBA - 123 Program - EMBRAER and FAMA (Argentina)
codevelopment and coproduction agreement to produce a 19-seat turboprop
civilian aircraft.
(2) AMX Program - Brazil and Italy codevelopment and
coproduction agreement, involving various defense industries, to produce a fighter
aircraft.
6. Hypotheses
The cases above were carefully chosen to provide variance in experience
in negotiating offsets, types of offset agreements, civilian and military offsets, levels
of technology transfer, intensity of government support, and origins of the
suppliers.
The hypotheses (if/then propositions) that will be tested are:
• H1: IF variance in experience In negotiating offsets affects the offset
outcome, THEN there is a learning process in recipient countries offset
negotiations, which will result in increasingly beneficial offsets over time.
• H2: IF variance in types of offset agreements affects the offset outcome,
THEN there is a trend that shows an evolution among different agreements.
• H3: IF variance between military and civilian offsets affects the offset
outcome, THEN the government should give different treatment to civilian and
military offset policy (different legislation, assistance, financial support, etc.).
• H4: IF variance in level of technology affects the offset outcome, THEN
there is a hierarchy among different offset agreements (i.e., some offset
agreements are able to transfer technology better or more efficiently).
• H5: IF variance in government support affects offset outcome, THEN
defense industries should search for offset agreements with government
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support (i.e., there is some suspicion that recipient industries have more
leverage in negotiating offsets if they have their government involved.).
• H6: IF variance in supplier countries and industries affects offset outcome,
THEN recipient governments and industries should develop "supplier scores"
to improve decision making (e.g., a databank with previous information by
country and by industry, about implementation, policies, trade barriers, etc.).
7. Data Collection
Since the increase in international arms transfers after the 1970s, social
and political scientists have studied various aspects of arms transfers and drawn
conclusions from existing data. These studies have produced questions concerning
the validity and accuracy of the data. This is especially problematic since those
data are especially "unreliable and open to manipulation" [Ref. 14]. This subsection
analyzes some of the data sources available for data collection for this research.
There are basically two institutions that put out arms transfer data: The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Some studies (Brzoska, 1982 [Ref.
14], Laurance and Sherwin, 1978 [Ref. 15] and 1979 [Ref. 16], and Kolodziej, 1979
[Ref. 17] offer analyses which compare SIPRI and ACDA data. They present the
limitations of both sources, present some differences, and examine their validity
and reliability'". For the purpose of this research, involving offset information and
statistics, the following issues should be discussed:
'"validity: "A measure or indicator is valid If It Is an adequate measure of what
it is supposed to represent".
reliability: "A particular measurement procedure is reliable to the extent that
It yields results that are consistent in successive measurements of the same case,
and comparable among cases" [Ref. 16].
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• ACDA and SIPRI sources have limited use in studying individual industries.
ACDA gives figures for total exports but does not contain information on types
and quantities of equipment transferred, v/hile SIPRI gives information about
different arms production firms, but without the detail required.
• ACDA and SIPRI sources do not provide information on direct costs accruing
to recipient countries, correct time for delivery, negotiations in progress, and
technical information of the weapons. ACDA does not include training,
technical services, and construction Information.
The others sources of specific offset statistics are in the 0MB [Ref. 1]
and DT/AIA/EIA [Ref. 2] studies, but the aggregation of values required to protect
proprietary data did not allow a more In-depth analysis of Brazilian cases
negotiated with the U.S. Also, the U.S Department of Commerce statistics do not
identify sales contracts with offsets even for civilian aircraft. The same occurs with
CACEX (Brazilian trade department) statistics.
The search of Brazilian sources of statistics was frustrating. Due to the
fact that offset is a new topic in Brazil only a few articles were found and they
produced contradictory information increasing the reliability problem.
In summary, different theoretical and practical questions demand different
arms transfer data. The researcher interested in technological impact of offset in
recipient countries needs the following basic data: hardware data sorted by
supplier and recipient firms; data on pricing of individual Items to access the
difference of prices with/without offsets, percentage of technology transfer
agreements in connection with the main agreement, and time for offset
implementation". This data is not currently available and had to be generated for
this study.
"See offset definitions in Chapter Two.
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8. Generalization
The case studies in this thesis will provide findings regarding the
technological factor in offset arrangements. But they also yield another benefit.
Together with the previous studies, these case studies provide a basis for
formulating generalizations relating to four significant issues expressed by the
following questions:
• What are the determinants of offset requirements?
• What is the relationship of different offset factors?
• What is the link between offsets and technology transfer?
• What are effective offset policies for developing countries?
F. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several sources have addressed the issue of offset trade and technology
transfer. For this study four topics were identified which supported the scope of this
thesis.
The first category is information on arms transfers and production in third
world countries. Of these sources, DOD [Ref. 18], SIPRI [Ref. 7], ACDA [Ref. 8],
Louscher, David, and Moniz [Ref. 19], and Katz [Ref. 20] were the most complete.
The second category of published work includes offset trade. An extensive
literature covers the different types of civilian offsets but very few address the
military aspects. This last part is superficially covered by articles in various defense
magazines. The official reports of 0MB [Ref. 18] and the DT/AIA/EIA [Ref. 2] are
the most complete studies. Some individual works by Neuman [Ref. 3], Schmidt
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[Ret. 10], and Welt [Ref. 21] offer excellent points for discussion and
recommendations for further research. Countertrade theory and issues have more
emphasis in East-West than North-South trade. Some organizations issued reports
-- OECD [Ref. 22], Business International Corporation [Ref. 23], and U.S.
Department of Commerce [Ref. 24]. Some expert opinion on the subject is found
In Banks [Ref. 25], Mirus and Yeung [Ref. 26], Hennart [Ref. 27], Korth [Ref. 28],
Verzariu [Ref. 29], Jones [Ref. 30], Schaffer [Ref. 31], Welt [Ref. 32], and Maynard
[Ref. 33]. License agreements are studied basically in Contractor [Ref. 34 and 35].
Aerospace coproduction is well explained in two RAND reports [Ref. 36 and 37].
Joint ventures general theory may be found in Harrigan [Ref. 38] and Killing [Ref.
39].
The third category in the literature, technology transfer theory, contained
many studies. Key works used were: Barason [Ref. 40 and 41], Rogers [Ref. 42],
Wallender [Ref. 43], and Singh [Ref. 44]. The literature of science and technology
policy in Brazil reviewed in Erber [Ref. 45], and World Bank [Ref. 46], gives the
entire view of Brazilian industrial policies and manufactured exports. Dagnino [Ref.
47 to 49] offers an excellent overview about the technology issue in the Brazilian
arms industry.
The last category, surprisingly well covered, gives general information of the
Brazilian aerospace industry history and main programs. However, in regards to
the specific about the cases studied, personal interviews, telephone conversation,
and correspondence with the industries were needed to complement the data
about the case studies.
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Theses and dissertations on the topic were surprisingly rare. Mckenna [Ref.
51] and Moses [Ref. 52] talk about military offset. On the subject of Brazilian arms
trade and foreign policy Tollefson [Ref. 53], Mura [Ref. 54], and Ellis [Ref. 55] are
excellent sources. Specifically regarding the Brazilian aircraft industry, an update
overview is presented by Reiners [Ref. 56].
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In Chapter One, the introduction and methodology is discussed. Chapter Two
addresses offset trade and technology transfer theory with focus on the scope of
this thesis. Chapter Three focuses on some governments' offset policies in
managing and supporting offset trade, with emphasis on Brazilian offset policy.
Chapter Four researches the Brazilian aerospace industry, dividing it basically into
aircraft industry and space industry. Chapter Five performs the case studies
analysis of four types of offsets: countertrade, technology transfer, licensed
production, and coproduction. Chapter Six offers, as an outcome, the analysis
based on the hypotheses previously stated and makes some generalizations from
the Brazilian cases.
The conclusion presents the main findings of the study as a guide the
decision-making in Brazilian offset agreements. Recommendations to improve
Brazilian offset policy and for further research are presented.
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II. OFFSET AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONCEPTS
This chapter presents a background of offset trade and technology transfer
concepts and introduces some of the types that will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter Five'^ The first section defines the various types, terms, and structures
of offsets, gives a short background of this concepts, presents the supplier's
motivations toward offsets, and characterizes the recipient's motivations within four
main offset factors that will be the basis of the theoretical framework used to
analyze the Brazilian cases. They are technological, economical, socio-political, and
military factors. The second section presents a conceptualization of technology
transfer applied to offset and discusses the application of military technology in
commercial business.
A. OFFSET TRADE CONCEPT
Offset is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of complex
compensatory terms by foreign trade partners as a condition of sale, particularly
for military and aerospace products.
Offset agreements are very flexible and they allow many combinations of
different contracts at the same time. Weapons in exchange for Yugoslavian hams
and Greek tourism are some examples of this flexibility.
'^A more detailed description of each offset type will be presented in Chapter
Five, before each set of cases. This is to facilitate understanding and association
between the case and its respective offset theory.
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1. Definitions, Terms, and Structures
There is a great deal of confusion regarding terminology. Some authors
differentiate between offset and countertrade, meaning military and civilian
compensatory arrangements respectively. Others say that offset is the principal
form of countertrade in the aerospace industry [Ref. 1 :p. 61]. To clarify terminology
and to attempt to differentiate between military and civilian cases, this difference is
expressed as "military offsets" and "civilian offsets", reserving the term countertrade
as a major type of the basic concept of offset'^
a. Definitions
Because the term "offset" has been used with different meanings in
worldwide trade, it is important that the reader be aware of how the term is defined
for this thesis. Among numerous sources researched, it was decided to adopt the
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) formulations due to its emphasis on
military trade and also due to its cumulative experience in researching offsets
during four consecutive years'\ 0MB reports also are considered the most
complete official study about this subject at this writing [Ref. 3],
The industrial and commercial definitions applied to offset used by
0MB and from now on applied in this research are:
13<See Neuman [Ref.2] to understand better this "frustrating and thankless task"
of differentiating between them. The author is responsible for any errors in
interpretation or judgment in terminology.
"0MB annually reports has been published since 1985.
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(1) OFFSET: A range of industrial and commercial compensation
practices required as a condition of purchase of military exports'". The various
types of offsets are defined as:
• COPRODUCTION - Overseas production based upon government-to-
govemment agreement that permits a foreign government(s) or producer(s)
to acquire the technical information to manufacture all or part of a supplier
country origin defense article, tt includes government-to-government licensed
production. It excludes licensed production based upon direct commercial
arrangements by supplier country manufacturers.
• LICENSED PRODUCTION - Overseas production ofa supplier-origin defense
article based upon transfer of technical information under direct commercial
arrangements by supplier country manufacturers.
• SUBCONTRACTOR PRODUCTION - Overseas production of a part or
component of a supplier country-origin defense article. The subcontract does
not necessarily involve license of technical information and is usually a direct
commercial arrangement between the supplier country manufacturer and a
foreign producer.
• OVERSEAS INVESTMENT - Investment arising from the offset agreement,
taking the form of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint
venture in the foreign country.
• TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER - Transfer of technology that occurs as a result
of an offset agreement and that may take the form of: research and
development conducted abroad, technical assistance provided to the
subsidiary or joint venture of overseas investment, or other activities under
direct commercial arrangement between the supplier country manufacturer
and a foreign entity.
• COUNTERTRADE - In addition to the types of offsets defined above, various
types of commercial countertrade arrangements may be required. A contract
may include one or more of the following mechanisms:
• Barter - A one-time transaction only, bound under a single contract
that specifies the exchange of selected goods or services for another
of equivalent value.
'"This military definition is extended to include transactions of general aviation
aircraft and satellites. This is due to the close relationship of these equipments with
the military equipment and the high value of these transactions.
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• Counterpurchase - An agreement by the initial exporter to buy (or to
find a buyer for) a specific value of goods (often stated as a percentage
of the value of the original export) from the original Importer during a
specified time period.
• Compensation (or buy-back) - An agreement by the original
exporter to accept as fijil on partial repayment products derived fi'om the
original exporter product.
Within the business community, offsets associated with military
exports are fi'equently divided into direct and indirect classes:
• DIRECT OFFSETS - Contractual arrangements that involve goods and
services addressed in the sales agreement for military exports.
• INDIRECT OFFSETS - Contractual arrangements that involve goods and
services unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales agreement.
Offsets may involve any of the above arrangements or may incorporate
elements from several of them. The most common types of offsets can be
structured as either direct or indirect, and sometimes as a combination of the two.
b. Terms
Some points in terminology must be addressed to show a distinction
similar to the situational difference between arms orders and the actual delivery.
Not all offset agreements signed are implemented.
Obligation in offset agreements is the offset value agreed upon
within a sales contract. Implementation is the value of those offsets actually
implemented. The latter's value may never be the obligated value, therefore real
implemented offsets are a better measure of economic impact. Implementations
lead-time is also important to measure their influence in the age of technology.
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Another term used in offset agreements refers to the obligation
enforcement used by the recipient country. The idea of recipient country
enforcement rests basically on two approaches; "best-efforT or "best endeavor
are the preferable terms in these agreements though they don't seem very
enforceable. "Liquidated damage" includes a penalty on any unfulfilled portions
of the offset commitments to be paid as a fine. This approach is largely used
nowadays, and usually is negotiated as a percentage of the total value of the offset
agreement.
c. Structure
Offsets may involve any of the above arrangements or may
incorporate elements from several of them. The idea to establish a framework upon
which offset arrangements are structured is somewhat difficult due to numerous
differences from one case to another. Not all offset agreements have all of the
elements that others do, and in some cases, individual pieces of the framework are
used differently than in others. These differences are not substantive; rather they
usually reflect the peculiarities of the particular case at hand and the individuality
of the drafter of the agreement. Some experts agree that offset agreements tend
to be more comprehensive than their predecessors, indicating a learning curve
phenomenon at work [Ref. 4].
The clauses that are negotiated in offset agreements generally are
originated from an offset proposal. From the literature available'', the main items
IBl
It was difficult to access any original offset agreements. Most of them are
government-to-government agreements and they are not available for public
release. The same occurs with the private companies agreements.
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stated in an offset proposal and consequent offset agreement are: the tendered
price (the share of offset of the total price), the value of recipient products, the
value and nature of direct and indirect works, the penalties, the period over which
offset commitments are to be achieved, and the extent of achievement of pre-
existing offset obligations and current action to fulfill these obligation [Ref. 5:p.
290].
2. Background
Offsets arose In the late 1950s and early 1960s in response to the
legitimate need to rebuild the industrial base for defense in Western Europe and
Japan. At that time, offset agreements may have been justifiable for reducing the
impact of military equipment purchases on the budgets and trade accounts of
these countries. Offsets have contributed to standardizing and modernizing the
arms inventories of the alliance, and to strengthening transatlantic ties in defense
of NATO countries [Ref. 6].
Offsets also contributed to commerce with the Eastern Bloc due to the
impossibility of exchanging their currencies Into the Western market. These
practices soon spread to developing countries because of numerous reasons'^
Now, times and circumstances have changed, but offsets remain. The
new concept of offset is a relatively new development for most defense companies
and governments that are now Involved in it. Although some of the basics are old
'^The reasons for developing countries engaged in offsets will be discussed
later on this chapter.
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(e.g., barter is the oldest method of business transactions), its modern
sophistication is new and dynamic.
During this research, several previous studies and surveys were
consulted". Although most of them represent one sample related to U.S.
industries, their results were considered as the best data available to analyze the
nature and extent of offset practices". From these documents and from other
sources, the following "rough estimates" emerge":
• Military offsets have increasingly become a central factor in awarding military
contracts .
Offset is estimated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to account for
between 20% and 30% of the roughly $2 trillion of world trade in 1983. However,
the U.S. Department of State (INR) believes the total is closer to 15%; the OECD
calculates 8%; GATT about 6%; and the IMF 1%'' [Ref. 2].
The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) found some evidence in
the DOD 1983 report that within the five years from that date about $30 billion in
'*They were DT/AIA/EIA [Ref. 7], 0MB [Ref. 3 and 6], and also some
conclusions from Korth [Ref. 1] from other surveys in countertrade realized in
1979 (Carleton University, Ottawa), 1981 (Canadian Commercial Corporation),
and 1982 (U.S. International Trade Commission - ITC). This last research data
was incorporated into 0MB in the interest of reducing the U.S. Government's
demands on the private sector.
"Data elements include the contract value of sales and the face value of
obligations, the value of offset commitments actually fulfilled, years of sales and
offset implementation, countries involved, type of offsets, products Involved in
sales, and U.S. role in sales.
*lTiis Neuman expression demonstrates the precarious status of data available
[Ref. 2]. The quotation belongs to this author.
''See the meaning of the acronyms in Appendix A.
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potential U.S. arms sales were expected to involve offsets [Ref. 8]. Recent figures
shows that from 1980 to 1987 contracts with offset agreements totaled $34.8 billion
and $19.9 billion of obligations associated with these contracts [Ref. 3].
• Offset is applied basically to large capital projects and high technology
products .
Ail sun/eys indicated a sharply increasing offset requirement in the sale
of military hardware, specifically military and large aircraft to recipient countries
governments and national airlines".
• The prevalent form of offset is direct offset .
The survey respondents reported that over 55% of offset obligations
have been in the form of direct coproduction, licensed production, and direct
subcontract [Ref. 6:p. 34]. For most of the contracts, the type of offset and method
of enforcement were agreed to when the contract was signed, and "best effort"
was the most preferred [Ref. 3:p. 8].
• Countries involved in offsets .
Some surveys show an increase in the list of countries involved in offset
arrangements. In 1972, only about 15 countries were involved in these
arrangements. According to another survey in 1984 there were more than 88
countries that request some form of offset before they agree to buy U.S. exports
[Ref. 1:p. 17].
Demand for offsets has come primarily from industrialized countries and
75% of all offset requirements were in countries with high and medium R&D
"DT/AIA/EIA and 0MB figures are 74% and 63.9% respectively of total value
of sales.
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expenditures. For instance, Canada was by far the chief individual country
beneficiary of offset commitments both in number of contracts and in value [Ref.
7].
• Characteristics of the Offset Contracts.
The common offset percentage, which is the percentage of contract
accounted for by the offset obligations, varied among countries, ranging from
roughly 5% to 175% [Ref. 3]. The average time of Implementation is 11 years. Of
these implementations, a great part refers to Indirect offsets.
Most of the supplier companies are still using trade specialists to help
facilitate offset. They rely primarily upon in-house specialists or trading subsidiaries,
then trading houses or banks and finally foreign government agencies, brokers,
and consultants.
• Technology Transfer
Unfortunately none of the surveys were asking about the level of
technology embodied because "it would have been difficult to answer and would
have discouraged response" [Ref. 7:p. 8].
• The future of the offset agreements .
Some of the reasons given for the continuity of offsets are: the
continuing debt problem and shortage of foreign exchange, the general world
economic conditions, the need to transfer technology, and economic development
needs.
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3. Offset Participant Motives
The reasons why any country engages in offset agreements are many
and varied. Most of the articles published show that offsets were required by the
purchasing governments. On the other side, some evidence shows that offsets
have been offered by defense producers as a marketing competition Instrument.
This subsection addresses the supplier and recipient motivations toward offsets
with emphasis In recipient rationale (factors) and gives some international
institutions opinions atx>ut offset.
a. Offs^ Supplier Motives
On the supply side, the incentives to export weapons are multiple.
They can be grouped in two basic categories: political and economic incentives.
As pointed out by Brzoska and Ohison" they operate on three levels: international,
national, and industrial [Ref. 9].
At the internationai ievel, the political factors are shaped by the
East-West (U.S and USSR) conflict and the struggle for political and ideological
hegemony in the world. However other major suppliers such as France and
Sweden are seeing the other face of the coin, showing weapons as an economic
commodity.
At the national level, other political factors such as to ensure stable
employment and provide surge capacity in case of war. The economic rationale at
''Some motivations that drive suppliers in engaging in offset agreements should
be inserted in a more general analysis of arms transfers. Brzoska and Ohison
offer an excellent assessment to analyze the structure and dynamics of arms
transfers [Ref. 9].
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this level is to ensure the stability of civilian markets, the inflow of necessary raw
materials, and to improve balance of payments. It is also argued that the longer
production runs lower domestic procurement costs and help to recoup some of
the outlays on military R&D.
At the industrial levei. some companies involved directly or
indirectly in arms production may share the political incentives. Otherwise, the
pressures to export arms are purely economic. The economic incentives at this
level are stronger because of three components of weapons market behavior;
weapons prices don't seem to fall with the reduced demand; arms exports are a
profitable business even in adverse negotiations when the supplier's government
guarantees the deal; and arms industries exports account for a substantial part of
the turnover, and with the relatively high barriers to entry and exit in arms
production this comprises yet another strong and built-in pressure.
As we stated before, this general analysis about suppliers
motivations in arms export also gives some directions in which supplier's
motivations toward offset may be analyzed. Although the focus of this thesis rests
on recipient's motivations", a list of specific offset motivations for supplier is
'^Some well-known recipient countries are becoming suppliers. Within the
limitations proposed for this research, these 180^ turns won't be the object of this
analysis.
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presented^. Here are some of the supplier country motivations in offering and
accepting offsets:
• The most common supplier motivation is the deal itself. Some managers say
that offsets are better than nothing, showing the increasing level of
competition from other suppliers;
• For some industries, offsets represent an expansion of market and
consequent expansion of product cycle;
• When the firm has a marketable technology, but lacks the resources, offsets
represent a way to obtain direct investments or a share in a coproduction
agreement; and
• Suppliers that support offsets, and are even using them as a marketing tool
claim that such arrangements lower the product unit cost, generate new
supplier jobs, and there is no reason to be concerned with the technology
transferred, because offsets rarely involve state-of-the-art technology.
b. Offset Recipient Motives
There is a substantial literature that discusses recipient countries'
motives for demanding offsets but no effort has been made to catalogue these
demands. Although the information available indicates that developing countries
are now joining the increasing number of industrialized countries demanding
offsets, reasons vary widely [Ref. 6].
Many developing countries are now turning to offset in response to
conditions such as: growing debt-servicing burdens, falling commodity prices,
generally worsening terms of trade, declining exports and deteriorating domestic
economic performance.
2S|
Most of the motivations from this list are seriously questioned by various
political and other government officials. They say that these reasons do not justify
the jobs lost, the weakening of the defense industrial base, the increasing
competition, etc. [Ref. 10].
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(1) Offset Factors
As outlined in Chapter One, there are four reasons why recipient
countries are demanding offsets". The initial idea is that factors and variables will
be rated as high, medium, and low in terms of their contribution to the case.
• Technological Factors
Technology transfer is a complex Issue because of the numerous
variables involved. Problems in developing countries such as lack of political and
economic stability, poor absorptive capacity, lack of internal resources to support
large projects, inappropriate institutional frameworks and economic policies are
only part of the decision-makers' concerns. In addition, concern with the reverse
impact of technology transfer has led the supplier countries to impose strict
conditions on the recipients [Ref. 11:p. 1].
The variety of factors that influence offset with technology transfer
to recipient countries through offset agreements can be grouped into five
categories":
Nature of the transferred technology
Various characteristics of product design and the relative
sophistication of production techniques may not be transferred by the supplier
firm. This occurs because the supplier firms are less interested in transferring the
product fields where substantial R&D funds have been invested or where they
hold a technological lead.
Transfer environments
Offsets that involve transfer of technology between different
countries are influenced by a variety of legal constraints in both supplier and
"The focus is given to developing countries demands because of the case
studies analyzed.
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The t)etter description of this factor was found in Barason [Ref. 12]. Although
his description focused on multinational production, its similarity with the
technological factor makes this definition perfectly suitable. The technological
integration variable was added to the previous ones established by Baranson.
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recipient countries, stages of product development, size of the market,
government policies of protection, and exchange controls. Another
environmental factor particularly important is competition. If there Is more than
one competitor willing to offer offsets, and offsets are a condition of sales, the
leverage power of the recipient improves and can bring more quality and quantity
of transfer of technology.
Recipient firm's characteristics
In considering whether to enter Into an offset arrangement the
technical absorptive capabliity of the recipient country and its potential In
competitive markets are major considerations.
Supplier firm's characteristics
There are two different points of view regarding the supplier
country's behavior when transferring technology. First, suppliers often prefer to
transfer technology to advanced partners because of the ease of transfer coupled
with the advantages of cross-licensing. Second, supplier firms are more willing to
disclose technical know-how to less sophisticated partners in developing
countries than to industrially-advanced countries, which may eventually become
serious commercial rivals in third markets.
The transfer capability, financial position, and corporate
philosophy of the supplier are among factors influencing technology transfer.
Technology integration
The success of an import substitution policy is identified by the
capacity of recipient to integrate the technology that is being transferred. There are
three ways to measure this variable":
Time is especially important to measure the technology integration of
defense industries. These industries are normally constrained by strict schedules.
For instance, a missile industry needs to deliver equipment to support the
"These and other ways were suggested by Singh [Ref. 11]. The author
identified time, skills, and service sector as the most applicable into the scope of
this thesis.
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customer's war, and any technology must be integrated faster through an
improvement in capital intensive techniques to give greater assurance of delivering
the product on time, without sacrificing the quality.
Skills is a measure that indicates if a lack of an adequately trained
manpower Is responsible for limiting the technology Integration. Skills may be
analyzed by the period of experience and graduation level of the labor force.
Service sector Is the last proposed way of measuring this variable. To have
more technology Integration, the firm needs to generate more production
employment than service employment. It means, if EMBRAER needs to improve
technology Integration, It should hire more technicians, engineers, and scientists
than administrative personnel.
• Economic Factors
The offset phenomenon has puzzled economists because it has
substituted for the money that allows multilateral trade for bilateral agreements,
sometimes without no currency transaction. In Brazil, the development of arms
industries has played an important economic and industrial role. This factor argues
that some of the developing countries' economic motivations toward offsets may
be grouped in four categories:
Conservation of foreign currency
The first idea is that offsets reduce the amount of hard
currency needed for defense systems; the same amount of foreign exchange can
purchase twice as many units of a defense system if there is a 50% offset [Ref.
6:p. 46]. This linear way of thinking does not mean that offsets save foreign
exchange. In these countries, the conservation of foreign currency is a difficult
variable to access. A previous study shows that only in rare situations do savings
really occur as a balance of one entire offset transaction. As Hennart [Ref. 13]
argues, much of the literature has ascribed the growth of offset trade to the heavy
Indebtedness of an increasingly large number of developing countries. Offset is
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seen as a way for these countries to solve their foreign exchange shortage". He
continues saying that "a careful analysis shows that the view of using offsets as a
way of saving foreign currency generally Is not true". He also pointed out one
example, "only barter can be shown to have this property, and only under very
specific conditions". The other types "consist of separate but linked money-for-
goods contracts". Finally, Hennart concludes that with rare exceptions of some
barter transactions, the other types of offsets "cannot help countries reduce their
outlay of hard currency or improve their ability to borrow foreign exchange"* [Ref.
13:p. 130]. This concept is denominated by the author as 'apparent savings".
With the objective of expanding the concept to better fit
measures for the Brazilian cases, the argument posted by the author is the
possibility of future savings of hard currency. It means, savings obtained with the
future substitution of imports by the internal manufactured of the equipment,
assuming perfect transfer of technology^\ For example, the PIPER case offered
some future foreign exchange savings because EMBRAER started producing the
planes to attend domestic demand. This new concept will be called from now on
'luture savings".
Another expansion is obtained with what the author of this
thesis calls "opportunity savings". It means the foreign currency saved in one
offset transaction is to be used in other transactions that involve hard currency
only. The example is the Brazilian Navy agreement with West Germany to buy two
submarines. Brazil paid in ore worth nearly $200 million and saved hard currency
28lHe also argues that saving on foreign exchange is not the only economic
motivation. The article proposes offsets as attempts to build reciprocity in order
to reduce transactions costs in the international market for intermediate products,
technology, and distribution services.
*Hennart did some statistical analysis to confirm the absence of a relationship
between indebtedness and two types of offsets (counterpurchase and buy-back)
and suggests the reasons for recipient countries engaged in these agreements
must be elsewhere.
'^Sometimes, due to lack of precise data of transactions inside the country,
this data becomes hard to access.
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for future oil imports, since some OPEC countries only accept cash payments
[Ref. 14].
Jobs creation
The developing countries arms industries contribute to a
country's social development by Industrializing ar\6 expanding employment and
training opportunities for a skilled indigenous labor force. Although the Brazilian
government's economic policies have never induced nor led to the realization of
specific employment goals", this variable measures the employment benefits from
one offset transaction. There are four different approaches of this benefit.
First, the creation of jobs is real. It rr^eans, certain new
coproduction or licensing production is requiring a certain number of new
employees with genera! knowledge and offering system-specific knowledge or firm-
specific knowledge". This is called real employment benefits. Second,
sometimes this gain in employment in the so called "high-tech" industries occurs
at the expense of employment in the industries in which Brazil has a comparative
advantage, thereby reducing Its real output and Income (e.g., some employees
shift from automotive industry to EMBRAER [Ref. 6:p. 40]. This is called apparent
employment benefits. Third, the creation of jobs can be indirect. It means that
other jobs are created as consequence of the offset agreement. The example
given is the expansion of airlines crew and administrative people in consequence
of the acquisition of civilian aircraft to incorporate in Its fleet. The offset agreement
(e.g., counterpurchase of other merchandise) is indirectly creating new jobs. This
assessment is called Indirect employment benefits. The last job creation
measure is called support employment benefits. This assessment considers as
creation of jobs the capacity that the offset agreement offers In maintaining the
"In Brazil there is no definitive orientation with respect to technology choice
and employment level in the manufacturing industry [Ref. 15:p. 4]. The majority
of the Brazilian government incentives to stimulate industrial growth have t)een to
lower the capital costs (machine) and in consequence, make the capital-intensive
firm more viable than labor-intensive firms.
"See definitions in Technology concept subsection.
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recipient's labor force's qualitative and quantitative capability to produce.
Scientists, engineers, and technicians need constant improvement in technology
training and new challenges.
Expand exports and imports
Some recipient countries state that offsets are a way of getting
new markets for their products and overcoming the barriers to expanding Imports.
These two possible recipient motivations in using offsets were identified and will be
measured as follows: First, offsets may offer a way to expand export. This is
obtained by the recipient using the suppliers' marketing expertise and
distribution network to open new markets for their products [Ref. 2:p. 193 and
16:p. 170]. These products may be current merchandise or excess production
capabilities [Ref. 17]. Second, offsets provide to the recipient countries, who are
concerned to somehow get around the constraint on development imposed by a
shortage of hard currency, an opportunity to raise imports level above where they
would otherwise have been [Ref. 16:p. 164]. This is done in three ways: as a
means of undercutting prices and quotas set by international commodity
agreements, a method of concealing the dumping^ of surplus goods, and a
means of circumventing International Monetary Fund (ir^F) restrictions on
recipient's imports [Ref. 2:p. 193 and 4]. Therefore, an offset may be measured
by its capacity to contribute to improving both export and import.
Enhance Financial Viability
A decline in arms sales to Third World after 1982 probably
reflects more a decline in these countries' abilities to finance new purchases than
a decline in real demand [Ref. 18:p. 171]". As Neuman argues, "disturbances in
the international economy since 1973 - rising oil prices, high rates of inflation, and
*See a discussion about the dumping effect in Banks [Ref. 16:p. 170].
36/One interesting empirical study by Steve Chan suggests that much of the
demand for arms by the Third World was from those countries that were also net
importers of oil [Ref. 19].
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slow economic growth and trade in many countries - have produced large trade
deficits, particularly among the non-oil producing LDCs".
Obtaining financing for some countries has been one important
reason to engage in offsets. Offsets allow a recipient country with high external
debts, liquidity constraints, and exchange controls to continue trading even when
hard currency is not available [Ref. 5]. Offsets do not increase overall
indebtedness, requiring only interim financing for the period between import and
export. The question arises as to whether offsets could result in an expandable
supply of credit beyond that available under normal trade. Three different
assessments were found to explain and measure this variable. First, a financing
offset involves standard methods of financing such as government-supported
credit programs, bank to bank credit lines (letter of credit), and buyer and supplier
credits. Second, although commercial banks generally do not lend money to
finance such double-edged transactions, some offsets that generate increasing
the volume of exports are considered as guarantees, in this case, the offset
agreement allows a deferrai payment until a specific time in the future or for
spreading out of payment over a prearranged period. The last assessment is when
some offset agreements bring some kind of foreign direct investments.
• Socio-poiitical Factors
The international arms trade market is governed more by the
objectives and policies of recipient governments than by traditionally defined
market influences. This variable measures the internal political feasibility of an
offset agreement.
Political motivation
The political acceptability of arms purchases from a foreign
source is one of the factors in the development of weapons procurement policies
of recipient countries [Ref. 6]. Offsets may be smartly used as internal political
tools to justify large military hardware purchases to constituents. With offsets it
becomes easy to say "don't worry, we will get it all back". This variable expresses
the level of different internal government organizations influence on the process.
In Brazil, despite the austerity policies demanded by Brazil's crisis, the arms
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industry seems not to be affected or affected very little. One hypothesis directly
related to this fact is that the development of an arms industry shifts the military to
a more international political role (not as belligerent country, but as a supplier of
training and equipment) which may allow the military to withdraw from domestic
politics [Ref. 20:p. 74]. Exemplifying the military political motivation, in mid-1980s,
was the Brazilian armed forces establishing the National Aerospace Defense
System, a project that sent the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (EMFA) to West
Germany in search state-of-the-art computers. Reflecting Brazilian commitments,
the government agreed to accord the data processing sector a high priority in the
allocation of scarce dollars [Ref. 21 :p. 341].
Government action
The direct role of the recipient governments in oversight of
offset agreements has increased dramatically*. Particularly in developing countries
this role has been fundamental in the process of industrialization. There are three
ways that recipient governments may act in the offset process. They may act as
a negotiator, supporter, or comptroller.
Using various forms of leverage, recipient countries may be
active or an observer during offset negotiations. As an active negotiator, the
government increases the recipient firm's leverage towards supplier obligations,
labor unions, and others government agencies directly or indirectly involved. As an
observer negotiator, the government may share the expertise and experience in
negotiations, provide facilities and manpower in an Embassy, and help in legal
aspects.
The government support exercises considerable influence over
offset agreements. Some types of support include Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE), transportation using military aircraft, test and training facilities,
and tariff incentives.
^he 0MB report indicates an increasing foreign government intervention. In
a survey, the respondents pointed that the foreign government acted as a sole
negotiator in over 75% of all offset agreements.
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Recipient governments have various reasons to control the
offsets' fulfillment. Their concerns vary from trade control (export and import
licenses, tariffs, quotas, etc.) to technology transfer control (quality assurance,
technology choice, etc.).
Political and social pressures
The political and social pressures variable represents the level
of influence of the people of the nation and its institutions such as military,
technocrats, congress, industry, press and labor unions. In Brazil, the military has
taken the leading role primarily on issues relating to security. The success of the
Brazilian arms industry, where most companies belong to the state, gives the
military ministries total power in negotiating the acquisition and consequent offset
agreements. In the case of the aerospace industry the Aeronautics Ministry is
responsible for approving all major projects. The technocrats include some
ministries and some officials that work in the state-owned banks. Sometimes they
are involved in offsets but usually only by providing financing expertise due to their
international trade experience. In the Industry, the influence of manufacturers in
the offset decision-making process is fundamental, where their entrepreneurial,
technical and marketing experiences are the major contributions. Congress has
played a marginal role in deciding about offset agreements. Since 1964 until now
the Congress has been isolated from the process of decision that involves the
Brazilian arms industries. The Brazilian press has been just a channel of
publication of commercial and technological success reached through offsets, but
its influence seems to be a bias toward pro-national industry. For similar reasons
as the Congress, labor unions have been far away from the offset decisions. With
the ascendence of the Workers Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), perhaps
this sector will exercise more influence. Most of Brazil's population has been
absent from the offset analysis because they are absent from the industrialization
decision-making process'\
'^An excellent discussion about the decision-makers is found in Tollefson [Ref.
22]. Most of the information of this section was extracted from his thesis.
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• Military Factors
The military factor has a set of variables that exercises fundamental
weight during negotiations of military offsets. This factor is sorT>ewhat more intense
in countries such as Brazil, where the military seized power and governs the
country. Due to the abstract level of the folbwing variables, it was necessary to
establish some examples to clarify the concepts.
Industrial Defense
The Improvement and preservation of Indigenous arms
production capability has been considered essential for maintaining Brazil's
national security. The great interest of Brazil's Aeronautics Ministry is centered in
three new areas of technology that are developing in large projects. These areas
are: (1) computer engineering for projects of atmosphere-escaping airspace
vehicles (2) material science and engineering (resistance composites); and (3)
airspace engineering and science, that is propulsion energy conversion,
instrumentation and control of vehicles and systems, and airspace structures [Ref.
23]. With these technologies, the Brazilian arms industries will become more
powerful and competitively prepared. This very abstract variable measures the
potential benefit that the transfer of these or other competitive technologies brings
to overall aerospace industry.
International prestige
As developing countries' indigenous arms industries reach
certain technological capability, they become more and more politically
independent. This new "political power" is called international prestige. This
variable is seen when a foreign country psychologically perceives this "power"
when Brazil is Involved in offsets. Although It may seem too abstract, this variable
may be measured by the future arms exports which originate with the production
of a weapon made possible by technology obtained through an offset agreement.
Military Capability
One of the hypotheses about offsets is that they provide an
increase in the number of units that certain countries may afford, contributing to
improve their military capability. In the case of Brazil sometimes this Is not
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applicable. Although the Brazilian industries are producing most of the weapons
actually used by the Armed Forces, the services have not increased their
stockpiles in the same proportion. Instead, it is developing the productive
capability and technology to have weapons readily available whenever necessary
[Ret. 20: p. 73]. As a result, almost 90% of the production is destined for export
and only a small part is really absorbed nationally. In the aerospace sector, even
with an increasingly indigenous production of aircraft and missiles, the Air Force
seems to be the most technological dependent service in relation to "high-tech"
weapons. This variable measures the offset potential in improving the military
capability. Each case will be analyzed as to the real contribution made to
increased quality and quantity in the service arsenals, and not only the industrial
capability. One lesson from Malvinas war gives an example of how this variable
operates. The Brazilian Navy, impressed with the Exocet, not only pressed ahead
with plans to build an antimissile cannon, but also opened negotiations abroad to
purchase Exocets or similar missiles^.
Independence and Non-vulnerability
During recent years some developing countries have been
insistent upon increased transfers of technology in order to expand their
manufacturing capacity and reduce their dependence on foreign military
equipment. This variable measures the capacity of a recipient country to prevent
an embargo or other supplier attempts to restrict the type and quantity of arms
needed. Although none of the developing countries pretends to be totally
independent, their objective is to increase their bargaining leverage in acquiring the
weapons they need in the time, quality, and quantity wanted. Often the recipient
countries come to depend on package deals of spare parts, thereby making It
difficult to switch to alternative sources in time of conflict, especially if they are
relying on a single source of supply [Ref. 18:p. 168]. Another indirect approach in
"At this time, military research activities emphasized the development of various
types of missiles. SM-70 Barracuda, an anti-ship missile, is one of the projects
developed by AVIBRAS. See Chapter Four for more information.
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which offset exercises a major role is when Brazil exports arms to oil supplying
countries in exchange for petroleum, a rather important Brazilian vulnerability.
Brazil has presented one example of the importance of this variable, when it
established an autonomous military-industrial capacity, encouraged by successful
arms exports. The long standing administration campaign has been to nationalize
war material.
(2) Offset Outcome
For this thesis, the three possible offset outcomes are
considered as the dependent variables for the Brazilian offset cases". They are
presented below with some more detailed explanation. Each outcome will be rated
as high, medium, and low in terms of offset contribution to the overall benefit.
• Independent technological capability
This dependent variable, as an offset outcome, emphasizes not a country's
possession of advanced weaponry acquired from developed countries, but the
capacity to produce and sell it competitively. Not only the technological capacity
transferred through offsets is considered but also sufficient R&D capability to
keep aerospace products at a competitive technological quality. Therefore, this
variable argues that aerospace products and technology obtained through offsets
allied with indigenous R&D will result in new products and technologies which
may find uses in other industries.
The result of the spread of military technology to date has been to create a
hierarchy of states defined in terms of their capabilities [Ref. 25]. The range varies
from those capable of producing the whole spectrum of modern weapons and
those only with capacity to produce small conventional arms. Brazil is considered
at the middle range with some ambitions objectives in establishing foundations for
a broadly-based arms industry. A major component of Brazil's strategy is the
acquisition of technological know-how. Eventual independence in arms acquisition
can only be achieved by gaining direct physical control and knowledge of the
"These outcome variables were suggested originally by Moxon, et al. [Ref.
24:p. 205].
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production process [Ret. 20: p. 80]. The cases will indicate If the wanted objective
(independent technological capability) is really obtained with the offset agreement.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that this outcome is the main objective that
motivates Brazil toward offsets. One vigorous example of the importance of this
variable as an outcome is found in the high priority given to establishing a national
computer industry by the Brazilian government*'.
• National security capability
The national security concept in Brazil has been a constant function of threat
perception. Since the Brazilian military seized power in 1964 these concepts have
changed as the military definition of the mission changed. In the period between
1964-74 the two major objectives of the national security doctrine were security
and development ("Seguranga e Desenvolvimento"). However, in 1974, when
General Geisel became the president, the instruction changed to "less security and
more development". It meant less internal repression and more long term
investment in development. This phase inaugurated a period called "abertura",
which has moved the country toward a redemocratization [Ref. 20]. Before 1974,
the mission was "promoting rapid economic development and simultaneously
waging relentless war on the radical left", which was perceived as the primary
threat [Ref. 21]. This concept of internal security was held by successive military
administrations during the 1967-74 period when the subversion and "indirect
communist aggression" was the most likely conflict scenario for Brazil. Since the
early 1970s, three strategic images assumed critical importance for the Brazilian
military shift to an external threat perception. They were the confrontation
dimension of relations with Argentina, the globalization of Soviet military, and the
technological revolution in warfare. Some facts such as the Vietnam war, Soviet
intervention in Cuba and Angola, and the Malvinas war gave the Brazilian military
*°President Figueiredo's administration in 1979 set up the Special Secretary of
Informatics, Secretaria Especial de Informatica (SEI), to supervise the computer-
manufacturing sector; an army colonel headed the new agency, which was placed
under direction of the National Security Council.
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the evidence of failure on national defense concept that was based on "trusting in
the protection of allied powers". Suddenly Brazil discovered that it was alone.
These constant changes in the Brazilian military threat perception and military
mission as a consequence have been one of the major incentives for Brazilian
government improved aerospace and nuclear technologies, weapons
modernization, and military personnel and organizations. President Figueiredo
emphasized these in a December 1984 speech.
National defense calls for the top efficiency, and top efficiency
can be achieved only with full time dedication by those who
are in charge of it, with constant training, and with the mastery
of technology [Ref. 21].
The offset case outcomes will be analyzed as to their contribution to
improved national defense capability. One example of this concern in improved
national defense capability was in the mid-1970s, when Brazil and Germany
concluded a pact providing for complete transfer of nuclear technology to Brazil.
That agreement came just after widespread speculation over Argentina's nuclear
intentions [Ref. 20:p. 78].
• Economic Capability
Offsets fit into the increasingly prevalent ideology of bilaterism that
characterizes developing countries policy, calling for balanced trade on a country
by country basis [Ref. 5:p. 27]. This ideology may provide to public administrators
of these countries incentives to enter into formal bilateral-balancing arrangements
and offsets for balancing the payments. Balance of payments represents one of
main Brazil's main economic necessities*'. The obvious danger in this trend is that
^'Brazil's foreign debt of $120 billion and how and whether to pay is the most
pressing issue polarizing that country.
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It diminishes the potential of hard currency earnings of countries like Brazil, which
are already hard pressed to meet their debt-service commitments**. The economic
capacity is an important variable to measure the impact of aerospace products
exports and imports savings. The outcome expected under this title is an offset
agreement really contributing to improving the balance of payments. One example
of the success of this outcome has been the increasing sales of the Brazilian
designed trainer, Tucano, to various countries.
c. Institutional Opinions^
Some international institutions are concerned with the increase of
offset practice around the world. Specifically GATT, IMF and OECD opinions are
described below.
The GATT general agreement's fundamental objection to offset
agreements is that they undermine GATT's basic principles of nondiscrimination
and general prohibition of quantitative restrictions. It means that the general
agreement restricts bilateral arrangements between an importing and an exporting
country, and prohibits all measures, including quotas and import-export licenses,
that would restrict commercial flows between trading partners. While offsets may
not be illegal according to the wording of the GATT articles, their consequences
flout the spirit of the open, market-driven, and multilateral trading system which is
the basic reason for the general agreement's existence.
**Brazil is spending roughly 80% of Its export earnings to service its foreign
debt.
^'Most of the information about institutional opinions was extracted from
Verzariu [Ref. 26] and BIG [Ref. 5].
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The IMF's policy has resulted in consistent pressure by the Fund
on its members to reduce reliance on bilateral payment agreements. The IMF's
particular concern with offsets refers to potential restrictions by such practices on
payments and transfers for international transactions. These include impositions of
offsets, penalties or other costs, and blocking payments, it could be argued that
by conditioning indebted countries' balance-of-payments and trade In parity (i.e.,
by enhancing exports and reducing imports), the IMF Itself fosters offset Initiatives
intended by these countries to achieve such a goal.
OECD has been opposed on economic and trade-policy grounds
to mandatory east-west offset arrangements. The issue of east-west offset has
resulted in numerous OECD studies*^.
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONCEPT
Technology transfer in the modern worid is a complex phenomenon that may
be examined from a variety of perspectives. This section emphasizes the
technology transfer related to offsets.
1. Technology and Technology Transfer Concepts
Any discussion involving technology transfer must start with clear
concepts of technology. Without such concepts, the interrelationship between
technology and its dynamic movement cannot be fully understood.




The term technology has its origin from the Greek word techne"
which means an art or skill. Technology is defined most simply as knowledge.
More elaborately, technology is "any tool or technique, product or process,
physical equipment or method of doing or making, by which human capability is
extended" [Ref. 29]. This definition indicates clearly that technology is both
hardware, consisting of such elements as factories, equipmerrt, infrastructure,
software, or the nonmaterial components of the productive process, such as
education, experience, and organization. Knowledge required to use the hardware
to produce goods or sen/ices is an essential element of technology [Ref. 30]. This
thesis rests upon a definition of technology that categorizes it in terms of types of
knowledge that are outlined below** [Ref. 35]:
• General knowledge refers to information common to an industry, profession,
or trade. At one extreme this category includes such basic skills as
arithmetic, and at the other such specialized skills as blueprint reading, tool
design, and computer programming.
• System-specific knowledge refers to the information possessed by a firm
or individuals within a firm that differentiates each from its rival and gives a
firm Its competitive edge. Some of this specific information will have been
acquired through engaging in certain tasks or projects. It comprises
ingenious procedures connected with a particular system, solutions to unique
problems or requirements, and experiences unlike those encountered with
other systems. System-specific knowledge is when a firm, in manufacturing
an item, acquires information that is peculiar to that item. Were any other firm
to manufacture that item, it too would probably obtain the same technology.
• Firm-specific knowledge differs fi'om system-specific knowledge in that it
cannot be attributed to any specific item the firm produces. Firm-specific
knowledge results from the firm's overall activities. Some organizations
possess technical knowledge that goes beyond the general information
*^ese categories are chosen because of the close application in aerospace.
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possessed by the industry as a whole; another firm manufacturing the same
products would not necessarily acquire this same technology.
To Illustrate the differences among the three types of knowledge,
some information required for the manufacture of the F-5 aircraft is common to all
firms with an aircraft manufacturing capability; this is general knowledge. The
particular firm that manufactures the F-5 has acquired some specific Information
about this weapon system not possessed by other firms; this is system-specific
Icnowledge. Certain other technology is possessed by this producer that other
firms do not share, but which is not attributable to the F-5; this is the producer's
firm-specific knowledge.
b. Technology Transfer Concept
A precise definition of technology transfer is somewhat difficult to
obtain. The following are some definitions:
The process in which an innovation originating in one institution is
adopted elsewhere" [Ref. 31 :p. 31].
The simple act of obtaining information from external sources-in order
that It may speed up industrial development and at the same time
conserve its technical resources" [Ref. 32:p. 21].
Technology Transfer is the process of transferring, from the industry in
one country to another or between countries, technical information
relating to the design, engineering, manufacturing and production
techniques for hardware systems using recorded or documented
information of a scientific or technical nature. It normally does not
include the transfer of common reference documentation such as
military standards, specifications, handbooks or commercial
counterparts to these documents" [Ref. 30].
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Any definition of technology transfer will not be complete, without
the identification of the types of transfer^:
• Single Track: the use of an Item of superior technology in a established slot
in a going operation, with the transfer being accomplished without
modification.
• New Track: plugging the new technology into a whole new activity
established as a consequence of the transfer.
• Cross Track: transfer of the new technology to an activity or use for which
It was not originally designed. In cross track transfer, therefore, technology
must be adapted to a different set of conditions and purpx)ses than for which
it was designed.
• Vertical Transfer: an innovation is adopted within a social system or
institution -such as a nation, scientific discipline, corporation, or a government
agency. In the other words, It is the adoption of an innovation "through
ministries and other change agencies to firms".
• Horizontal Transfer: an innovation is adapted to a different application,
across system or institutional lines, or from country to country.
• Unplanned Transfer: a chance phenomenon - lack of premeditation on the
part of the transferor or the transferee - takes place. In the absence of
systematic and purposeful work, such a transfer goes relatively unnoticed
during the process.
• Planned Transfer: modern systematic acquisition and purposeful use of
foreign-developed technology for promoting technological change and
economic development. As opposed to the unplanned type, planned transfer
of technology is not the result of chance or accident.
The case studies analyzed deal with offset agreements that include
planned technology which theoretically benefits both the transferor and the
transferee, with special emphasis on the latter. In this thesis, transfer of technology
occurs when technology is transmitted, received, and applied.
**The identification of types was extracted from Singh [Ref. 11:p. 8].
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2. Technology and Trade
Technical knowledge has become an important item of international
trade. However, changes toward greater restriction in some developing countries
and less in others make the current international environment very turbulent. This
subsection addresses some developing countries' general orientations toward
foreign technology*\
Wallender stated that, prior to 1965, the developing countries focused on
general improvements In their GNP through both import substitution and export
promotion. However, at the same period, even with some countries showing
positive real GNP growth, they felt an "increasing sense of dependency" on the
developed countries for technologies and capital. A "new economic order" was
needed^.
Since the early 1970s various developing countries have been involved
in intergovernmental debates, exposing their direction and underlying strategies
towards development. Success of the OPEC cartel and the creation of the United
Nations (U.N.) organization specifically to cope with third world problems (the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD) helped the formation of a Third
World bloc**.
"^Most of this discussion came from Wallender [Ref. 33].
^^The term New International Economic Order (NIEO) represented the prevalent
idea in 1970s among third world countries. In part, it means an improvement of
third world countries power related to the transfer of technology to their countries.
**rhe UNCTAD group started with 77 countries and by the late 1960's It had
grown to 115 countries, when they establishing a formal declaration which
demanded the creation of a New International Economic Order.
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One of the principal objectives of this program was to increase the
bargaining power of the third world countries and to gain greater control over
multinational firms and how they transfer technology and capital to their countries.
Some specific objectives included:
• Reducing the social and economic costs of technology acquisition in the
Third World;
• Increasing the power of the third world governments and their productive
sectors in terms of choosing and acquiring appropriate technology;
• Establishing new institutions that would help governments take a more active
role in controlling and directing the technology and capital flows;
• Establishing means through which technology and capital could be more
efficiently diffused within the host (recipient) country after its initial transfer;
• Creating pressures to establish more research and development in the
developing countries; and
• Carrying out studies and programs that would help design model laws and
institutions that will force multinational firms into joint ventures with local
governments and local private sectors.
As a result of these programs, debates, and research projects, the new
power of the third world was established. By 1974, over 20 countries had enacted
specific legislation and created specific office's to control and direct foreign capital
and technology". The offices actions and regulations focused on lowering the
royalties paid for technology, forcing local participation in management and
ownership, and increasing the government capability to screen and direct foreign
activities within the nation. Most of the regulations were aimed primarily at
protecting the nation fi-om balance of payments impacts associated with
°°At this time, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) was created in
Brazil. Some of its functions will be discussed in the next chapter.
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technology transfer. Some countries including Brazil also began to stress joint
ventures and proscribed foreign participation in a variety of industries.
By the mid 1970s the more restrictive policies were reversed in a number
of countries. Some governments believed that certain nationalization programs had
gone too far in restricting foreign participation. A new orientation came and seems
to continue up to now. It is expressed by:
• Reducing the opportunity for 100% owned foreign ventures;
. increasing local orientation toward self help and internal
development of science and technology with less foreign assistance;
. an interest in acquiring and diversifying sources of foreign
technology;
. a focus on building local institutions for stimulating local science
and technology development rather than relying on free market
practices; and
. concern with geographically and demographically spreading the
benefits of industrialization and technology transfer.
In summary, Third World countries concerned with their dependency
status formed a block to establish a New International Economic Order that
regulates the transfer of technology from developed countries. This t>ackground
will be important to understand some of the regulations existing in Brazil concerned
with the transfer of technology, license agreements, and joint ventures. Although
in some countries these regulations are not applied to acquisition of military
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equipment or aircraft, some of the basic principles are intrinsically considered for
offset agreements.
3. The Application of Military Technology In Commercial Business"
Civil and military aerospace technology have shared the same airspace
and have lived in a symbiotic relationship, while each responds to its own set of
specifications. The close links between civil and military aerospace technology
raise a number of interesting questions about the application of military technology
in civil aviation or space-related activities. How is military technology transferred to
a civilian application? What kind of technology is being transferred? What's the
Government role in this aspect? This subsection concentrates on defining the
"spin-off' phenomenon and identifying some aspects of the contribution of this
phenomenon for an improvement of the recipient's choice of aerospace technology
transferred.
It must be clear that the objective here is not to conclude that this
phenomenon, most of the time underestimated in offset negotiations that involve
technology transfer, should be given total priority in developing countries decision-
making. The intention is to show some benefits of developed countries'
experiences in sharing military technology with commercial business".
"Most of the material for this discussion was extracted from Wells and
Waterman [Ref. 34]. Although they focus on space spinoffs, the discussion may
be applied to aerospace industry in general.
'^The secrecy of developing countries's sensitive military projects poses
tremendous obstacles to the transfer of technology from military research to the
private sector.
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Opinion is sharply divided on the value of aerospace technology to the
commercial economy. Aerospace enthusiasts exalt the benefits of "spin-offs" from
missile, space and aircraft programs. Skeptics points to errors in these claims and
maintain that "spin-ofT benefits have been and will t>e relatively minor.
Who is right? An answer is important to justify a representative part of
developing nations' resources committed to government military programs,
primarily to develop and produce military weapons as aircraft, missiles, and
rockets. Most people agree that such expenditures are essential to national
security and certain preeminence in air security. Most also agree that commercial
investments are essential for growth in the private sector. Therefore, it is
reasonable that the resources committed to aerospace programs should serve a
dual purpose by encouraging the transfer of the technology to commercial use
wherever possible [Ref. 34].
Spin-off is the phenomenon of technology transfer of military technology
to commercial purposes. It can be classified as tangible, using well defined
products, processes, or materials originally developed for military application, and
intangible, using the military scientific technology information. Intangible spin-offs
are far more important and can contribute to the invention of an entirely new
product, process, or material (e.g., plasma-jet). However, tangible spin-offs are
easier to identify and can act to make something more available or to reduce the
production cost (e.g., solar cell)".
'^This author argues that tangible spin-offs may be decreasing as the weapons
become more and more complex, and open a "technological gap" between military
and civilian technology.
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The aerospace technologies commonly involved in this phenomenon are
grouped in the following areas: Instrumentation, electronic components and
miscellaneous systems, control systems, power sources, propulsion, materials,
medical technology, telemetry and communications, packaging and shipping, and
management and control [Ret. 34].
The government role in fostering this process Is fundamental since often
it is the only entity that can afford the major cost of such military programs. Its
action should be related to centralizing the planning and direction of technology
and support programs that improve close relationship between defense industries
and other civilian producers.
In summary, the spin-off phenomenon and its importance and benefits
are not well known even in developed countries. Spin-offs alone should not be
used to justify large military programs. But given other needs, spin-offs can be
included as an important issue in the future recipient's choice of technology
embodied in offset agreements.
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Ill - GOVERNMENT OFFSET POLICIES
There are two different views about offsets. The recipients' view is that offsets
are an integral part of the sale itself rather than unrelated "compensation practices".
The opposite, suppliers' view is that offsets improve the overall value of the sale.
These conflicting views are useful in understanding how governments establish
bipolar offset policies.
The increasing use of offsets has motivated a lot of countries to set policies.
This chapter addresses some supplier and recipient offset policies, and includes
an overview of the Brazilian offset policy, with focus on the Aeronautics Ministry
offset policy.
A. SUPPLIER COUNTRY OFFSET POLICY
Supplier governments have difficulty in establishing an offset policy because
of competing group interests. Offsets for some defense industries are a nightmare
that seems to never end. For others, they are a very efficient way of getting
business. Further complicating the setting of policy is the fact that it is very difficult
to distinguish which industries have been successful in applying offsets as a
marketing tool, because they don't like to share the good or bad experiences with
other competitors. This subsection clarifies these issues by explaining the offset
policy of the United States.
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1. The U.S Government Offset Policy
According to the GAO, the U.S. has no comprehensive national policy
on the administration of offsets, there is little coordination among the agencies
studying offsets, no central data base exists on offset commitments, and complete
and accurate data on offsets are not otherwise readily available [Ref. 1:p. 9].
Although officials at the Office of Trade Representative generally agree
that such a policy is needed, they have not agreed on how it should be
administered and which agency should have the lead role.
Since 1978, the nearest statement of policy has been the Department of
Defense (DOD) memorandum (called the Duncan Memorandum) stating that: (1)
DOD will stay at arm's length in guaranteeing offsets unless industry is unable to
satisfy a foreign government's demand; and (2) FMS credits will not be used to
directly finance coproduction or licensed production abroad" [Ref. 2].
Prior to 1978, DOD negotiated equipment acquisitions which included
offset arrangements between U.S. defense equipment manufacturers and other
countries. However, after the Duncan Memorandum, DOD policy changed so that
DOD would not be involved in negotiating such arrangements unless they could
not be resolved otherwise. As a result, offsets are now negotiated directly between
the U.S. defense contractor and the procuring government, usually without DOD
commitments and involvement [Ref. 1].
**The more important exception of this rule was Israel's Lavi fighter project
where $200 million in FMS credits were approved for Phase I of the program.
Later, even the U.S. Congress considered the Israel situation as a precedent. For
more information of FMS assistance to Israel see U.S. Assistance to the State of
Israel . GAO/ID 83-51, 24 June 1983.
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The U.S. has been taking no active role in administering offset
transactions and therefore no agency comprehensively monitors offset activity.
Coordination of the administration of offsets, to the limited extent it exists, does not
involve departments such as Treasury and Commerce, which have major trade
policy interests in these transactions.
Reasons for adopting the existing policy included (1) the management
complexities and resource drain on DOD in negotiating and implementing offset
agreements; (2) such agreements had the effect, or created the impression, of
obligating the U.S. government to place orders for systems or components in
foreign countries or requiring DOD to force U.S. contractors to do so; (3) a
conviction that offset commitments were business judgements which should not
involve DOD; and (4) once commitments were made by industry, the U.S. defense
contractors, not DOD, should assume responsibility to the foreign government for
fulfilling the promised offset.
In March 1980, DOD restatement of this policy specifically asked NATO
to continue to rely on industry to arrange for efficient means of arms collaboration
on each sale. If industry is unable to satisfy any particular government's demands,
then government-to-government agreements involving offset may be considered.
At that time, as government officials said, there was no involvement concerning
technology transfer, impact on the U.S. industrial base, and other political,
economic and military concerns [Ref. 1].
This DOD policy is currently being reevaluated [Ref. 1]. Congressional
pressure resulted in the 1989 Defense Authorization Act, which requires the
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Secretary of Defense to consider the impact of a potential offset on the defense
industrial base, and solicits the views and recommendations of the Secretary of
Commerce prior to conclusion of any agreement relating to R & D and
procurement of foreign defense equipment [Ref. 3]. The first evidence of this policy
change was the U.S. and Korea agreement in relation to the Korean Fighter
Program (KFP). Korea was considering purchasing 120 aircraft, either McDonnell
Douglas F/A-18 Hornet or the General Dynamics F-16 Falcon. The sale was esti-
mated to be worth $2.5 billion and the Koreans asked for 100% offset in licensed
production, indirect offsets, and coproduction. The Secretary of Defense stated a
ceiling of 30%, reflecting a radical change in U.S. government policy [Ref. 4 and
5].
As stated before, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Treasury
have interests in these transactions since they administer credit and licensing
arrangements but are rarely consulted during DOD's review of U.S. defense
contractor compensation agreements. In military offsets, DOD has negotiated and
implemented them with little or no input from other agencies" [Ref. 1].
Some U.S. industry and agency officials believe that offset demands will
accelerate if the new administration doesn't react. Although in the case above this
policy seems appropriate, they continue to be concerned with the competition and
consequent loss of sales by U.S. industries. As they said before, they think that the
*Very similar problems occur in the Brazilian government, where the trade
department and other agencies have not been active in the export of Brazilian-
made arms and technology [Ref. 1].
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U.S. government should negotiate multilateral agreements, instead of taking a
unilateral position to remove offsets from military sales.
B. RECIPIENT COUNTRY OFFSET POLICY
Recipient governments have established a wide variety of specific offset
policies. They depend on previous experience with negotiating offsets, national
objectives and interests, and the perception of the benefits gained from offsets.
The recipient country normally starts Its offset policy through indirect offsets
(short-term policy) and then puts emphasis on direct offsets (long-term policy). The
latter type brings long term benefits, creating an industry and manufacturing plant
[Ref. 6].
Customer demands for offsets stem by-and-large not from the defense
industries of the recipient countries but directly from their governments.
Purchasing countries generally administer these programs through their
defense or economics ministries; sometimes there is interagency group set
up to administrative offset contracts [Ref. 7].
In this subsection, three examples of different offset policies from different
countries levels are presented with different objectives in mind. Although they
present some differences, some similarities are perceived such as their interest in
competitive technology, maintenance of employment, and savings of hard
currency.
1. British Offset Polio/*
The most recent large offset agreement involved the sale of the Boeing
E-3A AWACS system to U.K. and France. The AWACS deal with the U.K. involves
56
All this information was extracted from Clifton [Ref. 8].
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seven aircraft worth more than $1.5 billion in 1986 dollars and a huge offset of
130% offered by Boeing, to be fulfilled over eight years.
Offsets are a British Ministry of Defense (MoD) requirement If the deal
meets MoD criteria. Current procurement policies of the MoD are guided by two
basic and simple but profound principles: value for money and competition in the
marketplace. These principles direct the following objectives and policies:
Any offset figure or percentage is specified, but ideally seeks 100% of the full
contract value;
The major objective of offset requirements is to expand and strengthen the
British high technology industrial base;
A large proportion of the work should be high technology, to develop the
capability of U.K. companies in new technologies or new techniques;
The period for implementation should be as short as possible at least within
the delivery time for the deal that triggered the offset;
All offset orders are to be competitive; open competition that returns best
overall value for money to the MoD;
The offset agreement is evaluated twice yearly by Defense Export Services
Organization (DESO) through reports submitted by the supplier; and
Previous contracts awarded receive offset credit.
2. Australian Government Offset Program"
It is a firm requirement of the Australian government that offsets be
directed back to the Australian manufacturing industry by an overseas supplier
who receives a major order for equipment and services.
"Most of the information was extracted from Business International Corporation
[Ref. 9].
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The offsets program is part of the general policy for development of a
more specialized, efficient export competitive manufacturing industry. It seeks to
secure a workload which will broaden the capabilities of the industries that are of
technological or defense significance to Australia and stimulate technological
advancement. It also aims to provide new employment opportunities within
Australian industry.
The policy appHes to all Commonwealth departments and authorities for
all types of contracts for goods and services and in any area where there is
government involvement in purchase decisions. Here are some criteria for
application of offset policy and procedures:
• The value of offset required in each instance is at least 30% of the net tender
price (i.e., excluding the value of Australian content not covered by the offsets
proposal offered as part of the tender);
• All contracts for purchase or lease valued at $1 million or more with a
minimum of a $500,000 imported content come within the scope of the offsets
policy;
• The government offsets authority, in conjunction with the demanding
authority, is responsible for determining the technical nature and scope of an
acceptable offsets arrangement and providing advice regarding the
acceptability of offset offers to the purchasing authority;
• Once an offsets proposal or commitment has been approved by the
Interdepartmental Committee on Offsets (IDC Offsets), or the Offsets section,
as appropriate, the purchasing authority will be advised accordingly. No
contract can be entered into with any tendered unless their offsets proposal
has been accepted; and
• Offsets achievements in excess of the contracted figure will be recorded and
may be applied as credit against future government purchases.
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3. Indonesia Countertrade Experience^
Indonesia was the first country to develop a countertrade policy in Asia
in the late 1970s. Indonesia chose a countertrade policy over other economic
tactics -- such as reducing imports or cutting back on development plans -- in
order to meet economic and political pressures that were facing the government
in late 1981. In January 1982, the Ministry of Trade formally promulgated
"guidelines for the implementation of linking government import procurement with
Indonesian non-petroleum exports". Since then Indonesia has rapidly acquired a
reputation as a country with one of the world's most stringent countertrade
policies. As a result, selling to the country's public sector has become very difficuft
for foreign firms that are not in a position to find markets for the limited range of
countertrade products.
The countertrade policy provided for the following:
• Procurement in excess of 500 million rupiah (about $500,000), financed from
State Budget or export credits, must be linked to exports. This applies to
procurement by Departments, Non-Departmental Government Institutions,
and State-owned enterprises;
• The Department of Trade and Cooperatives will periodically issue a list of
eligible export^ products and a list of exporters and commodity associations.
Foreign suppliers may chose one or several goods from the list;
• The value of Indonesian exports must equal the value of government
procurement (100% linkage). The value of the contract for the government
is to be stated on an F.O.B. basis. The price used in calculation will be the
price of the commodity at the time of signing the contract.
"Most of the information was extracted from Maynard [Refs. 10 and 11] and
Business International Corporation [Ref. 9].
"Export commodities linked to procurement are agricultural commodities,
industrial goods, and other goods, excluding oil and natural gas.
69
• Exports must be directly channeled to the country from which procurement
is being made. Exports to a third country are permitted only if this establishes
a new market for that product;
• All contract bidders must sign a letter of obligation to participate in
countertrade. Winners must submit a Letter of Undertaking, which legally
binds them to make the required exports. The Department of Trade in
cooperation with the commodity associations will monitor the implementation
thereof;
• Export contracts must be completed prior to completion of government
imports. Final payment to the foreign supplier will be made after the export
obligation is realized; and
• Foreign suppliers are held responsible for compliance. A penalty (equal to
50% of the value of the portion of exports which have not been purchased)
will be assessed for noncompliance.
4. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of an offset policy is very difficult to measure for
several reasons. First, it is a new and growing element in international trade and
not completely understood. Also, the long period of offset agreements
implementation obfuscates any attempt in measure their impact. Finally, it is more
difficult for recipient governments to follow up indirect offsets implementation
because they cover such a broad range of activities [Ref. 6].
C. BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT OFFSET POLICY
This section discusses basic issues of the Brazilian government trade and
technology transfer policies and discusses the offset regulations of the Aeronautics
Ministry (MAER).
Offset in Brazil is not yet well institutionalized. Even the term is not completely
understood among government officials, industries, and trading companies. Within
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the MAER, offset is understood in its limited concept of counterpurchase. Despite
this general conceptual problem, the Brazilian government, specifically the MAER,
has been requiring and controlling various agreements that involve countertrade,
licensed production, coproduction, and primarily technology transfer. The MAER
experience in negotiating various types of offset agreements is a result of a
constant exchange of offset and technology transfer sectoral policies from other
Brazilian government agencies responsible for overseeing different industrial
sectors.
With the major exception of Brazil, virtually every country in Latin America has
an official federal policy calling for offset and countertrade on major transactions
[Ref. 12:p. 106]. Even without this unique official policy, Brazil has directed some
selected offset transactions based on a set of scattered and pertinent regulations.
In the following subsections, an attempt is made to condense several policies that
affect directly or indirectly the aerospace industry into one "hypothetical" national
offset policy. The pioneering effort of the MAER in issuing an official offset policy
on a sectorial basis is also discussed.
1. Trade policy
The Brazilian trade policy has been subordinated to a strictly financial
policy that results in the Brazilian market being one of the most restricted and self-
sufficient in the world*. This policy is characterized by a restrictive import licensing
regime, prohibited list of imports, exports incentives, market reserve, severe
"Brazilian decision-makers argue that this control is necessary to foster
indigenous technological growth and boost exports to service the debt [Ref. 13].
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restrictions on the import of goods which contain microprocessor technology and
considerable tariff, non-tariff, and bureaucratic hurdles [Ref. 13:p. 4]. It is important
to recognize that offsets are a relatively small part of the overall trade policy. It is
not easy to negotiate an offset for a $110 million contract of satellite launcher
service if the major concern right now is signing a $3.6 billion rescheduling loan"'.
This subsection describes five main issues of Brazilian Government trade policy
that indirectly is related to aerospace industry.
a. Offset Status
Despite persistent rumors that the Brazilian government is issuing
specific regulations requiring offsets, recent interviews with Brazilian government
officials indicate that this situation is somewhat complex®^. It is unlikely that Brazil
will opt for mandatory offsets on the Indonesian model, opting instead for treating
offsets on an ad hoc basis. However, in the public sector^, an increased utilization
of countertrade by the large state-owned enterprises and trading companies such
^'Brazil has $120 billion external debt, inflation was 25% during June 1989, and
totaled 964% a year. See "Brazil skips a payment of interest", Washington Post . 6
July 1989.
^he complexities involved in formulating a national policy for offsets was
discussed in one telephone conversation with CACEX (Brazilian trade department),
when it was confirmed that this topic has been hardly debated by the Brazilian
government, and no short-term solution seems to have been reached.
**There is a clear distinction not only in offset policies but in other policies
between private and public sectors in Brazil. The public sector is regulated by
different legislation providing various incentives, protection and subsidies that the
private sector does not have.
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INTERBRAS is expected . An increase is also expected in government-to-
government accords that provide for the barter of needed raw materials and oil for
Brazilian commodities and manufactured products [Ref. 9:p. 197].
The Brazilian government initiatives in fostering offsets are
constrained, in large measure, by two factors. First, the IMF has taken a strong
position against barter and countertrade and is using its leverage to limit the
practice in Brazil. Second, these officials believe that barter and countertrade could
hurt the Brazilian economy"[Ref. 9:p. 198].
Although CACEX, the prime government arbiter for all import
licenses, has not formally sanctioned countertrade as a legitimate method of
international business, it has made known that it will consider import license
applications arising from such transactions^. CACEX will be more disposed to
approve deals that involve such high-priority imports as petroleum, health care,
"INTERBRAS is the giant trading company subsidiary of PETROBRAS, the
government-run oil corporation. It exports everything from agricultural commodities
and shoes to machinery and petrochemicals. The INTERBRAS network has 19
branch offices around the world and had exports topping some $3 billion in 1983
[Ref. 9:p. 28].
^Brazil has entered into long term clearing accords (see Chapter Five on
countertrade section for definition) with a number of Eastern Europe countries
and found that it has shipped some $2 billion more in Brazilian commodities to
those countries than it can generally buy from that area. This is a difficult position
since it cannot get paid in cash for Brazilian deliveries nor can it find usable
countertrade goods. This creates a lot of unclear thinking about offsets in Brazil.
^his research identified law No. 1807 of January 7, 1953 that prohibited
CACEX from granting licenses for certain barter transactions. This law provides
CACEX with power to look at private sector countertrade commitments on a case-
by-case basis.
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scientific instrumentation, and in the case of the export occuring prior to import
(See "advance purchase" in Chapter Five in the coutertrade section).
Another reason for a more favorable view of offset negotiations in
Brazil is its utilization by multinational companies as a vehicle for repatriating
blocked funds - whether profits and dividends or capital assets. To operationalize
this mechanism, the multinational company has to buy products in cruzados and
export them as offset goods, keeping the hard currency proceeds abroad [Ref.
9:p. 201].
Several major countertrade deals have been made recently in the
Brazilian aerospace industry:
• Brazil asked bidders on a $130 million space satellite contract for pledges to
export Brazilian goods. Canada's Spar Aerospace won the contract jointly
with Hughes Aircraft [Ref. 9:p. 199];
• EMBRAER negotiated with small U.S. airlines to sell six to twelve Bandeirante
commuter planes. To obtain financing, EMBRAER has asked its U.S.
suppliers, which provide some of the equipment for the Bandeirante, to import
parts and components from EMBRAER. According to the president of
EMBRAER, the firm obtained the financing it needed by convincing its
prospective customers to ask regional banks to participate in the financing
arrangements. The firm also set up a leasing operation through its U.S.
subsidiary [Ref. 9:p. 198].
b. Export Incentives
Since the mid-1960s, Brazilian economic policy has tried to increase
the export orientation of the industrial sector in order to relax the foreign exchange
constraint faced by the country and to reduce the dependency on exports of a
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small number of commodities. These efforts has been relatively successfur.
However, the outcome has been a result of vigorous export incentives to achieve
a moderate percentage of exports in the total manufactured output [Ref. 14:p. 53].
The Brazilian government offers various fiscal and financial incentives for the
aerospace manufacturers who export their products". None of these incentives is
specific to the aerospace industry. The examples will give an idea of the extent of
Brazilian aerospace industry utilization of these incentives.
The fiscal Incentives group is represented by tax incentives and tax
exemptions. They include the following series of tax benefits for the producer of
export goods:
• Corporate Income Tax -- exporters of manufactured products may reduce
their taxable income by the same proportion that export sales bear to total
sales. In 1987, EMBRAER exported $332.6 million of a total sales of $474.5.
It means, 70.1% of total sales was due to exports. The total net profit in this
year was $12.9 million and $9.1 million (70.1% of net profit) was the reduction
that EMBRAER was credited with.
• Tax on foreign remittances - remittances of earnings abroad are subject to
a 25% withholding tax but this amount may be reduced or refunded in
amounts equal to an exporter's expenses for commissions, discount fees,
advertising, international fairs, etc. EMBRAER may have a refund for
expenses in the International Fair of Le Bourget, France.
• Drawbacks -- the drawback system authorizes exemptions, suspensions or
refunds for exported goods of the duties initially paid for imported raw
^From 1965 to 1980, exports of industrial products grew from 17.8% to 56.5%
(about 40 times) of 1980's total $20.1 billion in exports [Ref. 14:p. 53]. Recent data
show that Brazilian exports are booming, having jumped from just over $26 billion
in 1987 to $34 billion in 1988 [Ref. 13], and industrial products in 1987 were 68.7%
of total exports (this last percentage figure was calculated from Conjuntura
Economica magazine).
^he idea of these incentives has been to compensate the loss of
competitiveness resulting from the fluctuation of cruzados in real terms.
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materials, parts and components. This arrangement also permits exemption
or refunds of the ICM tax (tax on the Circulation of Merchandise) paid on
such goods. Special legislation would even allow the duty-free importation of
an entire factory into the nation, as long as its output is designated for export.
EMBRAER enjoys exemptions of all taxes and duties which are based on the
importation of raw materials, components, and equipments".
• Miscellaneous taxes -- operations connected with exports are exempt form
lOF tax (tax on financial operations) which is tax imposed on the purchase
of foreign exchange. In addition, international transport services are exempt
from tax on transportation services and from social security contributions, as
well as the tax on fuels when destined for export or for supplying foreign or
national ships on international trips (the same example from previous tax
benefit is related to the lOF tax).
The financial Incentives offered by the Brazilian government may
be divided in two categories:
• Credits, guarantees and insurance . As some other developed countries, the
Brazilian government through CACEX has offered exporters insurance
against risks such as expropriation, inconvertibility of currency, war, revolution
or insurrection.
• Export credit . The Export Financing Fund, Fundo de Financiamento para
Exportacao - FINEX, managed by the Central Bank but autonomously
operated by CACEX may take the form of direct financing, loans to foreign
importers of Brazilian goods, below-market financing to manufacturers for
production of export goods, and funds for market research and
development^". One famous example of the foreign reaction of this incentive
was the Bandeirante case in the U.S. Although EMBRAER Bandeirante aircraft
were welcomed by owners of regional U.S. airlines, some Canadian and U.S.
manufacturers of similar aircraft began complaining in 1981 of the low interest
rates (7.5% to 9%) and long repayment periods (7-8 years) being offered by
EMBRAER to its customers, at a time when loans in North America were
being offered at 12.5 to 22% with 5-6 years to repay. The U.S. Fairchild
'^his exemption was given in the same Decree law when EMBRAER was
created in 1969 (see Chapter Four, subsection on government and industry
relationship).
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Brazilian law also authorizes and heavily supports trading companies to act
as intermediaries between buyers and sellers to facilitate the movement of goods
and to develop foreign markets. Such companies also enjoy a number of tax
exemptions and reductions [Ref. 15:p. 188].
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Swearingen Corporation considered the situation so detrimental to its U.S.
sales that it filed a countervailing duty petition with the U.S. International
Trade Commission on August 13, 1982"'. On September 21, 1982 the
Commission voted, saying that there was no reasonable indication that an
industry in the U.S. was materially injured or was threatened with material
injury by reason of imports from Brazil commuter airplanes^.72
c. BEFIEX Program
Companies which accept a long term commitment (more than 10
years) to export a stipulated portion of their production may qualify for the special
incentives granted by the Commission for Fiscal Incentives for Special Export
Programs, Comissao de Beneficios Fiscais e Programas Especiais de Exportagao -
BEFIEX. This program allows the rebate of tariff and taxes imports of raw materials
and components when those items are used in manufactured products destined
for export. Incentives available under this program include a 70% to 90% reduction
in importation duties or tax reduction^^ on imported machinery and equipment and
50% on imported raw material, components and intermediate parts. Profits
attributable to exports may be totally exempted from income tax, and any losses
of such firms may be carried forward for an extra two years. BEFIEX firms also
qualify for accelerated depreciation for domestically produced machinery
purchases. Although EMBRAER and other aerospace industries do not seem to
^'Fairchild alleged that these export incentives constituted an export subsidy.
^In May 4, 1982, the EMBRAER chairman eng. Ozires Silva defended Brazilian
trade procedures at a Aviation/Space Writers Association Conference in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida in a speech entitled "Manufacturing Aircraft In Brazil - some fair
trade issues" [Ref. 16].
"After the U.S. complaints that IPI credit was an export subsidy in violation of
GATT agreement, Brazil eliminated the IPI "credit premium" for BEFIEX program in
April 1985.
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use this benefit, its impact in other industries seems to be quite large. Actually
more than 400 firms have BEFIEX contracts with $87 billion in export commitments
over the life of the contracts [Ref. 17].
d. Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and GATTAgreement
Export subsidies can be subject to retaliatory sanctions under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of which Brazil is a member^^ A
countervailing duty is a charge imposed by an importing nation upon goods
subsidized by the country of origin; such duty is intended to offset the "unfair
advantage" the foreign items, as a result of the subsidy, would have over similar
domestic products [Ref. 18]. The Subsidies Code recognizes that subsidies are an
integral part of many development programs and asserts that the developing
nations are not subject to any retaliatory action for simply granting export subsidies
[Ref. 18]. In this case, Brazilian domestic subsidies such as government grants,
loans, and guarantees are not considered subsidies under this Code.
Specifically in aircraft trade, the U.S. government and the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association and its members, would like to see the Brazilian
Government sign the GATT agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and eliminate the
20% tariff on general aviation aircraft^^ as well as a 7% tariff on all other aircraft and
^*See the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing duties, GATT April 12, 1979
(Subsidies Code). The prohibition on export subsidies does not apply to domestic
subsidies [Ref. 18].
^'This tariff rate was established in 1975 (see the Piper case in Chapter Five)
and remained 50% until 1986 and then was reduced to 20%. Recent reports shows
that the Brazilian government is dropping import duties on aircraft components.
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a 5% duty on parts and components for the aircraft industry [Ret. 19:p. 11]. The
U.S. is investigating Brazilian subsidies during numerous countervailing duty
investigations. Under this pressure Brazil has lowered the subsidization level.
e. Trade Barriers
Virtually all Brazilian imports require an export license from CACEX.
This import licensing process serves to implement and control restrictive programs.
Although the "New Industrialization Policy" (NIP) promulgated in May 1988 makes
licenses more likely, CACEX still retains discretionary power to delay or deny
import permission for a wide range of products^^
The "law of similars" is a protectionism law (actually a collection of
laws and regulations) that denies an import license to products "similar" to
competing products produced or capable of being produced in Brazil. Although the
law ("buy national") requires the similarity test only if the importer is a government
controlled entity or seeks government benefits or incentives, CACEX actually
applies this test to an estimated 90% of Brazilian machinery and capital good
imports. Theoretically, government agencies may purchase an imported item if the
price of the national good is at least 15% higher than that of the import. However
^^he NIP aims to modernize Brazilian industry through a departure from the
import substitution model that no longer attracts investment, produces indigenous
technological capacity, or encourages industrial productivity and efficiency. The
new stated objectives are (1) Increase the efficiency, productivity, and
competitiveness of Brazilian industry, (2) increase Brazil's autonomous
technological development and (3) reduce progressively the dependence on
government stimulation of industry. To implement these goals, the Brazilian
government is reforming the tariff structure, simplifying the import of 3000 products,
and restructuring the fiscal and financial benefits to industry [Ref. 13].
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political pressures make it virtually impossible for government agencies to purchase
foreign goods if a domestic product is available.
Brazil has been accused by the U.S. of unfair trade. In 1988, the
Trade and Competitiveness Law was approved in the U.S. revealing the new spirit
of the U.S. government in solving this controversy unilaterally. The Super 301, a
new name of this U.S. trade law, sanctioned Brazil, India and Japan based on
charges of unfair trade. These three countries refused to submit to a bilateral
"negotiation" under the terms of the Super 301 clause. Brazilian officials said that
the trade restrictions adopted by Brazil are acceptable under international law in
view of the serious problem existing in its balance of payments [Ref. 20]. As a
result of these actions, aerospace industries in both countries are concerned with
the future consequences of this conflict. EMBRAER has in the U.S. an excellent
market for the Brasilia aircraft. Hughes, concerned about losing the bid for the two
new Brazilian satellites, asked for some U.S. official support to ameliorate the
negotiation climate^ [Ref. 23].
In summary, Brazil does not have an official offset policy that
regulates the most expensive imports. A summary of various trade laws,
regulations, barriers, and incentives shows a complicated international trade
environment in Brazil that parallels the economic situation. The Brazilian
"^As a part of section 301, in October 30, 1982, the U.S. President ordered
retaliation and imposed a 100% "ad valorem" tariff against $39 million in Brazilian
goods. The matter has been discussed under the GATT settlement procedures
[Ref. 17].
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government has been accused of unfair trade, and developed countries have
applied serious measures of retaliation.
2. Technology Transfer Policy
Among Latin American countries Brazil has given the most explicit
attention to the role of technology in economic development and to the stimulation
of technological development through government policy. The purpose of this
subsection is to provide a summary review of the main aspects of Brazilian
technology policy, particularly as regards the aerospace industry sector. In the next
chapter, the specific strategies and policies of the Aeronautics Ministry to foster
technology will be discussed. The main policies affecting technological
development in the case of Brazil are grouped in the following three headings^*.
a. Development of Technological Infrastnjcture
Before 1968 most of the effort in this area focused on institution
building and human resource development. The period between 1920 and 1950
was characterized by the creation of various Research and Development (R & D)
institutions in engineering and the sciences, including the Aerospace Technology
Center (CTA)^® in 1954. The primary objective in this period was to stimulate and
finance the development of high-level resources in order to strengthen Science and
Technology (S & T) capability, particularly in the universities and in research and
development institutions [Ref. 14:p. 95].
^*The idea of dividing this discussion into these headings is derived from the
World Bank Country Study [Ref. 14:p. 95].
™See Chapter Five for a more detailed explanation of this Center's activities in




scientific development became a specific policy
objective. The 1968-69 Development Plan, Programa Estrategico de
Desenvolvimento (PED), defined an explicit policy for S & T for the first time at the
federal level*^. Although there were some important differences in the priorities of
the PED and those of subsequent plans, the program of action and institutional
structure then established for planning have been maintained [Ref. 14:p. 96].
In the industrial sector, the most important development was the
creation of the Secretaria de Tecnologia Industrial (STI) of the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce (MIC) in 1972. It was the first sectoral S & T unit to be established
within a ministry, in the civilian sector [Ref. 14:p. 98].
b. Regulation of technology Imports
The strategy towards imports of foreign technology is a key element
of technology policy in developing countries. This includes not only specific policies
on the importation of disembodied technology (such as licenses and technical
services) but also those relating to the inflow of foreign investment and to the
control of imports of technology embodied in capital goods [Ref. 14:p. 98].
Since 1971, the National Institute of Industrial Property, Institute
Nacional de Propriedade Industrial - INPI, has been assigned to regulate the
incoming flow of technology assuming that such know-how is effectively utilized.
Initially INPI sought to: (1) evaluate whether the technology should be imported; (2)
""Among specific development strategies were the construction of a strong
industrial base, absorption of foreign capital, technology and managerial capacity,
modern industrial technology to increase competitiveness, creation and adaptation
of technology and open new markets for manufactured exports [Ref. 15:p. 182].
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reduce the cost of the imported technology by strengthening the bargaining
position of the local licensee; (3) eliminate clauses restricting the local absorption
and dissemination of the imported technology; and (4) favor the importation of
technology rather than capital goods. In 1975, INPI issued a policy statement
establishing the norms and concepts for the regulation and approval of technology
transfer agreements. Specifically, INPI is responsible by law for the registration of
patents and trademarks owned by foreigners and the approval of import licenses
that involve the technology transfer and patent and trademarks licensed
agreements that utilizes foreign technical assistance [Ref. 15:p. 190]. Each type of
agreement must be registered, terms and payments authorized, and various
special provisions depending on the type of contract. The main expansion from the
previous regulations consisted in making transfer conditional upon absorption of
technology by recipient firms. This is implemented by demanding full disclosure of
technical knowledge by the suppliers of the technology, and by the requirement
that the recipient firms present plans for the absorption of the technology and for
the local personnel training.
The impact of INPI's attempts to control the imports of technology
and to develop the technological capability of the importing firms seems quite
large. However, despite this control and regulation, it seems that most of the
military technology transferred to the aerospace industry only involves the military
ministries. Some complaints from various people involved in the technology transfer
with respect to INPI are that it is too bureaucratic, has an insufficient number of
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personnel for its large regulatory task, and is more worried about reducing the
outflow of foreign exchange than with technological development [Ref. 14:p. 100].
c. Development of Technological Capabilities
The Brazilian government support in the technology area can be
grouped in two categories: direct and indirect. The direct government programs
are divided in four categories:
(1) Direct Financial Assistance
The main instrument used in Brazil to encourage the
development of technological capability has been the provision of subsidized
financing by FUNTEC and FINER. FUNTEC was created based on previous
experience with large investment programs which were identified with strong
technological dependence with respect to product, process, and project
engineering. To ameliorate this problem, FUNTEC supported the development of
human capital in S & T disciplines, stimulated and supported research and
innovation by local industry, and adapted imported technology to local conditions.
FUNTEC activities are funding postgraduate training for scientists and engineers,
strengthening the Subprogram on the Demand and Utilization of Technology to
stimulate R&D, and the Subprogram for Generation and Supply of Technology to
attract research institutions and universities to participate more directly with the
firms' efforts [Ref. 15:p. 184].
(2) Direct Tectinicai Assistance
FINER has a program to strengthen the capacity of national
consulting firms to assist the development of new techniques [Ref. 15:p. 186].
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(3) Scientific and Teclinological Information
The National System of Scientific Information, under the
Conselho de Nacional Pesquisas (CNPq), is committed to information services
which enable Brazilian industry and government agencies to obtain current data on
technology developments in their fields [Ref. 15:p. 186].
(4) Direct Researcli and Development Programs
The Brazilian government's development programs are being
counted on to increase indigenous technological capabilities with locally developed
know-how [Ref. 15:p. 186].
The Brazilian government's indirect programs are basically
three: (1) a program to strengthen the financial position of the Brazilian firm (capital
funding); (2) measures to stimulate domestic and foreign market demand
(utilization of government procurement); and (3) programs to establish standards
and norms (certification of product quality standards by INMETRO - National
Institute for Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality).
Summing up, the Brazilian government has been developing
since the mid-1 960s various technical and financial incentives to foster the research
and development of indigenous technology and to facilitate the transfer and
absorption of foreign technology. A plethora of laws has been created to control
and channel the technology transfer process. The tasked agency, INPI, has not
assumed a fixed methodology in approving technology transfer and licensed
production agreements. Finally, the transfer of military technology seems to
bypass all these bureaucratic processes [Ref. 15:p. 187].
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3. Brazilian Aeronautics Ministry Offset Folic/'
The Brazilian government's first initiative in issuing regulations regarding
offset policy" was through the Aeronautics Ministry (MAER). There are various
reasons for this pioneerism. First, the Aeronautics Ministry was particularly
concerned in establishing an overall policy that involved both the Department of
Civilian Aviation (DAC) and the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), as well as EMBRAER,
CELMA, and INFRAERO, which produce aircraft, aircraft engine parts, and air
traffic control, respectively". Second, perhaps the Air Force is still concerned with
technology dependence for the development of the military aerospace industry".
Finally, there was a great deal of previous experience obtained in foreign
acquisition of jet aircraft, significant participation in international license and
coproduction agreements, and the establishment of Brazilian Aeronautical
Commissions in Washington and London.
^'This subsection is based on the author's own experience in the Brazilian Air
Force and with the regulations cited throughout the text of this subsection.
*^his is a sectoral policy applied more for general aviation. An interview with
the MacDonnell Douglas Co. department of offset and countertrade brought
attention to one curious detail. Brazil, as different from other countries, initiated
official offset polices for civilian offsets, whereas other recipient countries,
concerned with GATT agreement transgression, regulated only military offsets.
"The Brazilian Aeronautics Ministry controls the Brazilian Air Force, Department
of Civilian Aviation, and has majority control over preferred shares of three state-
owned companies: EMBRAER, CELMA, and INFRAERO. For more detailed
explanation, see Chapter Three.
*^here is no intention to discuss the other services' technology dependence.
Ellis offers discussion about the Brazilian Navy technology dependence [Ref. 22].
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The MAER's regulations about offset were recently published, although they
represent an aggregate experience from previous regulations since 1981 . The first
regulation is Portaria*" No. 434/DGAC of Dec. 14, 1988 that prescribes
requirements for planning technical controlling and commercial offset of Civil
Aviation Renewal Programs. The second regulation is called Portaria No. 230/GM4
of April 6, 1989 that establishes the need of including offset clauses in contracts of
acquisition of aeronautics engines and accessories by FAB, airlines, and
EMBRAER, with the objective of manufacturing spare parts, assembly, and test of
this equipment inside the country.
a. Aeronautics Ministry Offset Program
To understand the MAER offset program we need a background to
the DAC and its responsibility in controlling the Civilian Aviation in Brazil. Since the
creation of MAER in 1941 , the Aeronautics ministry has supervised the Department
of Civilian Aviation (DAC). In 1981, a Decree-law created a commission called
Comissao de Coordenagao do Transporte Aereo Civil - COTAC, under the general
Director of DAC. COTAC is responsible for proposing to other government
agencies technical, economic and financial measures for the harmonious
development of the civilian aero-transportation industry programs, and following-
up and supervising the execution of these programs".
^Portaria is a regulation issued by Brazilian government ministries.
66r
Every importation of aircraft shall be approved by COTAC which is also
responsible for giving the prefix of the aircraft to be operated in Brazilian airspace.
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A new COTAC restructured in 1987 integrates representatives of the
Central Bank (director of external area), CACEX (trade department under Bank of
Brazil), and other departments of MAER, including CTA/lpr. Since 1981, one of
the functions of this commission has been requiring offset clauses in major general
aviation acquisitions.
Due to administrative problems, lack of publicity of offset policy, and
primarily no establishment of an effective instrument of control, the offset policy
was not successful. Some government officials estimate that about $200 million
was lost in export opportunities^. Another critical reason for this failure was the
incapacity of the Brazilian aircraft industry to provide products and services with
international quality to satisfy the suppliers' demand in counterpurchase contracts.
In December 1988, DAC issued regulations establishing mandatory
offsets for general aircraft imported by Brazilian operators. Here are some policies
and procedures extracted from this regulation^:
• All aircraft"' importation and contracts for major services abroad are subject
to commercial offset obligations to be fulfilled following the final steps of the
negotiations.
• The final phase of the negotiations between operators and foreign aircraft and
services suppliers shall be forwarded to DAC through a Purchase Program
*^See acronym meanings in Appendix A.
'^This author's estimate is about 10% of the total aircraft imports from 1980-
1986.
^The translation of the original regulation from Portuguese is entirely the
author's responsibility.
"This may include expensive aeronautical parts, such as replacement engines,
ramp equipments, simulators and others, at DAC's discretion.
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Communication (Comunicagao de Programa de Aquisigao - CPA) containing:
object, quantity, delivery time, value, nature, and other basic elements of
contracting.
• To comply with the CPA, the Commercial Offset Commission (Subcomissao
de Compensagao Comercial - SCC) will issue the offset program defining
percentages, deliveries, and specific conditions.
• The commercial offset programs are applicable to the aircraft's negotiations,
regardless of the contract type, i.e., purchase, leasing or commercial renting
in accordance with the following conditions:
• Purchase or leasing -- minimum of 10% of the F.O.B. value
of the negotiations;
• Commercial renting -- same values as above, adjusted by
contractual time serviceable life time ratio; and
• Expenses due to spare parts, training and documentation
costs will not be included, as well as financial burdens related
to interest and other bank fees.
• The time to accomplish the prescribed offset values (implementation time) will
be up to ten (10) years depending upon the supply conditions, taking into
account the contract amount, the interest of the supplier, and the market
conditions.
• The following elements are eligible for commercial offset, and may be
included in the contracts:
• Aeronautical services and products made in Brazil, including
ground support equipments;
• Finished or semi-finished products for aeronautical applica-
tion;
• Effective know-how transference in aeronautics;
• Aeronautical services and products made in Brazil
purchased or financed by the manufacturer and forwarded to
the Brazilian operator; and
• Technical support proposed by the foreign supplier and
accepted by the Department of Civil Aviation benefiting the
Brazilian operator, its associates or the Civil Aviation System.
89
• When the support is considered relevant and valuable and has a multiplier
effect in the economy, it can be ascribed an amplification factor of the
contract's value"'.
• The DAC will follow up the negotiation developments between the operator
and the supplier within the limits pertaining to government assistance. DAC
also will offer the necessary help for the evaluation and judgement of
documentation in course at COTAC, promoting the adoption of rules,
adjustments and measures which, may be necessary to the implementation
of sec.
• Each aeronautical foreign manufacturer will have a current account, and it
may be possible to have an adjustment for subsequent agreements. The
engine manufacturers, whose offset will be proportional to their participation
in the final value, will have a subcurrent account assigned to the aircraft
manufacturer.
• Unclear cases or those subject to interpretation will be submitted to the DAC
Director, for a final decision.
In April 1989, the Aeronautics ministry issued a regulation that
involves the acquisition of aircraft engines and spare parts. At this time, the
motivations for the regulation were: minimizing the use of hard currency for the
acquisition of spare parts and accessories for imported aircraft engines;
establishing inside the country an industrial base with capacity to participate in the
production of spare parts and accessories for aircraft engines; and based on
international experience, the establishment of a government policy to foster the
growth of this industry sector. This regulation seems to complement the first one
and applies to the Brazilian Air Force, in addition to national airlines and
EMBRAER. The inclusion of the Air Force is evidence of the Brazilian government's
concern in regulating military offsets.
"'To be understood as a price increase.
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In summary, the Aeronautics Ministry offset policy is the first step
in constructing a policy in this complex area. The way chosen to start is through
the import of civilian jet aircraft for the Brazilian airlines. It has been noted that an
evolution in this sectoral offset policy is expected as it shifts from civilian to military
offsets. Although there is no official policy with respect to military offsets, the MAER
has been applying its offset agreement policy to technology transfer to develop Its
aerospace industry.
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IV - THE BRAZILIAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
This chapter provides a background of the structure and development of the
Brazilian aerospace industry. The first section gives the introduction. The second
section describes the Brazilian aircraft industry with special focus on EMBRAER
because it is involved in the majority of the cases that will be analyzed in this
thesis; under this section the helicopter and aeronautical engines industries will
also be covered. Within the same section the government and industry relationship
and support, the market evolution, and the technology strategy of the aircraft
industry will be analyzed. The third section focuses on the Brazilian space and
missile industry. The Brazilian space program, the role of the missile industry, and
the technology barriers of this industry will be discussed.
A. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Brazilian aerospace industry is a good example of a
developing country searching for offsets that involve the transfer of high-
technology to improve the aerospace industrial base. Brazil today produces
indigenous aircraft and missiles, assembles helicopters and aircraft engines under
licenses, and has developed an ambitious space program which includes a
domestic vehicle launch and satellites.
The Brazilian aerospace industry has developed a model that may be
followed by aerospace industries in other developing countries. State participation
through ownership, market opportunities carefully studied, government-financed R
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& D, protective barriers, and special fiscal incentives have been the essential
ingredients used by the Brazilian government through the Aeronautics Ministry.
Brazil is a big country in the Southern Hemisphere. It has a population of 145
million people within an area of approximately 8.5 million square kilometers.
Although it has a lot of potential to be explored, numerous problems have provided
constraints to its development. Brazil has the largest external debt of $120 billion
in the world, the internal inflation is close to four digits, and its population is
growing very rapidly.
The problem of establishing compatibility between the need for national
defense of a country and dealing with economic constraints is a constant exercise
in allocation of scarce resources. Increasingly concerned with its social programs,
the Brazilian government's military expenditures have shrunk to meet its minimum
needs.
The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) has the primary mission to protect all the air
space, which includes surveillance of the 200-mile ocean coastal zone. To
accomplish this significant task, the FAB has a small fleet of fighters, transport and
trainer aircraft, and helicopters, most of them technologically pressed accomplish
the increasing mission requirements.
The Brazilian government's participation in supporting the aerospace industry
has been a principal factor in the development of this industry. However, various
aerospace companies have enjoyed different levels of support, depending on the
government's interests and the companies' political leverage. This difference is
also perceived among various programs and during different periods. Today, some
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specialists forecast a trend to "privatization" of these industries, but as in the U.S.,
they will continue to be extremely dependent on political and financial government
support.
In terms of technology strategy, unlike many developing countries whose
industries have been based for many years on local assembly under license of
equipment developed abroad, Brazil has emphasized the development of
independent programs, using partnership rather than a subcontracting basis [Ref.
1 :p. 205]. This strategy has provided Brazil with a capacity to "stand alone among
South American countries in having established the most advanced aerospace
technology base of the developing countries" [Ref. 2].
The market evolution and strategy efforts of the Brazilian aerospace industry
has been unintentionally aided by the developed arms exporting nations. For
example, by the end of the Vietnam war, the U.S. military was enamored of
glamorous "high tech" weapons and increasingly ignored the development of
simpler systems. The Brazilian arms industry, specifically the aerospace industry,
quickly moved into the breach. As one U.S. government official in Brazil said,
"Their success was built on filling needs other people weren't filling" [Ref. 3]. Brazil
has developed indigenous inexpensive weapons with simple operation and
maintenance, adapted to third world requirements. However, as the Brazilian
aerospace industry has moved to "high tech" weapons to become more
competitive and as a result of the country's overall technological development, this
strategy cannot be applied anymore [Ref. 3]. Instead, the Brazilian industry is
moving to more complex products. As a result, Brazilians have secured more
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advanced foreign partners anxious to share technology liberally in exchange for
low labor costs and other advantages'^. Another aspect of the Brazilian arms
market success has been its strictly "commercial" interests". This allows Brazilians
to sell arms to practically any country that would like to buy them, without
imposing any end-user constraint. This has enabled Brazil to obtain a larger share
of the market, mainly in countries where the U.S. international policies have been
restricting arms transfers, or transfers made by other countries which the offered
equipment has any component made in the U.S. or under a U.S. license'^. This
known "pragmatic" policy has been known to restrict certain sales. It is
administered by a secretive organization in the Brazilian government called
PNEMEM (Politica Nacional de Exportagao de Material de Emprego Militar) which
monitors the Brazilian arms sales through licenses [Ref. 5:p. 60].
Within this somewhat complex scenario, the emergence of Brazil as the
largest third world arms producer leads to a major question. How was Brazil able
to develop its aerospace industry, in spite of its numerous problems?
^he best example of this change is the Avibras FILA system. For the first time
since Avibras was created, it contracted foreign technology to meet the Brazilian
Army requirements (See more information on Avibras in this Chapter).
''^The rationale expressed by Brazilian government officials is that the
"commercial" concern must be understood as the impossibility of Brazilian arms
industry survivability without export.
''^This kind of open Brazilian foreign policy applied to arms sales will be focused
in further discussions related to the U.S. government restrictions in technology
transfer to Brazil. The case of Brazil-Libya arms transfers is actually the main
reason restricting the transfer of U.S. missile technology to Brazil. For a complete
analysis of the Brazilian arms transfers and foreign policy see Tollefson [Ref. 4].
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B. THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
1. Historic events
The recent emergence of the Brazilian aircraft industry** in the international
aircraft market has been surprisingly rapid, but Brazil has a distinguished aircraft
history. For the Brazilian people, Alberto Santos Dumont is considered the "father
of aviation" and for the Brazilian air force, he is the "Patron of the Air Force"".
The Brazilian aircraft production history is divided in two phases. The industry
before EMBRAER, and the industry after the creation of this company"^
Since 1910 various individuals have designed and flown planes in Brazil but
only in the 1930's did the government and military began noticing the importance
of aviation. The first Brazilian plane made in series was the MUNIZ M-7,
manufactured by the Fabrica Brasileira de Avioes. Since then, other industries have
produced a variety of small aircraft, mainly for training of the increasing number of
pilots. In 1941 the Aeronautics Ministry was created, bringing both civil and military
aviation under one organization. At the same year, the Aeronautics Ministry
ordered 110 HL-1 units made by Companhia Nacional de Navegagao Aerea
(CNNA) [Ref. 1]. The most successful Brazilian-made plane before EMBRAER was
produced by Companhia Nacional de Aeronautica (CAP). More than 700 units of
"Brazil has emerged as the sixth leading aircraft production (by volume) nation
in the world [Ref. 6].
"The Brazilian Alberto Santos Dumont designed, developed, and flew the first
heavier-than-air craft in Paris, 1906 [Ref. 1].
"^The author decided to follow this division that was previously suggested by
Moxon [Ref. 1] in order to emphasize the importance of EMBRAER in the evolution
of the Brazilian aircraft industry.
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CAP-4 were sold during this period. The plane used virtually all Brazilian-made
parts except the engine and most of them still are being used in air clubs. The end
of World War il resulted in reduced interest by the government in aviation
production, once many war-surplus planes were available on favorable terms.
Orders from the government for homemade planes became scarce, and FAB,
CNNA and CAP all closed their doors [Ref. 1],
Some other ambitious projects supported by the government after World War
11 are outlined below:
• The "pet" project of President Getulio Vargas in Lagoa Santa, in Minas Gerais
state in 1936 to produce North American T-6's under license^;
• The Navy project with Focke Wulf, from Germany, to build four aircraft
models with German technology in a Navy-furnished factory in Rio de
Janeiro, in 1940"^;
• The U.S. licensing production of large number of a Brazilian version of the
Fairchild PT-19; and
• The Galeae factory's'°° joint venture with the Dutch company Fokker of S-1
1
and S-1 2 trainers.
The same problems involved in establishing an airplane manufacturer apply
to an aircraft engine plant. In 1930 the Army established the Fabrica Nacional de
Motores (FNM) in Rio de Janeiro, with a licence agreement from the U.S. Wright
company. The main reason for the lack of priority in the continuation of this
"^Today this factory is a maintenance facility of the Air Force.
*World War II interrupted that project, as the Brazilians and Germans found
themselves on opposite sides in the conflict. Later the factory was absorbed by
the Aeronautics Ministry.
'°^oday the Galeae's factory is a maintenance facility of the Air Force.
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industry was also the war. The U.S. offered war-surplus engines within the aircraft
packages and the plant was converted to making truck motors.
In the 1950's and 1960's some private entrepreneurs decided to invest in
aircraft production and founded two companies. The first one was Construtora
Aeronautica Neiva (Neiva) that produced gliders and the CAP-4 Paulistinha. From
this firm, the Aeronautics Ministry ordered some aircraft trainers for Air Force cadet
training, such as Regente (240 units) and T-25 Universal (150 units). Since 1980,
Neiva has been incorporated with EMBRAER and is responsible for assembling the
line of light planes made by EMBRAER under license from PIPER'°\ The second
company was Aerotec (founded in 1962), and had a rapid expansion with the
production Uirapurus trainers for both civilian and military application. Today, like
Neiva, some of the company's production line is conducting subcontracting work
for EMBRAER'"".
The history of the Brazilian aircraft industry prior to the 1970's shows a mixed
picture. Under government sponsorship, over 2000 aircraft were produced for the
Air Force and air club operations. The utilization of war-surplus aircraft and engines
saw a short-term decline in indigenous production. But things changed in the
mid-1 960's, and the opportunity to become more independent finally happened.
'"'This will be discussed with the PIPER case in the next chapter.
'"Aerotec was expected to sign agreements with Italians firms to build the SM-
1019 single-engine scout/liaison aircraft under license, as well as the S-700
Cormorano amphibious plane [Ref. 7].
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2. The Aircraft Companies
This subsection covers the three main Brazilian aircraft companies. It
includes EMBRAER and its subsidiaries, the major aircraft company; HELIBRAS,
the helicopter company; and CELMA, the aircraft engine company. This overview
will be useful as a background for most of the cases in Chapter Five.
a. Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautics (EMBRAER)
In 20 years EMBRAER became the most important company in the
Brazilian aerospace industry and a significant participant in the international market
of aircraft"^. The objective of this part is to describe EMBRAER's development of
its main indigenous projects'"^, the government support and partnership, and the
importance of the competitive market evolution and technology strategies of this
company.
(1) EMBRAER's development
With the experience of past aircraft venture failures, the
Brazilian government and private investors were reluctant to invest in another
dream. Few Brazilians continued with the idea of self-sufficiency in aircraft produc-
tion. At the same time, the Air Force was looking for a plane to replace the
medium-sized transport. The first step was the development of an indigenous
project inside the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), in a small group under the
leadership of Captain Osires Silva. The Institute of Research and Development
''"EMBRAER had built a total of 3773 aircraft by the end of 1987 in three basic
categories of aircraft - commercial, general aviation, and military [Ref. 8:p. 10].
'°*The projects that required some international agreement will be emphasized
in the case studies descriptions in Chapter Five.
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(IPD) projected a called IPD-6504 aircraft prototype, a two engine transport
turboprop, 8-10 seats, non-pressurized, designed by the team headed by a French
aeronautical designer Max Holster. The name of the aircraft was Bandeirante
(Pioneer). Overcoming various obstacles, the prototype successfully flew for the
first time in October 26, 1968, over 3 years after the proposal was approved by the
Aeronautics Ministry'"*.
The next step was the creation of EMBRAER in 1969. As said
before, experience with the previous private failures and with no interest from
internal and external private sectors to establish an aircraft company, the Brazilian
government decided to set up a factory of its own. EMBRAER has been a state-
controlled enterprise but managed like private companies by a board of directors.
The President of EMBRAER, however, is nominated by the President of Brazil with
three others directors. The other two directors are elected at the general body
meeting of shareholders. The "director superintendent", or the managing director,
is the only full-time member of the board"* [Ref. 6:p. 424].
(2) Government and industry relationship
The Brazilian government challenge and top-priority has been
the development of a viable aircraft industry based on domestic designs and future
1(»rDuring this period Max Holster, doubting Brazil's ability to mass produce an
aircraft, left the design in the hands of two Brazilian engineers of the original team.
One of them, Fontegalante Pessoti, later became Embraer's first technical director
and is still holding that job.
'°*The Presidency and also the Superintendency of this company was given
to Col. Osiris Silva who continues to supervise the company today. Mr. Osiris is
a retired pilot officer and also an aeronautics engineer educated by ITA.
100
international cooperative development programs that will provide the country with
an infusion of advanced technology and consequent national pride. Since the
beginning of EMBRAER, the government has been contributing in two major fields,
fiscal and financial support and R&D support and finance'°^
The first government initiative was fiscal and financial
support. It started by capitalizing EMBRAER as a mixed economy company'".
One may be surprised by this fact. If the government decided to establish an
aircraft industry, why does it not establish a 100% state company, as the Argentina
government did? One of the explanations of this approach is that the military
regime that came to power in 1964 defended capitalism and free enterprise'". The
creation of EMBRAER at that time required a large investment and for obvious
reasons the risk was extremely high''°. In August 19, 1969, the Presidential Decree-
'°^These two fields were chosen because of their importance in the offset
agreements. Other government support, such as high-ranking officer and
government official travels to foreign countries and issue of an arms catalogue by
Itamaraty, both to improve international arms marketing, were not considered. [Ref.
9:p. 8].
'"Such mixed economy corporations are legal entities (called "estatais") created
in Brazil by special legislation to carry out a specified economic objective. They
were developed in the hope that they could move rapidly and efficiently by
following the practices of a private company, without the risk of bankruptcy and
enjoying other privileges [Ref. 10:p. 52].
'"Moreover, the Brazilian Constitution at that time authorized the state to enact
legislation intervening in the economy when necessary to establish an economic
sector which otherwise could not be effectively developed through private initiative
and free competition [Ref. 10:p. 50].
"The reasons previously addressed for the private investors refusing to invest
their money was complicated by the fact that the aircraft industry requires a long
term of return on investments and at that time, other investments were giving faster
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law No.770 created EMBRAER that stipulated the initial capitalization of 51% of the
voting shares (ordinary shares) which gave the government the company control.
The remainder of the shares would be offered to private Brazilian companies. With
the objective of providing incentives to private investors to invest in EMBRAER, the
Brazilian government extended to the company shareholders the same fiscal
benefits that were applied to other companies in priority regions or industry
sectors'". The Brazilian government through EMBRAER, however, was offering
more advantages than these previous benefits. Any company operating in Brazil
can take a 1% ceiling from its income tax and buy EMBRAER shares. This means
the investment costs nothing to the tax payers. The interesting point was that the
acquisition of EMBRAER stock was not included within the 50% limited proportion
on combined investment tax credit, which permitted EMBRAER investors a
maximum total credit of 51 %''^ As a result, EMBRAER shares have been sold in
large amounts, reducing government participation to the minimum necessary to
control the company' '^ Another fiscal incentive enjoyed by EMBRAER involves
and better returns besides offering lower risk.
'''Some regions such as Amazon and Northeast, and some industry sectors
like tourism, fishing and reforestry were the focus of many government incentives.
The government allowed the shareholder to invest a proportion (up to 50%) of their
income tax in these companies [Ref. 10:p. 528].
"^EMBRAER has adopted a slogan "surpass the 51% barrier on income tax
credits" [Ref. 11:p. 43].
"*The company started its operation in 1970 with only 500 firms (most of them
were local business hoping to supply parts or accessories to EMBRAER) and now
has about 250,000 shareholders [Ref. 11]. Today over 90% of the shares are in
private hands and the government has the control of 51% of the voting shares [Ref.
5:p. 52].
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basically the whole government tax exemption system. The same Decree law of
the creation of the company had exempted it from paying most of the existing tax
on export or import transactions, on the domestic aircraft commercialization, and
even services tax - Imposto sobre Servigos (ISS) and Property tax - Imposto sobre
Propriedade Territorial Urbana (IPTU)"'.
EMBRAER can also benefit from some government financial
support such as land donation''', capital to support facilities construction and
development cost in a cost-plus fee contract basis"^ and loan guarantees"\
The Brazilian government R&D support to the aircraft
industry is additional evidence of the its "partnership" with the aerospace industry.
This support is expressed through the technological development inside
government organizations which release the company from the R & D risk,
certification of quality assurance in international patterns (e.g., using U.S. FAA
regulations), utilization of R & D installations (e.g., wind tunnel), and various other
kinds of support.
''*These two last taxes are for the local government and are collected by the
city council. The mayor exempted EMBRAER since its creation until 1990
(information from EMBRAER).
"^he company main plant was constructed just beside the CTA in a public
land donated to EMBRAER by the Aeronautics Ministry. This facilitates the
company access to the airport and to the numerous other CTA facilities.
"I'he Brazilian government has supported the development costs and the
necessary facilities for the AM-X program [Ref. 5:p. 54]. Another example was the
development of the Tucano trainer contracted in December 1978 [Ref. 8;p. 13].
"^The Brazilian government covered $80 million of a international loan from
the Royal Bank of Canada to be applied in the Brasilia aircraft development
estimated at $200 million [Ref. 12:p. 19].
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The Aerospace Technical Center (CTA) is mainly responsible
for this division of labor. The CTA conducts state-sponsored research to support
the aerospace manufacturing firms and consists of the following five institutes:
• ITA - Institute Tecnoi6gico de Aeron^utica - it is a technical educational
institute that grants undergraduate and graduate degrees in aeronautical,
mechanical, electrical, electronics, and aeronautics infrastructure
engineering"*.
• IPD - Institute de Pesquisas e Desenvelvimente - it is the aeronautical
research institute, with divisions of aeronautics, electronics, mechanics, and
materials"^
• lAE - Institute de Atividades Espaciais - It is responsible to develop the
space research and is particularly involved in the SONDA rocket program.
• lEAv - Institute de Estudes Avan9ades - It develops research on frontier
technologies.
• IFI - Institute de Femente e Ceerdena9ae Industrial - It is responsible to
promote liaison between CTA and industry. Specifically it issues certification
for Brazilian made aircraft and parts, assists on technology transfer, promotes
marketing support, and is the one key government agency that oversees the
technical implementation of offsets.
Today EMBRAER has an in-house technological capability that
is sometimes better than that at the CTA.
One of the formidable tasks of the IFI has been to improve the
certification of more suppliers from national industry to meet the requirements of
EMBRAER and also the international requirements. Like EIVIBRAER, these
"*Since 1950, ITA has graduated over 72200 engineers and granted over 300
postgraduate degrees. Probably about 10% are military officers but the civilians are
sent not only to EMBRAER and AVIBRAS but to nearly all the successful supplier
firms in the Brazilian aerospace industry [Ref. 5:p. 51].
"^his institute was responsible for the design and development of the
Bandeirante project IPD-6504.
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suppliers cannot support the economies of scale needed to manufacture most
aircraft parts or subsystems just with domestic demand. Therefore, in addition to
offering quality control education, IF! is assisting these companies in identifying
international markets. IFI is using the Brazilian airlines purchases in international
aviation markets as a leverage to establish offset agreements and to bring
contracts to smaller firms. This activity is now regulated by the Aeronautics Ministry
(see the Aeronautics Ministry offset policy in Chapter Three).
(3) Market strategies
Rather than being forced by military control to produce only
military planes, EMBRAER has developed products that are in demand
internationally and are viable economically, given Brazil's technological and
economical constraints'^. Early on EMBRAER learned that even with a domestic
protected market, the domestic market is too small to sustain an internationally
competitive company for the long term. Although the domestic market, including
the FAB orders, has given a relatively assured base, the company has been
careful to design planes that have good export prospects [Ref. 35:p. 195]. The
case of the Bandeirante project illustrates this behavior. Since the beginning of the
program in 1965, the aircraft has been developed to support two requirements.
The first is the civil requirement from third-level carriers. At the time of this project,
'"One interesting case that demonstrated the government flexibility in meeting
EMBRAER's commercial concerns has been the government accepting the
shelving of the fighter project. An example of what could happen if this project had
been started was the Israel Lavi fighter program, cancelled because of
uncompetitiveness. Although state-owned, EMBRAER has not been required to
manufacture uneconomical products [Ref. 5:p. 54].
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the civilian airlines needed an aircraft to replace the DC-3. The international market
was offering mainly larger turboprop transports and the small carriers began to find
it impossible to operate low-density traffic services on a cost-effective basis. A
market for an aircraft that better adapted to this type of route and with capacity to
operate on unprepared runaways airports was being increasingly expressed, not
only in third world countries but also in industrialized nations. Second, the military
requirement from the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) was also applicable to some other
third world areas. At the same time, the FAB was looking for a replacement for its
7-10 seat Beech C-45 light transport, with a large cabin space. Despite numerous
trade-offs which favored the military layout'^', the Bandeirante production and sales
success in various versions has proven the value of such dual market planning.
Although the initial production was a big risk due to the inexperience of EMBRAER
in a monopolized market dominated by industrialized nations, the initial acquisition
by the FAB and Brazilian regional airlines opened the way to the international
market'^^fRef. 13]. In 1977, after the Paris Air Show, EMBRAER opened the
European market'". While the European market naturally constituted one of the
'^'The final design was limited to ten seats in order to comply with FAB
requirement. Later, other stretched version were developed to attend civil
requirements.
'^he initial deliveries of the FAB 80 aircraft [Ref. 280], followed by Transbrasil
and Vasp (two major Brazilian domestic carriers) and lately by TABA (Transporte
Aereo da Bacia Amaz6nica - one of the first legally Brazilian regional airline to
operated third-level services) changed the unambitious production of 2 aircraft a
month to a large-scale production. So, EMBRAER felt itself with capacity to jump
for the international market.
'"This event played a major role in the development of EMBRAER sales. A
total of 48 Bandeirantes were sold mainly to France, U.K., and Australia [Ref. 13].
106
Brazilian manufacturer's aims, outlets in the U.S. were without question a primary
target for the Bandeirante. To ensure maximum impact in the North American
marketplace, EMBRAER signed up with Aero Industries of Los Angeles as U.S.
distributor in June 1978. The U.S. FAA certification was obtained only on August
18, after a series of frustrations'^\ The first orders came by mid-September and
Bandeirante sales reached a number which required EMBRAER to establish a
factory support facility in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida^".
When Bandeirante reaches 500 units sold, it will be substituted
by the CBA-123, known as the Bandeirante successor, because production tooling
is virtually identical [Ref. 14]. Bandeirante has been continually produced in twelve
versions, all designed for specific applications. As a "pioneer", Bandeirante had to
overcome a lot of obstacles'^, and set the market for the Brasilia and following
commuters, but its survivability has demonstrated the capability of a small aircraft
producer in competing in an aggressive market.
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^*The FAA refused to certify the Bandeirante until an order was placed for it
by an American customer, while EMBRAER was unable to sell the aircraft in the
U.S. until it had been FAA certified [Ref 13].
'^Besides this facility, EMBRAER has opened subsidiaries at Le Bourget Airport
Paris, France, and at London to be in charge of the AMX marketing (information
from EMBRAER).
''^The U.S. - Brazil relations in general aircraft trade has been tense. FAA
certification, Bandeirante's crashes [Ref. 32], retaliation for tariff and trade barriers,
and numerous other problems has been focused in the Brazilian aircraft exported
to the U.S.
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There were various other market success and failures. The
following descriptions emphasize the market evolution of EMBRAER through their
different indigenous models'".
• EMB-201 IPANEMA'*" - This agricultural aircraft was developed following
Ministry of Agriculture specifications. Over 500 aircraft were produced and are
in operation in Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay. The production was transferred
to Neiva in the second half of 1981 [Ref. 15:p. 14].
. EMB-121 XINGU'" - The production started in 1977. It was the first
pressurized aircraft ever built in South America. However because of the
Brazilian government economic measures against inflation, freezing credit and
funding requests, the domestic market was paralyzed. The same lack of
success was found in the international market. Through the end of 1983,
about 100 Xingus was delivered, including 41 to France for military training
and liaison.
• EMB-120 BRASILIA'" - This 30-seat pressurized aircraft occupies the
highest priority among the commercial projects at EMBRAER because it
exists in a much more crowded market. The main competitor is the Swedish
Saab-Fairchild's 34-seat SF-340. EMBRAER is forecasting that a minimum of
400 will be sold in a production program that could last as long as 12 years
[Ref. 14]. Twenty-six customers in 13 countries by May 1988 have placed
orders or options for 295 aircraft [Ref. 8:p. 12].
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The Piper models, AM-X, and Parana cases will be covered in Chapter Five.
The information about the following aircraft came from Jane's All the World's
Aircraft [Ref. 15] and various other specialized periodicals.
'"^Design started in May 1969 by IPD-CTA and transferred to EMBRAER in
January 2nd, 1970. The first flight was in July 30th, 1970, and certification in
December 14th, 1971. A total of 600 Ipanema have been produced and sold [Ref.
15].
'^^The first flight took place on November 16Th, 1976. The production started
in 1977 and the certification occurred in mid-1979 [Ref. 12 : p.18].
'^Design started in September 1979, initial flight on 27 July 1983, certification
by CTA in 10 May 1985, first customer Atlantic Southeast Airlines (USA), scheduled
production rate is four per month. Its primary name was Araguaia [Ref. 13].
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• EMB-312 TUCANO'"' - This aircraft was designed in the late 1970s to meet
Brazilian air force specifications for a new high performance trainer to re-
equip its fleet of aging Cessna T-37s. Today It has become very successfur^.
It is a single motor turboprop trainer aircraft that can also be equipped with
1CXX) kg of armament for tactical support functions, filling a segment in the
international market somewhere between a beginner trainer aircraft and a
more complicated jet. The FAB ordered 118 with an option to buy 50 more
[Ref. 8:p. 13]. Tucano burns 30% less fuel, can reduce indoctrination time in
a typical training syllabus by 20%, and it is priced below Its nearest
competitors. EMBRAER has given licensed production of this aircraft to Short
Brothers (North Ireland) and Arab Organization for Industrialization - AOI
(Egypt) in offset for large aircraft acquisitions for the U.K. Royal and Egypt air
forces'"[Ref. 5:p. 53]. Tucano deliveries then totalled 349 out of 467 firm
orders; options were held for a further 125 [Ref. 8].
(4) Technology Strategy
EMBRAER basic technology strategy has been followed two
basic approaches'^. First, it has used a series of R & D institutes to develop new
products, train its employees, and improve government technology transferred by
the CTA. Secondly, it has acquired technology from foreign firms when rapid
acquisition has been necessary. The first approach was expressed by indigenous
designs, manufacturing, and production (e.g., Bandeirante and Ipanema were
developed by CTA and passed to EMBRAER to be improved and commercially
produced). At the beginning it was reserved to CTA as an important task to
'"" Design began in January 1978, first flight on the 16 August 1982, production
rate was 4-5 per month in 1987 [Ref. 8:p. 13].
'^EMBRAER has been using strong sales promotion efforts such as advertising
and impressive demonstrations by the air force aerobatics team Esquadriiha da
Fumaga (Smoke Squadron) [Ref. 8:p. 13 and 9:p. 27].
'^he Egyptian government ordered 120 (40 for Its own air force and 80 for
Iraq) with options on 60 more, of 20 would be for Iraq. The Royal air force ordered
130 aircraft with special requirements [Ref. 8].
134Moxon [Ref. 1] clearly identified these two approaches in his study.
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develop both civil and military products. As the company became technologically
self-sufficient, EMBRAER started to design and develop the civil-related products,
leaving the CTA with more advanced or experimental work. Today, EMBRAER is
the main organization doing R & D in the aircraft field'" and the CTA has been
concerned with the certification of aeronautics products and quality assurance, in
addition to the development of the space program. The second approach indicates
that in addition to the indigenous R&D, EMBRAER has been acquiring
considerable foreign technology using various joint-ventures with different
countries. In 1970, EMBRAER got its first license from Aermacchi (Italy) to produce
the Xavante jet trainer which allowed the company to developed valuable design
and production technology considering its technological level'*. In 1973, under a
subcontract arrangement with Northrop as an offset for the purchase of 42 F-5E
by the Brazilian air force, EMBRAER acquired significant technology through the
production and assemble of wings pylons and vertical fins and the honeycomb and
metal bonding techniques'^^ In 1974, EMBRAER signed a licensing arrangement
with Piper, which did not seem to have contributed to improving the technological
level of the company. The pressure was on EMBRAER to begin immediate
production of planes for a booming market without incurring development costs.
'"in 1985, EMBRAER was ranked as the second Brazilian industry in R & D
investment [Ref. 31]. Its Technical Department has about 1300 employees
(scientists, engineers and technicians).
'^EMBRAER at that time only was developing Bandeirante and Ipanema.
'^^These last chemical welding process are commonly used in the production
of supersonic aircraft. Under the same contract, Metal Leve S.A. was
subcontracted to produce the aircraft's control and bomb rack [Ref. 9:p. 19].
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It was clear that a marketing objective was taking priority over a significant
technology transfer interest. In 1983-4, EMBRAER signed a technology transfer
agreement with Sikorsky to acquire composite materials technology such as Kevlar
and Nomex, which are used in various EMBRAER production aircraft. In April 1984,
EMBRAER announced that it will nationalize the landing gears that It imports from
Eran of France. EMBRAER once more set up a subsidiary, EMBRAER Equipment
Division (EDE) to accomplish this task in more efficient way. The last agreement
and way to acquire technology has been through the AMX program, although the
benefits are unclear as to how much airframe, avionics, and engine design,
development, and production technology is being transferred to EMBRAER. This
short evolution in the technology transfer approach demonstrated that the
company has been used a "steping-stone" approach, establishing a synchronized
equilibrium between technology needs and capacity and funds available. Another
evolution has been with respect to type of contract, from licensed assembled and
production agreements, subcontract and technology transfer agreements, and
then to coproduction, as the level of technology transaction increased. It is not an
easy task to recognize the benefits of the above transfers in indigenous models
but it is evident that much of the technology transferred was absorbed and
transformed through R&D and finally applied to indigenous models such as
Bandeirante, Ipanema, Xingu, Brasilia, and Tucano, and certainly will be applied in
new projects as Parana (CBA-123) and EMB-145'-138
'^his last project was announced in 1989 during Le Bourget Aerospace
International Fair. The new aircraft will accommodate 45 passengers and will cost
$1 1 million. The resources to develop the airplane are being obtained from clients.
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b. Helicopteros do Brasil SA. (HEUBRAS)
Brazil has not been successful in lessening dependence on foreign
helicopters. The first initiative to establish a helicopter industry in Brazil curiously
did not come from the Aeronautics Ministry. In early 1970's, in response to plans
of modernization, the Brazilian Navy opened a bid to purchase 35 helicopters. At
that time, Aerospatiale from France, Bell from the U.S. and Augusta from Italy each
submitted a letter of intention to manufacture helicopters in Brazil. The Aeronautics
Ministry favored the French proposal, but was unwilling to invest in this new
project. EMBRAER offered itself as a partner, but was overloaded with other
projects at that time. This bid was delayed until 1977, when finally the government
officially approved the p^oposa^^^ Under this agreement, the French company was
required to initially supply all parts and components of the system and
progressively transfer technology without payment of royalties [Ref . 9:p. 21 ] . At the
same time, Helicopteros do Brasil S.A. (HELIBRAS) was formed and jointly owned
suppliers, bankers, investors, and EMBRAER. It will have a short development
because is an enlarged version of the EMB-120 Brasilia (75% of the parts) [Ref. 16
and 17].
'^According to some sources, the French government's purchase of
EMBRAER's Xingu aircraft, in later 1983, was linked to this approval. It means the
Xingu sale was connected as an offset for the acquisition of the helicopters.
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by Aerospatiale from France (45%), Aerofoto Cruzeiro do Sul (10%)"^, and the
government of Minas Gerais state (45%)'*\
As an offset for this first contract, H ELIBRAS has been assembling
Aerospatiale SA315B LAMA (called HB315B GAVIAO in Brazil) and AS350B and
AS350B1 ECUREUIL (called HB350B ESQUILO in Brazil) single-engined
helicopters and later the company also started assembling the twin-engined
AS355F2 ECUREUIL'"^. Throughout the entire contract, general government
dissatisfaction with H ELIBRAS and Aerospatiale existed due to the constant delay
of the French company's schedule in delivering the knocked-down parts and
because of the short amount of local content in its helicopters'*^. As a result, the
production, expected to total 200 units over ten years since 1979, was delayed and
"*^his private company had extensively used Aerospatiale helicopters. Later
it dropped out and sold its shares to the government of the state of Minas Gerais.
'"'The company is located in Itajuba city in Minas Gerais state. After the
acquisition of the Aerofoto shares, the government of Minas Gerais, in 1982, sold
4% with an option of other 47% of the shares to Construtora Mendes Junior (a
large construction firm) that took over management of the company. However, 12
months later, Mendes withdrew and sold the shares back to the state. Finally, in
1987, the state government of Minas Gerais gave up its holding the company; the
new major shareholder is the Brazilian armored vehicle manufacturer ENGESA
(Engenheiros Associados SA).
'**These helicopters have been manufactured with some local modifications
and a limited number have been exported to Bolivia (11), Venezuela (3), Paraguay
(5), Argentina (1), and Chile (1) [Ref.8 : p.15]. The military version of HB350B
ESQUILO includes artillery support, SAR, training, transport , and observation
[Ref. 18].
"**The local production of knocked-down kits was expected to build up from
27% by 1980 to approximately 70% by 1983.
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costs were running above international levels. Less than 70 units had been
assembled by 1984, with no local technology input [Ref. 1:p. 190].
In January 1985, the Aeronautics Ministry opened another bid to
purchase large helicopters. Although dissatisfied with HELIBRAS and its parent
company Aerospatiale, the Brazilian government decided to buy 25 SA330 SUPER
PUMA for the Air Force (15) and Navy (10), and 15 ESQUILOS for the Navy, but
this time all were made and assembled in France'*^. It was reported that besides
very favorable financing offered by the French, Aerospatiale had agree to purchase
a number of EMBRAER Bandeirantes in offset"^ [Ref. 1:p. 191].
In February 1988, the Brazilian Army once more selected
Aerospatiale as the winner of that service's helicopter bid. The Brazilian Army
bought 52 antitank and assault helicopters for its first airborne cavalry unit. This
last contract value of $260 million involves an offset agreement and will be
discussed later on the Aerospatiale case.
c. Companhia Eletromecanica Celma (CELMA)
'**\X was reported that EMBRAER had called for the dissolution of Helibras and
had negotiated for the establishment of a new helicopter joint venture with Sikorsky
who submitted a proposal in February of 1984. The other company also involved
in this second bid was Bell Aerospace Textron Co. The EMBRAER/Sirkorsky
agreement for composite materials technology was supposed to be the basis for
this agreement but once more, Aerospatiale won.
"^his demonstrates the versatility of EMBRAER. Whichever contract was
chosen by the Brazilian government, EMBRAER was prepared to win, even
indirectly.
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There were many failed attempts to establish an aeronautical engine
manufacturing company in Brazil'**. The creation and improvement over time of
maintenance shops by VARIG, ROLLS ROYCE DO BRASIL, and CELMA was
considered a definitive step towards the creation of a comprehensive national
engine industry.
CELMA, a private manufacturer of vehicle chassis and domestic
appliances, was purchased in 1957 by Panair do Brasil, a subsidiary of Pan
American World Airways, and turned into an engine repair facility. In June 1972,
when Panair went out of business, CELMA became part of the Aeronautics
Ministry, that holds 80% of the shares leaving 12% for Pratt & Whitney and the
remaining for other minor shareholders.
CELMA is located in Petropolis, Rio de Janeiro state. It employed
over 1400 in 1989, in an area of 35000 sq mt [Ref. 8]. It overhauls GE and Pratt &
Whitney engines and repairs engine parts. Most of its services are for the Brazilian
Air Force and regional airlines.
CELMA has recently upgraded significantly its engine maintenance
and repair capabilities under a joint investment program with GE and the Brazilian
government. It has sophisticated parts repair capabilities, using advanced
processes such as plasma spraying, electroforming and electron beam welding.
'*^e government, through the CTA, began pushing engine production in the
1970's, but again found the same obstacle; a limited market needing large scale
production. Both Lycoming and Pratt & Whitney PT6, used in aircraft manufactured
by EMBRAER, were found to be uneconomical.
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With the AM-X coproduction agreement with Italy, the Brazilian
government took a share of the production of the fighter Rolls-Royce engine MK-
807 Spey. CELMA is to produce twelve components, assemble, test, and overhaul
this engine, performing 22% of the man-hours required for the production of the
complete engine. The Project Spey will be analyzed within the AMX case.
C. SPACE AND MISSILE INDUSTRIES
Brazil's space industry has played an essential role in the overall aerospace
industry growth. Under an ambitious space program with numerous technology
transfer barriers and financial constraints, Brazil is working in three main directions:
telecommunications, remote sensing, and launch capability. Despite Brazil's
enormous area and population, its population is concentrated mainly in urban
centers along the Atlantic coast. This has created two different countries within the
same country. On one side it has an industrial region with a complex society
engaged in productive activities. On the opposite end of this socioeconomic
spectrum, is a rural region struggling to overcome severe economic limitations.
The difficulties that affect the development of the interior are complex, and they are
getting worse with the lack of communication between a distant Amazon region
and the overcrowded, industrial Southeast cities. One means of overcoming these
communications barriers has been the development of satellite
telecommunications.
In the early 1970s, various Brazilian government agencies and industries
started working in telecommunications and space programs to develop a Brazilian
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industry capable of connecting all points of the country'*'. Various problems such
as the energy crisis and the lack of technological and financial capabilities have
resulted in the Brazilian government engaging in alternative programs. For
example, the Ministry of Communications created the Sistema Brasileiro de
Telecomunicagoes por Satelite (SBTS) to give more flexibility in the
communications services. As a result, numerous earth stations and ground
terminals were spread all over the country; transponders from INTELSAT were
leased; and as the requirements increased, communications satellites were
acquired to form an independent system. But even with these efforts, the space
program continues with its mission to develop indigenous satellites and launch
vehicles and to launch them from domestic launch bases. The hope is that some
day in the future, this second important part of the Brazilian aerospace industry will
find its "commercial" way as some products from the aircraft industry did.
As a consequence of the technology development and spinoffs, an
indigenous missile industry is being created that already develops short and
medium-range ballistic missiles. A critical point of this discussion is the link
between the space industry, with non-belligerent motives, and the ballistic missile
industry, which seems to have the same outcome'**. This section condenses each
'*'The Brazilian Telecommunications industries are represented mainly by
TELEBRAS (Telecomunicagoes Brasileiras S.A) and its subsidiary EMBRATEL
(Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicagoes) both under the Ministry of
Communications control.
"**This point focuses on BRASILSAT as the "crucial case" of this research. Prof.
Tollefson (NPS - National Security Affairs Department) assisted this part with his
expertise and research material.
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of the above activities into three parts: the space program which includes
BRASILSAT program, the missile industry, and the technological barriers which are
the background for the BRASILSAT case that will be discussed in Chapter Five.
1. The Space program
Despite the numerous technical, political and financial problems, Brazil's
space program, called Brazilian Complete Space Mission, Missao Espacial
Completa Brasileira - MECB, continues to be the most ambitious in South
America'*®. This extensive program, in its original concept, included the
construction of four flight satellites; design, development and construction of a
launch vehicle system; construction of a launching base and a tracking network;
and development of a modern data processing capability [Ref. 19:p. 75].
The MECB program implementation responsibility is shared by two
different government agencies based on military and civil objectives. The military
part is subordinated to the Aeronautics Ministry and the civilian part is
subordinated to the Science and Technology Ministry. Each part has its own
missions and objectives. However, both parts are coordinated by a joint military-
civilian committee, the Brazilian Commission of Spacial Activities - Comissao
Brasileira de Atividades Espaciais - COBAE, that is responsible to establish
guidelines and policies in space-related issues'".
'**The program cost estimate is about $1 billion [Ref. 19:p. 75].
'"Although the division of labor is well defined, the military part is predominant.
The president of the COBAE is the armed forces chief of staff. The COBAE is
directly subordinated to the President and comprised by a group of ministries [Ref.
20].
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The Aeronautics Ministry directs the development of the construction of
the launching base and the satellite launch vehicle, Veiculo Langador de Satelites
(VLS). Both programs are under the direction of the CTA. The launching base
program, called Launching Center of Alcantara - Centre de Langamento de
Alcantara (CLA) is being constructed in Alcantara, a small city located in Maranhao
state, 35 km from the capital, Sao Luis. The implementation is administered by the
Alcantara Launching Complex Group - Grupo de Implantagao do Centre de
Langamento de Alcantara - GICLA'^\ This site was selected because of the
meteorological conditions, the position with respect to sea level, and the proximity
to the equator (2 degrees and 18 seconds)'^^ The VLS program is developed by
the CTA under the Space Activities Institute, institute de Atividades Espaciais - lAE.
The program, denominated SONDA, has been using a stepping-stone approach
based on four series of sounding rockets. More than 200 SONDA rockets have
been fired, mostly for weather data such as temperature and winds [Ref. 19:p. 77].
Since November 1984, there have been at least five firings of the last stage rocket
called SONDA IV, that is a 1 1 meter rocket weighing 7.3 tons and has some 3000
components, of which 70% are locally purchased'" [Ref. 23]. Table 4 shows the
evolution of the SONDA program. The VLS will be a four-stage, solid fuel launch
'*'ln October 1987 it was reported that 1200 workers of two construction
companies, Andrade Gutierrez and Mendes Junior, were working hard to complete
the schedule because the first VLS launch was scheduled for 1989. This base is
supposed to be completed now [Ref. 21].
'"According to specialists this site permits maximum tangential speed, allowing
for a substantial saving in rocket fuel (about 25% savings) [Ref. 21].
'^he first prototype SONDA IV was launched in November 1984 [Ref. 22].
119
vehicle powered by four SONDA IV boosters. The test-launches of the SONDA
series have occurred in Barreira do Inferno launch base that is located in the
extreme northeast, near Natal. The VLS was due to be ready in 1989 based on the
original timetable, but the first flight has been postponed until 1992 [Ref. 25].
The civilian part of the MCEB program is administered by the Brazil's Institute
for Space Research, Institute Nacional de Pesquisa Espacial - INPE, also located
in Sao Jose dos Campos'*^. It is responsible for the design and construction of
satellites'". The other activities of this agency include space and atmospheric
sciences, space engineering and technology, and space applications.
2. BRASILSAT Program
Not all developing countries have the same degree of development in
space technology. Some of them already have the missile technology and have
put satellites in orbit, using a national launch pad'". Brazil has been searching for
an opportunity to get into this small club, called the "space powers". The
'^he VLS is 19 meters, weighs 50 tons, and carries 40 tons of solid fuel [Ref.
24].
'^In 1984, INPE had approximately 1400 employees of which 80 were employed
with doctor's degrees, 150 with master's degrees, and 400 with bachelor's degrees
[Ref. 20]. In February 1989 it reported 1707 employees [Ref. 26].
'"Some sources indicate that the first satellite, the Data Collection Satellite,
SCD-1, has already been constructed. The contrast in deadlines between INPE
and CTA resulted in the firing of the INPE head, Marco Antonio Raupp, who
insisted that Brazil should contract just the services to launch the domestic
satellites instead of waiting until 1992. This position was opposed completely by
the Aeronautics Ministry that had incorporated INPE after the dissolution of the
Science and Technology Ministry [Ref. 26].
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BRASILSAT program is one of the Brazilian space strategic plans to reach this
objective. BRASILSAT is one part of the MECB entire program and it consists of
launchingcommunications satellites in geosynchronous orbit as the spaceborne
segment of a system to provide television, telephone, telex and data transmission
[Ref. 19].
Originally, the general space plan involved the design and construction
of four flight satellites to be launched by the VLS. However, due to numerous
technical problems, Brazil has delayed the construction of the first satellite until
1989, and has still not accomplished the VLS, rescheduled for 1992.
What has the Brazilian government been doing in the meantime to
overcome these telecommunications problems? The first Brazilian option was
leasing spare capacity from INTELSAT. The second option was the acquisition of
the foreign made satellites and respective launch services from other countries.
The cost and benefits of these options is not the objective of this thesis, but for
various reasons, the Brazilians were not satisfied just with the leasing option.
In 1976, the Brazilian government opened the first bidding process and
had France's Matra involved as an European MESH consortium, but due to
financial problems, the project was shelved [Ref. 39 and 40]. In 1981, Brazil
reopened the bid and had Aerospatiale, and Canadian Spar competing for the
satellites and Arianespace and Ford Aerospace competing for the launch service.
In 1982, the Brazilian government decided to sign a $131 million contract with Spar
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for the acquisition of two satellites and their respective launch services'"[Ref.41].
Spar at that time had a license agreement with Hughes (U.S.) to produce the spin-
stabilized craft of the HS 376 variety'*®. The offset package asked for by the
Brazilian government seems to include training in the launch operation and
communication of the satellites [Ref. 20]. The package deal consisted of training
EMBRATEL personnel in the ground base station of Guaratiba, close to Rio de
Janeiro, and also inside the Spar plant [Ref. 33]. Spar worked with TELEBRAS in
the design, development, manufacture and servicing of the systems for the
aerospace communications defense aviation and mapping [Ref. 34].
The first satellite (BRASILSAT I) was put in orbit on February 8, 1985 on
a V12 Ariane rocket, launched from ELA1 Kourou, Guyana. The second satellite,
scheduled for August of the same year, was delayed up to March 26, 1986 due to
the VI 5 third-stage failure in September of 1985. The second launch (BRASILSAT
II), involving also the G-STAR II Arabian satellite, was made on a VI 7 rocket in a
brand new ELA2 launch complex, also in Korou [Ref. 27]. Some rumors at this
time indicated that the Brazilian government did not include insurance for this
second satellite because the premium was 50% of the value of the satellite. As time
passed, difficulties in the space program have continued. The supposed failure of
the SONDA IV and numerous other technical problems have delayed the entire
'"Spar was the main contractor and also provided the launch services through
Arianespace, France. It was also reported that Aerospatiale and Ford Aerospace
were competing jointly [Ref. 41].
'^here is evidence that Hughes participation in the construction of these
satellites was about 32%.
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program. The satellites, although completed, for political reasons will remain waiting
for the VLS. So, because of the need to replace the BRASILSATs I and 11 in 1995
and 1996 respectively, the only option was to invite new bidders for the second
generation of domestic communication satellites. This was done in February 1989,
and constitutes the case that will be analyzed in Chapter Five.
3. The Missile Industry
According to Agusto Calton, Brazil's missile development program and
industry are still small and not engaged in large-scale production. However, he
also pointed out that several small and isolated projects may soon become big
programs, depending on the decisions by the armed forces [Ref. 28]. Most of the
missile technology has been developed indigenously by the two main research
institutes of the Army (CTEX) and Air Force (CTA). The development of missiles
with domestic technology is due more to constraints in accessing foreign technol-
ogy than in aiming for self-sufficiency. As the CRS study points, the development
and testing of these missiles is probably constrained by lack of key foreign-made
components and perhaps by insufficient testing of the short range systems on
which the bigger missiles are based [Ref. 29:p. 88].
Two main Brazilian companies have engaged in the production of
missiles and have already presented missile projects to the Armed Forces Joint
Command, which has coordinated all missile development and production in the
country since 1986. A brief description of each industry is given, and their main
missile projects are described below.
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a AVIBRAS AEROSPACIAL SA.
AVIBRAS has several facilities around Sao Jose dos Campos that
represent a total area over 13 million square meters of floor space, employing
more than 5000 people. The group has three subsidiary companies: TECTRAN
S.A., TECTRONIC S.A., and TRANSVIP S.A. Defense products include rocket
engines of several calibers, a wide range of single and multiple charge warheads
and fuses, self-propelled and towed-driven multiple launchers, and short medium,
and long-range systems for the ASTROS II (Artillery Saturation Rocket System)
multiple-rocket-launching systems (with SS-30, SS-40, and SS-60). Its electronic
antiaircraft system is called FILA (Fighting Intruders at Low Altitudes)'^. Its air-to-
ground defense systems include twin machine-gun pods for light aircraft, several
types of reusable and disposable rocket multiple launchers, and general purpose,
incendiary, and special applications bombs. Its surface-to-surface missiles include
the Barracuda (SM-70) anti-ship missile, an Exocet type. The company's
conceptual project is an anti-aircraft missile named SOLAR by the Army'®\
AVIBRAS is also at the heart of the Brazilian space program building the SONDA
line rockets. It is developing a series of missiles (the SS-150, SS-300, and SS-1000
with ranges of 150, 300, and 1000 km respectively). They are perhaps the most
important ballistic missiles being developed in Brazil today. The SS-300 missile is
leo;
AVIBRAS, for the first time, purchased technology to implement the Brazilian
Air Forces' air defense program. In order to develop the FILA fire control system,
AVIBRAS approached the Swiss company Contraves, to adapt SKYGUARD
technology [Ref. 18].
'^'Some specialists said that this missile is very similar to the Roland, of which
the Army bought four for instructional purposes [Ref. 30].
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based on solid-fuel SONDA IV rocket, with an indigenously designed inertial
guidance system. AVIBRAS is hoping to achieve extreme accuracy, precluding the
requirement for a nuclear warhead^^.
b. ORBFTA SISTEMAS AEROSPACIAIS SA.
ORBITA was created in February 1987 to coordinate Brazil's missile
program'*^. It is owned by Engenheiros Associados - ENGESA (40%), EMBRAER
(40%), Engenharia de Sistemas de Controle de Automagao - ESCA (11%),
Industria de Material Belico do Brasil - IMBEL (5%), and Participagoes e
Consultoria - PARCON (4%). Initially ORBITA was developing guided missiles as
well as rockets and satellite launchers for the space program. However, the Army
and Air Force have transferred to them some missile projects developed inside
their research centers.
ORBITA has four simultaneous missile projects. The first, namely
LEO, will be an anti-tank, laser guided missile based on Italian technology from
OTO MELARA company and is being developed for the Brazilian Army'®^. The
second project includes British Aerospace for the production of a missile
incorporating technology used in the Thunderbolt. The Brazilian version (MSA-3.2)
'^Sources reported that some Middle East countries such as Libya and Iraq
are may be even partially funding the program to develop it [Ref. 35 and 36].
'**This company was created to overcome Brazil's armed forces frustrations
with delays in the development of self-guided missiles. After a secret meeting in
June 1986, a consensus was reached that standardization was necessary in missile
production.
'"The Italian missile MAF will be produced under license. The official Brazilian
denomination is MSS-1.2 but is known as LEO in honor of the Army Minister,
General Leonidas Pires Gongalves.
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will be in the Mach 3 class but it's likely to be extremely agile, possibly
incorporating British thruster and television guidance technology. The third project
is the MAA-1 (called MOL in honor to the Aeronautics Ministry Brigadier Moreira
Lima) air-to-air missile, originally developed by the CTA research program called
PIRANHA. It is an infra-red, thermal-attracted air-to-air missile for "dog fight" combat
designed under contract for the Aeronautics Ministry to fit the AMX and its other
fighters. The last project, the MB/EE-150 and maybe the most important, had been
under development by Engemissil, a subsidiary of ENGESA. It is a mobile tactical
missile, fired from a dual launcher chassis, and capable of carrying a 500 kg
warhead to a range of 150 km. This missile generated a family of other missiles
such as the MB/EE-350, the MB/EE-600, and the MB/EE-1000 with ranges of
350, 600, and 1000 km, respectively.
As was demonstrated, ORBITA and AVIBRAS are the two main
Brazilian missile producers. The first one has significant experience using its own
technology, but shows an increasing need for more advanced technology through
technology transfer. The last, a complete new industry, owned by two other "big
ones", acquired most of the its technology abroad to become more competitive
than AVIBRAS. Both companies are now competing with each other for
government projects, especially those that include tactical missiles.
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4. Technological Barriers
This subsection discusses the "Missile Technology Control Regime"
(MTCR), a very current topic that has been discussed in lots of newspapers and
magazines and is related to transfer of missile technology to Brazir^*.
The MTCR is a policy aimed at limiting the proliferation of missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons. It was announced in April 16, 1987 by the
governments of the United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. This MTCR, although neither a
treaty nor an executive agreement and with no new organization formed to
administer it, establishes strict guidelines to limit the transfer of certain missile-
related technologies while preventing commercial advantage or disadvantage for
any of the agreeing countries'^.
The reasons for the emphasis on restricting the proliferation of missile
production technology originate with the existing restrictions under some of the
U.S. regulations'^'. Basically they point out that missile technology (in the form of
products or know-how), purchased ostensibly for civilian purposes through normal
civilian export licensing, could lead to a recipient country's development of a
nuclear-capable missile system.
'^he following discussion is based on Frederick J. Hollinger's article, 'The
Missile Technology Control Regime: Major new Arms Control Achievement", ACDA
World Militan,/ Expenditures and Arms Transfers . 1987, Washington DC [Ref. 37].
'*lt is emphasized that these guidelines are not intended to impede international
cooperation in the peaceful use of space-related and other modern technology, nor
are they directed at any country or set of countries.
'^'These restrictions are guided by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
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All items to be controlled are detailed in the Equipment and Technology
Annex to the Missile Technology Guidelines issued by the seven countries in April
1987. Specific items to be controlled are divided in two categories. Category I
items are those of the greatest sensitivity'**. It includes complete rocket systems
(ballistic missile systems, launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned
air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and
reconnaissance drones) as well as special facilities for these systems. Also covered
are certain complete subsystems, including solid or liquid fuel rocket stages,
reentry vehicles, solid or liquid fuel rocket engines, guidance sets, thrust vector
controls, and warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms'*^. Category
II includes propeilants, structural materials, flight instruments, avionics, guidance
and control components, and test equipment and facilities'^".
Major world powers suspect that Brazil is developing medium and long-
range ballistic missiles to deploy nuclear payloads. This has created a lot of
concerns from the U.S. government, resulting in a U.S. refusal to transfer
technology used to continue the development of the Brazilian VLS. The U.S.
suspects that the technology used to make the rocket could be used to
'*®Most of the export licenses for these items will normally be denied and when
exceptions are applied, there will be appropriate assurances against misuse.
'*^Controls are placed on guidance systems capable of achieving system
accuracy of 10 kilometers or less at a range of 300 kilometers. Guidance systems
designed for short-range missiles (less than 300 kilometers) or manned aircraft are
exempt.
"^hese items may be approved at the discretion of each partner in the regime,
depending on a variety of factors including stated end-use.
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manufacture a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying an atomic bomb
or other chemical and biological weapons'^'. The other related reason is Brazil's
"pragmatic" foreign policy and aggressive arms sales that could enable non-allied
countries such as Libya to obtain this kind of weapon'^^
Although the U.S. boycott has been carried out with the leading
industrialized countries through the MTCR, the French have not been so inflexible
and have been maintaining a large space cooperation program with Brazi^^^ The
BRASILSAT case is an example of this French cooperation though it has not been
without rest^ictions'^^
'^'Some specialists pointed out that the first series of the Brazilian rocket
SONDA has been the basis for AVIBRAS to develop its ballistic models for military
use [Ref. 29:p. 92].
'^^he U.S. has used the recent example of India to justify the ban on the
"proliferation" of ballistic missiles in the Third-World. On 22 May 1989, the Indians
launched the Agni ("fire"), a ballistic missile with an estimated range of 25(X) km.
India has also constructed satellite launch rockets using the same basic technology
[Ref. 25].
'^^For example, the Brazilian launch base at Barreira do Inferno is helping with
the flight control of the Ariane rockets launched from Korou in French Guiana [Ref.
25]. Brazil charges the pittance of $100,000 for each launch tracking. This base is
also being used to launch experimental rockets for the FRG [Ref. 22].
'^Trance has not issued a blank check for the transfer of technology. Some
specialists inside McDonnell Douglas point out that France is offering at least 25
year-old technology in offset for launch services [Ref. 38].
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V - BRAZILIAN AEROSPACE OFFSET CASES
This chapter analyzes the Brazilian aerospace offset cases in four main types.
A background about the existing theory of each type of offset is described in
Chapter One. The four sections are:
A. COUNTERTRADE (MD-11 aircraft)
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (BRASILSAT program)
C. LICENSED PRODUCTION (PIPER and AEROSPATIALE)
D. COPRODUCTION (CBA 123 aircraft and AMX program)
The following sections will cover specifically the case analysis within the
framework already established in Chapter Two. For each of the independent
variables a grade will be attributed ranging from low to high impact on the
dependent variables (outcome). The outcome will be obtained according to the
combination of factors explained in Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter One. A medium
grade will be attributed when there will be a balance between the positive and
negative impacts. When the information is not available to answer the question, the
term unknown will be used. When the analysis of the variable does not make
sense, the term not applicable (N/A) will be used as an answer. At the end of
each case, there will be a table which resumes the case results. A comparison of
the cases will be drawn in the Chapter Six, where the hypothesis will be tested.
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A. COUNTERTRADE
This section provides an example of Brazilian government utilization of
countertrade in an acquisition of civilian aircraft for Brazilian airlines. The term
countertrade, as defined before, encompasses various types of commercial
arrangements such as barter, counterpurchase, and compensation (or buy-back)
in which a supplier commits himself to take products from a recipient country in full
or partial payment. In some countertrade transactions, payments for the goods
bought and sold are actually made; in other forms of countertrade, there are no
payments at all'".
1. MD-11 Aircraft Case
The MD-1 1 countertrade agreement was chosen in order to illustrate the
application of the previous established framework to the offset type called
countertrade. The case is related to the VARIG Brazilian Airlines acquisition of 10
tri-jet MD-11 aircraft acquisition from McDonnell Douglas. The offset required by the
Brazilian government is 10% of the $1 billion total value. This offset has been
implemented through a contract between McDonnell Douglas and EMBRAER for
the development and production of flaps sets for the same aircraft. Since it is a
recent agreement, much of the information had to be collected from personal
interviews and telephone conversations with the companies' staffs, and also
through correspondence with the Brazilian government offices involved in the offset
program.
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^^his is one important point that should be clarified at this stage. Countertrade
is not "trade without money". Only in a few cases of classic barter does this occur;
in all other cases money is used.
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Q17) What are the offset agreement characteristics?
In March 1987, VARIG Brazilian airlines''' signed a "letter of intention"'^
with McDonnell Douglas (MCD) for the acquisition of 4 MD-11 aircraft with an
option for 6 more for a total value of $1 billion'^' [Ref. 2]. From now on this contract
will be called the VARIG contract.
The MD-11 is a tri-jet long range aircraft, with a payload of 25 tons, a
range of 12,746 km, and a capacity to transport more than 400 passengers in Its
high density configuration. However, VARIG planned to operate this aircraft with
only 270 seats in three classes [Ref. 2] . The airline company's current plan is to
use the MD-11 to expand existing international services [Ref. 5].
In the last half of 1987, MCD signed a contract with EMBRAER for
developing and manufacturing composite wing flaps for the MD-11. The contract
implied that EMBRAER would supply 200 sets and an option to deliver a further
100 sets at a later date. It was worth $120 million [Ref. 6]. For this analysis, this
contract will be called the EMBRAER contract.
'"VARIG is the largest airline in Latin America. The company is 79% controlled
by its employees, operates a fleet of 84 planes, and has offices in 64 countries
[Ref. 1].
'"^This document is commonly used by aircraft manufacturers to assure the
market before launching any huge aircraft project. When VARIG signed this letter,
11 other international airlines announced the same intention [Ref. 2]. The launch
customer was British Caledonian Airways in December 1986, with 9 aircraft [Ref.
3:p. 466]. In 1988, MCD published that 88 MD-11 orders and 162 options and
reserves were recorded between 1987 and 1988, for a total of 250 aircraft [Ref. 4].
''®This information was confirmed through a personal interview with MCD [Ref.
7].
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Both agreement and contract were signed before the Aeronautics
Ministry (MAER) had issued the new regulation in December 1988 requiring offset.
The real contract, superseding the VARIG's previous letter of intention was signed
at the beginning of 1989. Although the EMBRAER contract was awarded in 1987,
MCD has been arguing with the MAER to accept this previous contract as a 10%
obligation, according to the offset regulation. Chances are that the MAER will
accept this MCD proposal, which means that MCD had already fulfilled this offset
transaction before the actual sale had occurred'"' [Ref. 7].
Assuming the MCD proposal was approved by MAER, this offset is
classified as a countertrade type involving some transfer of technology. It also may
be classified as direct (the flaps are components of the same aircraft sold). The
10% percent offset goal was reached ($120 million is more than 10% of $1 billion).
The implementation time regulated by the MAER must be up to 10 years, which
seems to be more than they need, taking into account the financing arrangements
(normally 5 years) for the aircraft acquisition and EMBRAER's schedule for flaps
delivery'^. The method of enforcement applied was "best effort". The VARIG
contract was not available for analysis but it does not appear to have any offset
clause or "side letter" asking for compensation. Because the aircraft is for civilian
application, the EMBRAER contract does not have an "end-user" clause.
'""One clause (section 38 - OFFSET/COPRODUCTION) of the EMBRAER
contract for the production of the flaps explains that MCD would be credited in
the future for any offset requirements [Ref. 7].
"^he delivery of the first set of flaps was scheduled for August 1987 with the
assembly of the first MD-11 commencing in April 1988 [Ref. 8]. Until December
1988, no MD-11 aircraft was delivered [Ref. 4].
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Q1) What type of technology is being transferred?
It was not possible to ascertain the type of technological methods and
processes transferred to EMBRAER in this agreement. According to MCD
managers it was a very "low technology" contract. Once EMBRAER was contracted
to develop and produce the flaps, It meant that they already had the technological
capacity to perform the job. It is possible that the transfer of a low technology may
involve the transfer of specific outboard flaps drawings originating from the MD-
11 main project design [Ref. 7]. Each wing flap is 8.9 meters long, with a width
ranging from 1.9 meters maximum to 1.29 meters minimum. The flaps are made
of carbon-epoxy composites that will achieve a 168 kg weight saving for each set
of flaps [Ref. 6 and 8].
Since the technology involved in this contract will improve the overall
EMBRAER level of technology in composite materials very little, this variable was
graded as low .
Q2) What is the technology transfer environment?
The information collected through interviews indicates thatthe technology
transfer environment is excellent. EMBRAER is considered by MCD engineers to
possess the technological capability to develop and produce the flaps with no
major quality problems [Ref. 9]. EMBRAER's contract was signed before the
Brazilian government had enacted the regulation, and it is likely that the
Aeronautics Ministry will credit this contract as a VARIG offset contract.
Based on information collected personally at MCD, this variable was
graded as high .
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Q3) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
EMBRAER has been expanding its capabilities to work with new
composite materials since 1983, when the company contracted with Sikosky to
transfer composites material technology. The company has expanded its molding
facilities for composite parts by 10,000 square feet and installed a new autoclave.
EMBRAER also installed another $1 .5 million autoclave to complement the 15 X 4.5
meters unit currently being used to cure composite parts"" [Ref. 10].
Because of the recent EMBRAER capacity development in composite
materials, balanced with the evidence that EMBRAER was certified as a reliable
supplier by the MCD technical department, this variable was graded as medium .
Q4) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
The MCD subsidiary, Douglas Aircraft Division, is a well known
commercial jet manufacturer. It has been producing the DC (Douglas Commercial)
series since 1933 and started with the MD (McDonnell Douglas initials) series in
1983 with the MD-80 (derivative from the DC-9). The new MD-11 is an advanced
medium/long range successor of the DC-10. The principal marketing
characteristics of the company have been to provide offset incentives as a tool to
win international competitions. The offset department is prepared to offer offsets
ranging from subcontracts for the production aircraft parts to tourism packages in
181/Composite materials account for 15% of the EMBRAER Brasilia aircraft along
with other lighter materials. These materials have decreased the plane weight by
858 lb, making it the lightest plane of its kind [Ref. 10].
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exchange for sales . The MCD technology transfer philosophy may be evidenced
through the numerous offset agreements signed mainly with NATO countries for
the transfer of high technology weapons. In this case, the company was motivated
by the aircraft sales in order to make this project commercially viable and by the
lower labor cost offered in Brazil.
In summary, due to major use by MCD of offsets and technology transfer
as a powerful marketing instrument not only in the EMBRAER agreement, but in
the most civilian and military offset agreements, the value of high is assigned to this
variable.
Q5) Will this technology be Integrated?
It is very likely that EMBRAER will be able to develop and produce these
flaps without major problems. The company owns a relatively high quality
assurance division, strictly controlled by the IFI, the Brazilian government agency
responsible for certifying aeronautic products using FAA patterns. It seems that in
terms of labor skills, the company has a very well trained cadre of engineers and
technicians in design and production engineering. The composite material division,
although relatively new, has been receiving experienced personnel from the other
divisions. The other measures such as time pressure and proportion of service
labor in relation are not in evidence. It seems that this division has adjusted its
'^his commercial characteristic in using offsets frequently is also applied in
the negotiation of military aircraft such as the F-18 deals with Spain, Australia,
Canada. MCD currently reported to have some $1 billion in offset commitments
which rises annually since 1960 [Ref. 11].
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chronogram for deliveries with the aircraft assembly , and the proportion of
service personnel has been normally managed.
The low technology transferred through this agreement is
counterbalanced with the EMBRAER high quality assurance of Its products. This
variable is graded as medium .
Q6) Does this offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
This case exemplifies what was described before in Chapter Two as
"apparent savings". This countertrade may help the country in exporting more
products (in this case flaps) but the real foreign currency savings has not
happened because both contracts require cash payments. One alternative to
improve the savings is through some kind of credit account that would be
established by MCD and could provide some savings in the overall transaction,
which would not be that attractive to EMBRAER. For example, VARIG would pay
$120 million in cruzados to EMBRAER and the country would pay the $880 million
in U.S. dollars, saving $120 million of foreign currency. Although this transaction
seems easy, it would not offer advantages to EMBRAER, which would lose money
in the foreign exchange processing. Considering that this last alternative would
demand several changes in the two contracts already awarded, this variable is
graded as low.
Q7) Does this agreement create jobs?
'"Assembly of the first MD-11 was planned to begin in March 1988, with the
first flight scheduled for March 1989. The first delivery is scheduled in Spring of
1990 [Ref. 3:p. 467].
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The information to answer this question is unknown. However, It seems
that this contract will support for at least three years a reasonable labor capacity
in the EMBRAER composite material department. Today, besides this production,
this department has been used to produce some parts in composite materials for
the Brasilia aircraft and, in the future, to the AMX fighter. Certainly EMBRAER will
not hire more people just to keep this contract on schedule. There is evidence
that the company is using three shifts a day of eight hours each in the critical
departments, which may include the composites department also.
Despite lack of data to answer this question, the assumptions made lead
to an estimated value on this variable of low .
Q8) Does this offset improve exports?
The subcontract to develop and produce outboards flaps for a top
advanced aircraft represents a way for EMBRAER to establish a market for
components using the composite material technology. This contract would open
to EMBRAER a great opportunity to compete technically and commercially with
other industries in the U.S. for the supply of components made using this
technology. It is really difficult to forecast if it will happen for sure. According to
MCD, EMBRAER is considered now by the company as a reliable supplier and
future agreements with MCD certainly will occur [Ref. 9]. EMBRAER is concerned
about executing their agreements with United States companies, expecting that this
strategy will result, in a future medium to long term "two-way street" approach.
EMBRAER has been seeking a partner to be more competitive in the U.S. market
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with its Tucano trainer, and MCD has expressed interest'". Another approach that
answers partially this question is the VARIG capacity in exporting its services. With
the new aircraft, the company may set up a relevant market and may export better
services. This variable is graded as medium because the proportion of offset (10%)
is relatively low, but it is balanced with the future benefits in opening the export
market.
Q9) Does this agreement enhance the financial viability of the
project?
Both the VARIG and EMBRAER contracts are using financial
arrangements but they are considered separately, without any financial link. It
means that countertrade, if accepted by the MAER, will not add any financial
benefits beyond the previous arrangements. The EMBRAER contract does not
include any foreign direct investment by MCD, either. This variable is graded as
low because the countertrade, even considering the terms accepted by the MAER,
will not result in any financial benefits, in the case of both the EMBRAER and
VARIG contracts.
Q10) What are the internal and external political motivations for this
agreement?
The main internal motivation found in both the VARIG contract and the
EMBRAER contract is found in the Aeronautics Ministry department called DAG.
This department is now responsible for coordinating the Subcommission of
'"In interview at MCD, it was mentioned that a possibility exists for MCD and
EMBRAER to be allied to win the USAF and US NAVY bid for the substitution of
the Fairchild T-46 jet trainer [Ref. 9 and 13].
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Commercial Compensation (SCC) activities. The MD-1 1 case is estimated as one
of the first applications of the regulation enacted in December 1988. Even If the
MAER considers the EMBRAER contract as an offset credit and misses the
opportunity to require 10% compensation from MCD, it is believe that the contracts
will be beneficial in future negotiations With U.S. aircraft manufacturers. The initial
difficulty is to develop a way of thinking about offset. It is difficult to convince
companies such as VARIG of the overall benefits of this policy and to require this
company to include the offset clause in its acquisition contract'".
Because the motivation to have the offset program implemented starting
with this agreement only came from the Aeronautics Ministry, and seems to have
been supported by the other government sectors, this variable is graded as low .
Q11) How does this government act in this offset?
This case is the first identifiable opportunity that the Brazilian government
has had to implement its offset policy at least for the acquisition of large
commercial jets. The government has been controlling the acquisition of foreign
aircraft since 1974, not only to protect the domestic industry, but to control the
volume of aircraft and the safety and maintenance requirements'^. The government
also has actively supported the negotiations in a second phase, basically on the
'^he buyer company (e.g., VARIG) always has the impression that this clause
will harden the negotiation, with the supplier increasing the price of the contract to
cover the administrative costs of these offsets. There is no evidence that this has
occurred in this case but many offset specialists have pointed to this drawback for
recipients.
'**The COTAC requirements to have the petition approved include the aircraft
fabrication date and maintenance facilities that will be used [Ret. 12:p. 32].
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offset clause arrangement discussions. It seems that the new Subcommission of
Commercial Compensation (SCC) will be responsible for controlling the offset
fulfillment. But for this case, it seems that this department is still waiting for a major
decision from the government as to whether it will consider the EMBRAER contract
as the offset for the VARIG contract. Perhaps after this definition, SCC may
implement some of the fulfillment controls.
The government participation in this agreement has been effective in
establishing regulations requiring offsets, being an active negotiator, and setting up
some government departments responsible for managing this type of special offset
agreement. On the other side, this Aeronautics Ministry movement has been
isolated and autonomous instead of an integrated governmental action. Because
of this duality, this variable is graded as medium .
Q12) What are the political and social pressures of this agreement?
The evidence of political and social pressures in this agreement are
unknown.
Military factor (industrial defense, international prestigious, military
capability, and independence and non-vulnerability)
Because this is a civilian case of offset, the military factor is not
applicable.
OFFSET OUTCOME
The expected outcome of a typical countertrade agreement is sometimes
very nebulous. The benefits obtained through an agreement like the MD-11 are
only partially available due to the numerous variables that are difficult to identify.
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For example, if the government decides to impose this offset policy and It becomes
evident that the price of the aircraft is increasing because of the offset clause, who
will pay the difference between the price with offset and the price without offset?
The following outcomes of the MD-11 raise some interesting points that will be
used as the basis for further recommendations to the Brazilian government in
Chapter Six. The MD-11 case results Is shown on Table 8.
Q18) Does this agreement provide Independent technological
capabilities?
The MD-11 case reveals some Interesting results which occur in the
countertrade type of offset. Although the transfer environment and the suppliers
characteristics are favorable in most of these offset transactions, the integration of
technology does not reach the same level as it would In another type of offset.
This may prove that offsets in this particular area (countertrade) sometimes are not
required by the buyer but are used mainly by the sellers as a tool to marketing
competitively. Another observation is that the technology transferred through
countertrade arrangements is not considered "leading" technology. The explanation
for this is that some transactions are not really a good deal for sellers because of
fierce competition and the fact that negotiations tend to reduce the profit margin.
Large aircraft manufacturers are not always willing to transfer "high-tech" to
recipient countries because the contract does not cover the administrative costs
Involved In this transfer. Another observation collected In Interviews and evidenced
in this particular case is that developing-country industries must have a technical
capacity Installed previous to the contract because legislation requiring offsets
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should be supported by the capacity to offer the service or production
competitively. For example, it would be very difficult for the Brazilian government
to require MCD to transfer part of the production if the Brazilian companies would
not already have the technical capability to produce wing flaps with composite
materials.
In summary, this case demonstrates that EMBRAER was perfectly
capable technically to accomplish the contract. But the technology transferred to
EMBRAER did not add to its technological capability. Therefore, the technological
capability outcome rests between these two extremes, and the value is medium .




Q17) OFFSET TYPE COUNTERTRADE
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY LOW
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT HIGH
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
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Q19) Does this offset improve Brazilian national security?
It is not expected that countertrade arrangements result in large benefits
for the national security outcome as was defined in this thesis. Although
countertrade has been supported politically in other countries, the same does not
happen in Brazil. The reasons why these arrangements are not made frequently
ranges from total lack of knowledge of their benefits to difficulty in getting political
support from the various government sectors. The initiative of the Aeronautics
Ministry in establishing a sectoral offset policy has been supported only partially by
the airlines companies, since many barriers still existe in private sector. The socio-
political factor is very important in the implementation of an offset policy if it is to
achieve successfully the estimated benefits. Although spinoffs to the military may
flow from this agreement, this factor was not analyzes. Summing up, because of
the lack of commitment from other government sectors in supporting the offset
policy, and the lack of firm evidence regarding possible spinoffs, this outcome is





QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION MEDIUM
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION MEDIUM
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES UNKNOWN
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE N / A
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE N / A
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY N / A
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY N / A
OUTCOME
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY MEDIUM
Q20) Does this offset improve Brazilian economic capability?
The economic benefits of countertrade agreements are always
questioned by economists. It is obvious that the MD-11 agreement has benefited
the Brazilian economic capability by supporting jobs, promoting exports of
Brazilian-made products, improving the production efficiency, etc. But if this
countertrade would not have happened, would these things happen anyway? The
EMBRAER contract was signed before the legislation was enacted and VARIG had
already specified the MCD aircraft before any agreement had been negotiated. The
offset arrangement, as considered by the Aeronautics Ministry, would not improve
the financial capability of the Brazilian companies involved. The probability of saving
hard currency is remote because of the foreign exchange difference, which would
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have benefited the Central Bank but at the same time hurt EMBRAER's foreign
exchange account. Due to this pessimistic evaluation of the results, incremented
by Brazil's critical economic situation at the time of this agreement, the economic
capability outcome is expected to be Iqw. The general grades under this outcome




Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LOW
Q7) JOBS CREATION LOW
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION MEDIUM
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY LOW
OUTCOME





Q17) OFFSET TYPE COUNTERTRADE
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY LOW
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT HIGH
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LOW
Q7) JOBS CREATION LOW
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION MEDIUM
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY LOW
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION MEDIUM
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION MEDIUM
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES UNKNOWN
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE N / A
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE N / A
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY N / A
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY N / A
OUTCOME VARIABLES GRADE
Q18) TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q2 0) ECONOMIC BENEFITS MEDIUM
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B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
This section analyzes an example of a technology transfer type of offset. The
trade of advanced military technology through offset arrangements is one of the
most complex transactions, because it attempts to balance the needs of a recipient
country with the requirements of the supplier country national security. The threat
arises from the recipient country abilities to exploit the technological capabilities of
a system through reverse engineering and then promote other transfers to non-
allied nations. Specifically the U.S. government stringently controls transfers of
advanced weapons systems abroad, placing extensive restrictions on the buyer
("end-user" clause). The BRASILSAT case powerfully shows how offset and
technology are related and how the other socio-political, economical, and military
factors reacted.
1. The BRASILSAT Program Case
The BRASILSAT case is related to the Brazilian government acquisition
of two communication satellites and their respective launcher services to replace
two existing ones that were orbited in 1985 and 1986. The case is a typical case
of an offset arrangement in which technology transfer is the key characteristic. This
case is currently being negotiated, so the answers to each of the questions (i.e.,
the values generated for each of the variables) represent forecasts by the author.
017) What are the offset agreement characteristics?
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The main contracts and respective offset agreements are currently being
negotiated'®'. The subjects of the major contracts are the acquisition of two
communication satellites and two respective launcher packages, both to be
delivered in 1995 and 1996. The second generation satellites (BRASILSAT B1 and
B2) will be orbited in substitution of existing orbited satellites BRASILSATs A1 and
A2 (the first generation agreement), after their active life is extinguished'".
The companies involved in the satellite bid are Spar Aerospace Ltd.
from Canada'^, Hughes and General Electric from the United States, Matra from
France, and Dornier from West Germany. The others involved in the launcher
service bid are McDonnell Douglas (MOD with the DELTA II or THOR rockets),
and Ford Aerospace (TITAN rocket) from the U.S., Arianespace (ARIANE rocket)
from France, and the Chinese Great Wall Industry Corporation (Long March
The Brazilian government opened an international bid in February 1989.
Some McDonnell Douglas officials believe that the main reason for the Brazilian
government delaying the negotiations is the presidential elections in Brazil in
November 1989 [Ref. 1].
'^he author is assuming that this second generation satellite agreement will
be divided into two parts, one related to the satellites and the other related to the
launcher service. In the first generation agreement. Spar was the major contractor
and it was responsible for the Ariane subcontract to launch the satellites. This
division does not mean that they are completely independent at this time. In fact,
they continue to be intrinsically connected.
'**This is the same company that built Brazil's first generation of domestic
communication satellites under license from Hughes Aircraft Co. in 1985.
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rocket). These three groups of bidders will be analyzed as the U.S. group, the
French group, and the Chinese group"^.
In the satellite bid, two state-owned Brazilian Telecommunication
companies are responsible for managing the satellite bid: EMBRATEL (Empresa
Brasileira de Telecomunicagoes) andTELEBRAS (Telecomunicagoes Brasileiras)'".
Both companies share the responsibility to operating the Sistema Brasileiro de
Comunicagoes Via Satelite (SBTS) and have experience in negotiating international
bids. The National Institute of Space Research (INPE) is responsible for developing
the Brazilian Satellites and gives some technical support to the choice and
localization of satellites.
The firms that presented proposals also included offsets. In the U.S.
group, Hughes offset proposal includes a countertrade of auto parts'^. In the
French consortium, the Canadian Spar offset proposal includes the acquisition of
EMBRAER Tucanos for the Canadian Air Force and space segment components
'^'Negotiating with these three different groups is complicated by the technical
incompatibility between satellites and launcher vehicles. According to McDonnell
Douglas officials interviewed, the Delta rocket cannot launch Spar satellites
because of weight and other incompatibilities. It was not determined if the same
occurs with the Hughes satellites to be launched with the Ariane rocket. The
Chinese compatibility is unknown [Ref. 1].
'^'EMBRATEL is the SBTS owner and operator. TELEBRAS is responsible for
domestic long distance links and all international services [Ref. 2].
'"In 1985, General Motors (GM) acquired Hughes Aircraft Company. Becoming
part of GM broadens considerably the potential offsets that Hughes did not have
to offer in BRASILSAT's first generation agreement. GM plans to handle the offset
side of the contract in auto parts. GM in Detroit already imports from its Brazilian
subsidiary some $120 million in 1988 and also imports from other Brazilian
companies [Ref. 3].
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in composite materials also from the same Tucano's manufacturer [Ref. 3] . An
interesting point is that both proposals did not include either technical assistance
or technology transfer, including only countertrade and subcontract of 100% of the
contract value offered'*".
In the launcher service bid, the Brazilian Aeronautics Ministry,
responsible for conducting the military side of the space program and for following
an "Intrinsic offset policy"'*, asked for the transfer of missile technology in offset for
the launcher service contract'". McDonnnell Douglas and Arianespace had already
presented their proposals, creating a controversy related to the transfer of sensible
missile technology to third world countries [Ref. 5]. The Chinese proposal has not
been publicized up to now'^^ The McDonnell Douglas proposal includes the offer
"*rhis consortium includes the France's Matra. This alliance was done probably
to reach technically the Hughes new version satellite.
'**lt was not possible to access the solicitation for the satellites bid that would
include any clause requiring offset. As said before, there is no legislative
requirement to report offsets. The first agreement had some kind of technical
assistance to train EMBRATEL personnel to operate the satellite communication,
but no technology transfer was mentioned.
'"The author means by this term an offset policy that the Aeronautics Ministry
has concentrated on, although there is no evidence of the existence of a written
document or regulation specifically about satellites and launcher service
negotiation.
'"It was not possible to ascertain the type of technology that MAER asked in
offset for the launcher service. It is supposed that Brazil had asked for liquid-fuel
and guidance systems technologies, both under Category I of the MTCR. With
these technologies the recipient country may be capable of launching rockets with
a range of 300 km with a "circle of error probable" (CEP) of 10 km [Ref. 4].
"^According to Marcio Nogueira Bartx)sa, head of INPE, the agreement is still
being negotiated with China [Ref. 3].
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to let Brazilian aerospace engineers perform 60 worker-years of labor on projects
such as the proposed U.S. orbiting space station, two scholarships for Masters or
Doctoral degrees at Purdue University, and an option for marketing services inside
the U.S. for Brazilian products'^. The Arianespace offset proposal includes the
transfer of Viking rocket technology. Both proposals seem to reach 100% of the
original contract value'*. The U.S. price proposed was about $110 million for the
two launches. The French amount is unknown but considering that Brazil paid $130
million to Spar (total contract including satellites and launcher services) and Ariane
offered $58 million just for the first two launches^, it seems that the difference
favoring France Is not significant^'. Therefore, for the launcher service, both offset
proposals include transfer of technology, although MCD proposed what is
considered "know-how".
'^he information about the last two offers comes from a personal interview
at McDonnell Douglas. The last offer is optional and it is conditioned on a payment
of $5 million for the service [Ref. 1].
'^he values were relatively easy to ascertain since the main concern in this
international bid is not the price but the offset that rests inside the contract.
^he exact value of the first generation satellites was very dubious because
of the variety of numbers reported in different sources. Two sources presented
the total estimated value of the first generation BRASILSATs, including the launcher
services, was about $250 million [Ref. 6 and 7]. Two other sources show that the
total cost of Spar contract was $131 million [Ref. 8 and 9]. A third source reduced
this last value to $122.5 million. Finally, last source shows that Ariane offered to
Spar $58 million for the two launchers ($29 million each) [Ref. 10 : p.442]. This last
source seems to be the most reliable.
^'In early 1988, Aerospatiale was charging $45 million to place a 1,100 kg
satellite in geostationary orbit, which should be add $25 million for a total insurance
mission [Ref. 10:p. 422].
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It seems that the time for implementation of both offset proposal sets will
be extended for at least 6 years (until 1996), the minimum lead-time for the last
launcher of the second satellite.
The method of enforcement that probably is going to be used for the
Brazilian government would not change, staying in the "best effort" category for
both satellites and launcher service offset proposals.
The financial arrangements included in these proposals were only
partially ascertained due to the uncertainty that surrounded the agreement. The
U.S. proposal for the satellites and respective launcher services probably would
have some financing by the Eximbank^^ To finance this project, Hughes promised
100% fixed rate credits from the U.S. Eximbank. The MCD financial arrangements
would be similar. The French proposal also includes 100% financing provided
primarily by Canada's Export Development Corp (EDC) and Compagnie Francaise
d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur (COFACE). The financial arrangements
will be one of the most important variables in defining the future of this contract
due to Brazil's external debt and the uncertain policy of the next Brazilian
government related to foreign debt^^[Ref. 3].
^In the first contract it was reported that Eximbank provided $27.6 million
toward financing the part of the project related to Hughes, that indirectly produced
27.5% of the BRASILSATs [Ref. 8 and 11].
^In the first agreement, EMBRATEL had part of the funds released through
Brazil's Central Bank, and a significant part was conditioned on an external loan
from Canadian Banks. The Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Sofia
approved a $110 million loan to Brazil for the system on behalf of a consortium
consisting of eight Canadian banks [Ref. 8].
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The "end-user" clause would be a critical factor if the U.S. releases the
rocket technology package as part of the arrangements for offset launcher service.
The U.S. is convinced that if they released this technology to Brazil, there would
be a great risk that this country would develop ballistic missiles for nuclear
purposes. The possibility of a "end-user" clause also is great in the French launcher
package, not because of their concern for releasing technology but due to the
international pressure from the signatories of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) agreement.
Q1) What type of technology will be transferred?
The technology embodied in these offset proposals is a very interesting
example of the difference between technology and know-how^. The f^CD is
offering what they called "know-how". This proposal seems to be far from what the
Brazilian government had asked, because of the U.S. government constraints in
releasing this kind of technology to Brazil. It seems that, within the U.S.
government restrictions, this offset package is the best deal that could be offered
to Brazil. The French Ariane is offering a technology package that includes the
license to produce parts of the Viking liquid rocket engine used in Ariane^[Ref. 5].
^he discussion about the technology factor was limited to the offset
proposals related to the launcher service, since the satellite proposals only contain
counterpurchase negotiations.
20Sr
For obvious reasons it was not possible to ascertain the product designs
and production techniques included in the French proposal.
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j2oe
According to some specialists this French technology is at least 25 years old
Although both offset proposals are excellent offers, the author forecasts that if the
Brazilian government officials only consider the short-term technological benefits,
they will prefer the French proposal, even with the old technology. Considering this
estimate, the type of technology variable may be graded as medium .
Q2) What is the technology transfer environment?
The technology transfer environment for this agreement Is somewhat
complex due to the numerous variables involved. The competition among the three
main groups: the U.S. group, the French (technically connected with the Canadian
consortium) group, and the Chinese group is fierce. The U.S group is highly
motivated to win this Brazilian contract, but the restrictions posed by the U.S.
government will constrain the U.S. industries' abilities to negotiate better terms with
the Brazilian government. Once more the U.S. industries may lose deals to other
competitors because of the political constraints connected to the transfer of
technology. The French group is also motivated to continue the supply of the
second generation of BRASILSATs. France is offering rocket technology under
license probably in exchange for cheap labor, abundant steel supply, proven
industrial capability, and mainly to sustain the Latin America market position [Ref.
12]. Another motivation, similar to the German restrictions in exporting arms
outside NATO countries, may be that the French will try to use indirectly the label
"made in Brazil" to overcome some of the political restrictions on its arms exports.
^his information was collected in one interview with McDonnell Douglas on
12 October, 1989 [Ref. 1].
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The Canadian Spar is also interested in maintaining its own customer in South
America. There is no evidence that Spar is seeking to transfer satellite technology
to Brazil through license or coproduction arrangements, but it would be anxious
to subcontract EMBRAER to supply the honeycomb panels in composite material
not only for the new BRASILSATs but for other future Spar sales. Finally, the
Chinese group wants to expand its market to Latin America. Although they have
a relatively low level of technology in relation to the other bidders, the transfer
environment seems to be very difficult because of language, drawings, etc. The
PRC and Brazil agreement to coproduce an earth imaging satellite to be launched
in 1992 may be an important indicator that Brazil may favor China when negotiating
agreements for technology transfers associated with satellites dissociated from the
rocket^\
Brazilian development and production of satellites and launcher vehicles
seems to be constrained basically because of lack of government funds for
research^. With insufficient funds, the Brazilian agencies have conducted only
limited research with numerous problems such as the transfers of high level
personnel to private industries. Another critical constraint is posed on the product
itself, where researchers have opted for the inexpensive but demanding process
^'This dissociation maybe is a result of the dissociation between INPE satellite
and lAE rocket initiatives.
^According to Raupp, in 1989, the INPE asked for $600 million and received
just $170 million [Ref. 13].
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of substituting technology for labor-intensive processes to make the technology
viable'^'.
The potential size of the market that would be developed Wtth the
technology acquired through this offset agreement seems to be restricted at least
in the short term. To make the product viable commercially, Brazil will need to
export home-made satellites and to provide launcher services with a competitive
price in relation to other countries. As of today, this will be difficult to achieve.
The Brazilian government's protection and exchange controls will not be
discussed because the nature of the product development (satellite or rocket) has
been already strictly controlled by the government.
In summary, the technology transfer environment is evaluated as lying
somewhere between very positive and negative. The potential for meaningful
technology transfer is enhanced by the incentive of three groups and the ability of
Brazil to absorb mid-level technology. These prospects are dampened by the
MTCR and other national political constraint, as well as the limited size of the
market for space products. An overall value of medium is assigned to this variable.
Q3) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
The main recipient for the rocket technology transfer will be the Brazilian
government through the Institute of Space Research (lAE). After the development
208,
According to Engineer Jayme Boscov, the chief of the project division of the
VLS program at lAE, the option to use four engines instead of one in the VLS is
due to lack of facilities in the industrial complex to produce turbines over 1 meter
in diameter. Another example is the use of solid-fuel instead of liquid-fuel, which is
more effective but also more expensive [Ref. 14].
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of the VLS, this project would be transferred to two companies: ORBITA, a new
company that will be responsible for coordinating the entire VLS production, and
AVIBRAS, responsible for producing the Sonda series rockets.
The lAE, one of the institutes of the CTA, has been working since 1965
in the development of the Sonda series sounding rockets. lAE has demonstrated
a continuous evolution of its rockets, even when constrained by technology
transfer. The technical absorptive capacity of rocket technology seems to be
relatively good. The potential to absorb this technology and to make it
commercially viable seems to be one of the first objectives after the complete
development of the VLS program. As happened with the Sonda series, lAE would
also transfer the VLS to the companies in charge for the series production. This
variable is also estimated as medium .
Q4) What are the suppliers firm's characteristics?
The prospective suppliers for this agreement are very interested in being
the main contractor, some with commercial incentives and others with political
incentives. The prospective suppliers are also divided in three groups. They will be
analyzed as supplying the overall system, consisting of satellites and their
respective launch services. As said before, some companies are, intentionally or
not, interconnected technically. For example, the DELTA II rocket cannot launch
Spar satellites because of technical incompatibilities. Besides this technical
connection, the European companies also have formed consortia to improve their
technical and financial leverage in competitions. The characteristics of each
company are detailed on Appendix B, to this chapter, BRASILSAT Bidders Profile.
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The first bidding group consists of Hughes and McDonnell Douglas.
Both are situated in the U.S. and they are supported by forces in the U.S.
government that are interested in winning this contract in Brazil. They say this is
a "great chance" to have Brazil become a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation
agreement^'". MDC will offer the launch service of its new rocket, DELTA II. The
company has an excellent tradition in launcher services for more than 25 years. Its
participation in the recent NASA Space Station program as one of the major
contractors demonstrates its technological capability. The aviation part of the
company has been contracting with EMBRAER for the development of composite
materials products, and the relationship between supplier and recipient has been
very good. Hughes is a traditional company in manufacturing earth satellites for
communication. The company has demonstrated some success in the transfer of
technology to other countries, exemplified by the success of the Canadian Spar,
which produced the first generation of BRASILSATs in 1985 under Hughes license,
and today is competing together with Hughes for an international bid.
The second bidding group consists of Spar from Canada and
Arianespace from France. Because they offered the best technology package,
both were selected on the last Brazilian acquisition and they look like the most
probable winners. Spar is a relatively new firm but it is leading a Canadian group
^'"During one interview with McDonnell Douglas, it was emphasized that the
export license from the Office of Munition of the Department of State took only 4
weeks to be approved, when the normal time is around 13 weeks [Ref. 1].
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of companies that will work jointly in the NASA Space Station^''. The previous
relationship between Spar and Brazilian companies was not discovered, but it is
assumed to be good because of Spar's interest in expanding the Latin American
market. Ariane has gained a lot of experience with the Ariane series. It has already
launched 38 rockets from its two launcher bases in Korou, Guiana. The advantages
accruing to Ariane in this competition are the offset package, the price, and the
launcher base location^'^
The third group is China. The Great Wall Industry has developed a
continuous sales campaign and has won at least eight foreign orders to launch
commercial satellites since 1987. Most of the success of the Chinese launch
services has been attributed to their willingness to admit customer's spacecraft
previous inspection, and the owners themselves may convey their satellites to the
launch site. Another key aspect of China's continuing space expansion is based
on acceptance that it must be a two-way street business. This last feature is
observed through the constant Chinese interest in cooperation and technological
exchanges with the rest of the world sometimes involving the construction of
launch sites abroad^'^ From April 1970 (Long March 1) to September 1987, China
^''Canada was the first country that entered into the Space Station program
because of its technological level.
^'^he location of the launcher base was an important factor considered by the
Brazilian government in the first generation agreement. Being closer than the U.S.
launcher base (Cape Canaveral), the Ariane rocket saved some fuel and this will
add about one year to the life time of the satellites [Ref. 15 and 10:p. 3].
*'^lt is reported that China proposed the construction of an $800 million
equatorial launch site in Indonesia [Ref. 10:p. 17].
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had launched 21 rockets, and it has a world record 100% success rate in payload
disposition. Despite this success, the Chinese have some financial problems and
are economically restricted to only two launches a year[Ref. 10:p. 18].
Because the French group is forecast as the winner of this competition
due to Its technology package and previous successful experience in launcher
services and satellites, this variable is graded also as medium instead of high if the
U.S. would release its rocket technology.
Q5) Will this technology be integrated?
The technology integration variable is one of the most important from the
perspective of the Brazilian government. The first critical point is time. Because of
the serious political consequences of this delay, the increasing gap between the
development of the VLS by the Aeronautics Ministry (MAER) and the construction
of the satellites by INPE seems to be the MAER main concern at this time. In this
case, the French proposal, which only partially achieves the technology transfer
objective, seems to be the best short-term option. The second point is personnel
skills. The main concern of the MAER is to maintain its cadre of scientists
technically and financially satisfied with the VLS development program. Because
of the economic situation, scientists and engineers are transferred to private
companies, looking for better salaries, even to work in a completely different
environment from research. The third point about the proportion of the service
sector in relation to specialized sector was not assessed numerically, but this
proportion may be estimated from the INPE institute that has in its cadre 5% with
doctor's degrees, 10% with master's degrees, and 28% with bachelor's degrees.
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Theses percentages, although from the other center, may be used to give an idea
of the high level of researchers in lAE.
Considering time, skills, and the proportion of service sector in the VLS
program, the technology integration capacity is rated as high .
Q6) Does this offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
In October 1987, the Minister of Aeronautics Otavio Moreira Lima stated
that the launch of SONDA IV rocket vy/as of vital importance for the development
of rockets like the Ariane, and with the improvement of current technology
development, Brazil would be able to launch its own satellite at a much lower cost
and would save hard currency in the future [Ref. 16]. The benefits in savings of
hard currency in this agreement assume various dimensions. First, with the
development of the VLS, Brazil wouldn't need to expend foreign currency for future
launcher services. The same would occur with the satellites. Another saving
obtained since the BRASILSATs A1 and A2 has been that Brazilian companies do
not need to pay for leasing other satellites from other countries (e.g., International
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium - INTELSAT).
The conservation of foreign currency through future savings has been
one important motivation in this agreement, although it does not seem to occur
enough in the short term to improve the economic capability outcome. The grade
for this variable is medium .
Q7) Does this agreement create jobs?
It seems that the main motivation of this proposed offset agreement
related to the creation of jobs is to support the employment of the high level
163
scientists, engineers and technicians not only in lAE but also in INPE. Another
aspect of the offset proposal relates to the employees from GM of Brazil and
EMBRAER whose numbers will increase due to the sales increasing in autoparts
and Tucanos, and composite materials respectively. Internationally, this contract
seems to be very small to cause such employment impact, but considering that
these two companies are working close to full capacity and the relatively cheap
labor cost in Brazil, one offset of $110 million is relatively a medium impact.
Q8) Does this offset improve exports?
On the satellite side it is obvious that if Brazilian companies will obtain
the technology through offset, this will contribute to export expansion in basically
two ways. First, Brazil may sell satellites and launcher services to other countries.
Some governments such as Iraq have already received proposals from the
Brazilian government for the acquisition of a military observation satellite made in
Brazil. This satellite is expected to have the same basic requirements established
by INPE for the first Brazilian satellite for remote sensing from an orbit of an altitude
of 700 km and weighing about 150 kg. The Brazilian proposal also includes the
possibility of Iraq procuring a lab for manufacturing and testing satellites similar
to the INPE facility in Sao Jose dos Campos. The Brazilian made satellite costs $40
million and has at least France as the other competitor in this bid. Second, Brazil
may lease some channels and television programs and this may be considered as
service export. The leasing of spare capacity with other countries is a profitable
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business^'". The television business is of somewhat more economic interest for
Brazil. Brazilian television has reached the international pattern, and "mini-series"
and soap operas are being exported to Portugal and various Spanish speaking
countries.
Because of the long-term return on the investment and the Brazilian
inexperience in marketing future products due to the projects being strictly
restricted to the government without private companies participation, this variable
would be considered as low impact.
Q9) Does this agreement enhance the financial viability of the
project?
The actual financial situation of Brazil is critical. The situation of
maintaining the highest external debt in the world leaves Brazil very vulnerable and
with low leverage in financing these kinds of space projects. Officials in developed
countries always feel right in asking: Why BRASILSATs and rocket technology if
the Brazilian people need urgent social programs? Despite this situation, Brazil has
continued to obtain financing from foreign commercial banks and other financial
entities such as IMF, Paris club, etc. The offset in this case will be used as a
resource to continue buying critical equipment without increasing the level of
indebtedness. The conditions offered by the bidders seem appropriate for obtaining
interim financing between the time of acquiring satellites and launcher services, and
^'"EMBRATEL offered to lease channels for between $1 and $1.6 million or to
sell them at $4.8 million each to seven neighboring Latin American countries -
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay and Bolivia [Ref. 10:p. 3].
Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela are actually leasing more than 1% of Intelsat's
services [Ref. 10:p. 352].
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the time when credit is obtained for the deliveries of Tucanos, auto parts, or
composite materials.
Considering the financing offers, the lead-time to deliver the counter-
purchase, the French technology licensing, and the medium amount of foreign
currency involved, a value of medium is assigned to the impact this offset W\\\ have
on the overall economic situation.
Q10) What are the internal and external political motivations for this
agreement?
Due to the peculiarity of mixing military and civilian objectives and
ministries and the actual situation of radical change in politics in Brazil, this
agreement is expected to experience political pressures from a variety of groups.
The military certainly will continue to exert much influence in the decision-making
process. There are two major military objectives in this agreement. First, the missile
technology would provide a new way to continue the development of the SONDA
IV program that seems on hold not only because of a lack of resources but mainly
because of technical problems that are difficult to solve in a short time. Second,
the increasing international interest in the Amazon forest is causing a lot of concern
with respect to the protection of the immense jungle territory. In this case,
communication satellites certainly will help the task of remote sensing satellites in
controlling the air space, monitoring forest fires, and localization of border
invasions. Industries also have an interest in this agreement. EMBRAER, for
example, may expand the market for its Tucanos to the Canadian Air Force,
considered an important step in the marketing of this trainer aircraft. Other political
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motivations will be expressed through the two new civilian Ministries
(Communication and Science and Technology) because of the importance of
continuing to supply the Brazilian customers with better services and technology
sufficient to develop indigenous satellites. Congress will be motivated to participate
in this agreement because of its new power over the Brazilian government budget.
Considering the radical changes expected in the political environment in
Brazil in 1990, the relative distribution of the decision power related to both a
military and civilian product, It is easy to assign a value of high to the socio-political
impact of this case.
Q11) How does the government act in this offset?
The Brazilian government is developing an active role in this agreement.
The negotiations certainly will be divided into two parts: the satellite part involving
the contract department of EMBRATEL and TELEBRAS, and the launcher service
contract, involving the contract sector of the MAER. Both negotiations will to be
coordinated by the COBAE. The idea of requiring offsets in each sector of
negotiations seems to be prevalent and strategically used by both sets of
government agencies. The other kinds of government action in the future may be
in financing supply or offering facilities such as Barreira do Inferno to track the
launches from Korou.
Considering the complete involvement of Brazilian government in this
agreement because of the great amount of governmental interests, it is also easy
to grade this government action variable as high in terms of contributing to the
outcome.
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Q12) What are the political and social pressures of this agreement?
It is expected that there will be significant political and social pressure for
this agreement. The new Brazilian Constitution enacted in October 1988 asked for
some complementary law to differentiate between the civilian and military parts of
the Brazilian Space Program. In 1990, with the new President, it is estimated that
Congress would have stronger influence In the definition of the new policies
concerning the restructuring of COBAE. It is also forecasted that the military would
continue with the VLS program and with the administration of Alcantara and
Barreira do Inferno launcher bases, but it would become less powerful to influence
decisions related to satellites and earth stations. This part would be shifted
completely to the companies under the responsibility of the Communications
Ministry. The technocrats will pressure the new government because of the impact
of this agreement on the foreign debt. Probably, to be approved, it will require a
detailed lease-buy analysis to justify this new second generation of satellites
besides a complete review of the first BRASILSATs cost/benefit analysis.
EMBRATEL and TELEBRAS would have an important role in concluding this
agreement. They would have power to impose a technically and economically
feasible solution, instead of a political one. Important pressures would come from
EMBRAER in favor of the Canadian proposal because of the possibility to offset
Tucanos and composite materials and also by GM of Brazil and other Detroit
suppliers towards the U.S. proposal. The labor unions are expected to improve
their leverage in these kind of agreements and they even may conflict with
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themselves^'^ For example, the Sao Bernardo do Campo labor union would be
favorable to the GM (Hughes) proposal and the EMBRAER union would prefer the
Spar proposal, which would provide more jobs. Finally, the population also would
exert tremendous pressure if the press started announcing, for example, that the
Brazilian people would not watch their favorite soccer team live If the satellite facility
would not be possible anymore, in case of problems in replacing the first
generation BRASILSATs.
The increasing socio-political democratization of the country certainly
will bring agreements to a more detailed discussion in various sectors, either inside
the government or other civilian sectors. It would be estimated that the socio-
political pressures will be high in influencing this agreement, particularly as it relates
to the overall national security.
Q13) What are the benefits of this agreement for national industries
producing military equipment?
The improvement of the space industry is always a major challenge for
any country. The spinoff benefits that this technology brings to the technical
improvement of the weapons systems is substantial. The agreement includes the
technology necessary for Brazilian launcher rocket development. According to
some specialists, the spinoffs of this technology for the development of ballistic
missiles for military purposes are a fact that not only involves Brazil but also most
215|
In the beginning of 1988, The EMBRATEL labor union cancelled contracts
because they were a breach of the constitutional principal of state monopoly in
telecommunication. This incident cost the entire board of EMBRATEL their
jobs[Ref. 17].
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of the developing countries that produce arms. The missile is an inexpensive and
effective weapon. Due to a series of developed countries boycotts, the third world
turned to develop its own indigenous missiles, based mainly on technology transfer
or heavy domestic R&D. The question of Brazil redirecting its space program to
specifically develop medium and long-range missiles is somewhat complex and
beyond the scope of this thesis. But taking for granted that Brazil is using this
process to improve its missile production, this process has been slowed down by
the technological gap and barriers imposed by developed countries. Therefore, this
variable grade was medium due to the significant gap between the success in
developing commercially and technically feasible ballistic missiles for military
purposes.
Q14) Does this agreement bring international prestige?
The acquisition of two more satellites and even the substitution for the
other two that are still in orbit will bring high international prestige to Brazil. The
BRASILSAT's make Brazil a member of a select group of countries that have the
same level of independence. It is the only country in South America that has its
own satellite system. EMBRATEL has been offering to lease channels or sell them
to seven neighboring Latin American countries - Colombia, Peru, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia [Ref.10 : p. 3]. This kind of commercial
cooperation certainly will give Brazil a leading position in the continent. Some of the
Latin American countries are not satisfied with INTELSAT'S intergovernmental
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agreement that is based on the same price for all users of its services, regardless
of the number of circuits a country requires^'^
Q1 5) How does the technology embodied in this offset improve the
national military capability?
The utilization of communication and remote sensing satellites has been
one important feature that improves the air-space control and military
communications in distant locations. Brazil has been dealing with a lot of
communication problems towards the south and north regions. The dense Amazon
forest has been one of the most difficult locations to access. The previous
INTELSAT services were not dealing with this kind of demand because of their
location. This is one of the reasons why Brazil chose to have their own satellites,
in specific orbit locations to better access this region. Today, in terms of satellite
communications, the Brazilian military is sharing the same facilities as the civilian
systems, but in the future probably the services will have their own systems. In
terms of rocketry, Brazil has continually developed and produced rocket systems
which are very inexpensive and simple, but very effective at a short distance^'^ The
expansion of the range, the payload capacity, and the precision are now the main
objectives.
^'®ln the case of Colombia and Peru, they are arguing that INTELSAT cannot
provide the circuits they need for Spanish-language live feeds at prime time [Ref.
10:p. 352].
^'^There is an interesting trade-off between range and payload in ballistic missile
systems. If you reduce the payload, the range improves and vice-versa.
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Objectively, the military capability variable may be improved with time.
Today, it seems that the technology embodied in this offset proposal will give a
medium contribution to Brazil's military capability.
Q16) How does this agreement contribute to the country's
independence and non-vulnerability?
This last variable may be analyzed with one example of dependence and
vulnerability that a country has if it continues to have satellites under leasing with
a developed country. In 1982, during the Malvinas war the United States turned off
the GOES satellite, and Argentina had no other source for remote sensing [Ref.
13]. The same may happen to any other developing country with the same
vulnerability. Therefore, it is easy to see that this agreement, although not
satisfactory in all aspects, would bring, at least, partial independence because the
communication satellites are an important part of the entire range of resources
that may be available from space^'^ This variable was graded as medium
importance in determining the outcome of this case.
OFFSET OUTCOME
The outcome variables of this case show interesting findings as a result
of a supposed offset package obtained in compensation by the acquisition of
satellites and launcher services. Because is difficult to label this case as a "civilian
case" due to the numerous applications of satellite and rocket technology for
military purposes, all four factors were analyzed. The results from these
^'^Brazil is still using INTELSAT (a small portion) and Landsat for remote
sensing. The central station of remote sensing is located in INPE [Ref. 18 and 10:p.
3].
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independent variables were grouped in three main outcomes as was explained in
Chapter One and are shown on Table 12.
Q18) Does this agreement provide independent technological
capabilities?
The rocket technology that Brazil needs to continue developing its VLS
program is considered fundamental for the process of negotiating offset
agreements In the satellites acquisition and launch services. Despite the fact that
the Brazilian government has been making great efforts to obtain technology
sufficient to reduce the delays and technological bottlenecks of the VLS program,
this action has been boycotted by developed countries. The final outcome would
be a serious constraint for the technology barrier. All of the five independent
variables related to this outcome predict that this future agreement will have a
medium impact on the independent technological capability. The results are shown
on Table 9.
Table 9
CASE: BRAS I LSAT
VARIABLES GRADE
Q17) OFFSET TYPE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION HIGH
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OUTCOME
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) Does this offset improve Brazilian national security?
The socio-political and military factors discussed indicate that this
agreement will be tremendously affected by the political environment in Brazil
today. This fact may change previous behavior and traditions, such as the
predominant position of the military over the space program, the passive role of
Congress, and also the new direction of state-owned enterprises such as
EMBRATEL and TELEBRAS towards privatization. All of these changes will lead to
a high national security capability outcome representing all of the substantive
changes in the Brazilian government objectives in the 1990s, shifting from "military
application" of the technology in the arms production to a wider "civilian application"
of the same technology to socially improve the living conditions of the Brazilian
people. The grades under this offset outcome is found on Table 10.
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Table 10
CASE: BRAS I LSAT
VARIABLES GRADE
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVES HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES HIGH
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE MEDIUM
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE HIGH
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH 1
Q20) Does this offset improve Brazilian economy capability?
The economic benefits of this agreement are a consequence of the
previous technology and national security benefits. This means if the Brazilian
government is to solve its dramatic economic problems, they need the technology
and the socio-political resurgence first. In a small scale of this agreement, it is draw
every risks that the Brazilian government may be exposed if it won't be able to
continue weighing these three outcomes in every international negotiation. The
variable results from this outcome show that perhaps a large gap will still exist in
the commercialization of the rocket technology obtained through this offset
agreement. This result also may direct the Brazilian officials to a more detailed
study about the short and long term benefits of this technology, which will certainly
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help in establishing adequate strategies. The outcome of this agreement is graded
as a medium contribution to improve the economic capability. This outcome grade
is explained on Table 11.
Table 11
CASE: BRAS I LSAT
VARIABLES GRADE
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS MEDIUM
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION LOW
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME





Q17) OFFSET TYPE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTS MEDIUM
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION HIGH
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS MEDIUM
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION LOW
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY MEDIUM
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES HIGH
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE MEDIUM
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE HIGH
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME VARIABLES GRADE
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q2 0) ECONOMIC BENEFITS MEDIUM
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C. LICENSED PRODUCTION
This section shows two examples of licensed production offset agreements.
Licensing is becoming very instrumental in technology transfer. The term usually
contains the basic element of granting a right at a price. A licensing agreement
transfers industrial property rights (patents and trademarks) and technical know-
how to an unaffiliated licensee in return for compensation (royalties or license fees)
paid to the licensor. The two cases of licensed production agreements provide a
comparison between a civilian and a military agreements in which the government
participation is the crucial difference. Another important factor is the time. For
instance, the Piper cooperation program (in 1974) found a more favorable
environment than the Aerospatiale project (1988). Finally, the cases define the
differences in the government support which is related to the government
proprietorship and control over the industry.
1. The Piper General Aviation Case*"
The Piper general aviation case was selected as an example of a
licensed production type of offset agreement^. Like in the previous cases, this
case will be analyzed within the same framework described in Chapter Two. The
Piper case is a relatively old case of the mid-1970s, but it still remains as an active
contract. The case is a cooperation agreement formed between EMBRAER and
^'^his discussion is based on Baranson [Ref. 1 and 2] and various periodical
articles.
220/One point that should be emphasized is that this agreement Is an example
of a civilian offset, where there is no government-to-government agreement. This
characteristic fits with the definition of licensed production made in Chapter Two.
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Piper for manufacturing small and medium general aviation Piper models in Brazil
under license. It is a very typical case of the commercial offset relationship between
companies, where the government acted more as a policy maker than as a direct
agent. In addition, this case emphasizes the technology transfer as a strategy to
shorten the production time of aircraft with the objective of dominating the market.
Q17) What are the offset agreement characteristics?
In August, 1974 Piper Aircraft Corporation entered into a 10-year
industrial cooperation program with EMBRAER, based on two agreements -- one
for single engine aircraft and the other for twin-engine aircraft - which allowed
EMBRAER to select any Piper model it wished for local production [Ref. 3:p. 18].
It was the first EMBRAER important joint venture for EMBRAER in the civil aviation
field. Under this licensed production agreement EMBRAER has been producing six
aircraft models: the Navajo (Navajo Chieftain), the Seneca, the Minuano (Cherokee
six), the Corisco (Arrow II), the Sertanejo, and the Carioca (Pathfinder) [Ref. 4:p.
50]. Table 13 shows the Piper models produced by EMBRAER. This program is
basically a licensed production agreement, but at the time the agreement was
signed it was expected that, in the medium and long term, it could provide for the
cooperative development [Ref. 2:p. 31].
Piper has been responsible for providing the necessary assembly and
the parts manufacturing know-how, as well as for assisting in some areas such as
quality control, materials handling, and manufacturing^' [Ref. 5:p. 29]. The
221
1
'Piper also includes in the agreement an option to use its international
distribution system for aircraft that may be exported from Brazil.
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TABLE 13
PIPER MODET.S PRODUCED BY EMBRAER
MODEL NAME PIPER MODEL CAPACITY
(EMB) (EMBRAER) (CREW+PASS)
710 CARIOCA PA-28-236 DAKOTA 1 + 3
711T CORISCO PA-28-RT-201 ARROW 1 + 3
711ST CORISCO PA-28-RT-201T TURBO ARROW 1 + 3
712D TUPI PA-28-181-ARCHER II 1 + 3
720D MINUANO PA-32-301-SARATOGA 1 + 5/6
721D SERTANEJO PA-32-3 01-SARATOGA SP 1 + 5/6
810D SENECA III PA-34-220T-SENECA III 1 + 5/6
820C NAVAJO PA-34-22 0T-NAVAJO CHIEFTAIN 1 + 7/9
N-821 CARAJA SCHAFER COMANCHERO 500 (*) 1 + 7/9
Source: General Information, Brazilian Aeronautical
Industry, EMBRAER, Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil.
agreement permits EMBRAER to: (1) fabricate Piper aircraft for sale in a domestic
market and, occasionally, to produce jointly with the U.S. company for foreign
market sales; (2) replace on a gradual scale Piper-supplied components with
EMBRAER-fabricated products; (3) initiate cooperative programs, sharing
development and production of a new aircraft with the object of selling in domestic
or foreign markets; and (4) market one another's products through individual
distribution networks.
The price of the contract was not ascertained because of the numerous
phases of the contract containing different kits and consequently different prices.
No royalties have been paid for this agreement. The U.S. firm's compensation has
been primarily a percentage return on the components shipped to EMBRAER.
Although the returns would diminish as the licensee progressively substitutes local
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content for these imported outputs, Piper would continue to be paid a fee for
support service. Since 1983, Neiva has been assembling imported parts from the
U.S. and parts produced in Brazil. At that time, the licensed production program
was extended to 1989 [Ref. 3:p. 18].
In July 1986 a new deal was concluded with EMBRAER, which was
called Phase 8 of the main agreement^. It included the supply of 156 completely
knocked-down aircraft kits which had to be delivered in 18 months at a value of
$14 million^. At that time, the Piper president Frank Manning said that more than
2000 kits had been supplied to EMBRAER under agreements worth $100 million
[Ref. 7].
Q1) What type of technology is being transferred?
Throughout these 1 5 years of the agreement, no sort of design work has
been transferred to EMBRAER since the aircraft look similar to the Piper models.
When these models came to EMBRAER, the Bandeirante had already started its
production; that design technology was not the main motivation of EMBRAER .
Although the agreement allowed EMBRAER to make modifications on the foreign
partner designs, whenever necessary in order to make the aircraft more suitable
for local conditions, very little has been done by the recipient country to modify the
^Phase 8 requires that EMBRAER (Neiva) perform a portion of the
manufacturing and most of the aircraft assembly. Piper said that it was the most
unassembled condition that Piper has ever sold its aircraft [Ref. 6].
^he models selected were: Seneca 3, Saratoga, Turbo Arrow 4 and Archer
2 [Ref. 6].
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original designs^' [Ret. 8:p. 430]. In terms of production techniques, EMBRAER
and Neiva have benefited more in volume of production, which reduced production
costs, than the incorporation of new techniques. There is some evidence that, in
terms of components and parts, both companies have increased the proportion of
domestic content to 60%^. During this long term agreement no other evolution
happened related to development and manufacturing of a new model, but if is
evident that some component technology has been passed to EMBRAER and Its
subsidiaries and subcontractors. Because of this, it is valid to assign of medium
to the type of technology in this case.
Q2) What is the technology transfer environment?
As was explained in the introduction of this section, the Brazilian
government at that time (early 1970s) was creating new rules and establishing new
legal constraints for the transfer of technology. The domestic-content requirement
and no royalties payment clause were the Brazilian government actions in this
period which directly affected this agreement. The "law of similars" was another
tool used to allow COTAC to bar other international manufacturers entrance into
the Brazilian market of general aviation aircraft [Ref. 3:p. 18].
The competition environment during this agreement negotiation was
interesting. EMBRAER conducted negotiations with three companies: Beech,
^*The clause allowing EMBRAER to make changes in the original design was
the main point of disagreement between Cessna and EMBRAER during
negotiations.
^he acquisition of the kits in 1986 is an evidence of this improvement. Piper
shipped detailed parts and components which represent only 55 to 60% of the
value if it would be sent completely [Ref. 3:p. 18].
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Cessna, and Piper. Beech dropped out quite early, taking a contentious position
that if Brazil wanted its aircraft, it would have to import them from the U.S.
EMBRAER had a particular preference for Cessna because it enjoyed wide recogni-
tion and confidence within the country, and it had a large market share and
effective distributorship system^. Cessna's initial position was to release
technology and managerial control to EMBRAER, but some differences arose
during negotiations, and Cessna's ultimate position was negative. Two points were
basically the source of this disagreement. First, Cessna refused to grant EMBRAER
autonomy to make modifications it deemed appropriate in the Cessna aircraft
models. Second, EMBRAER wanted no royalty obligation for manufacturing know-
how acquired from the foreign partner. As a result, Cessna dropped out and Piper
was selected^'.
The protection policies imposed by the Brazilian government just one
year after the agreement was another important factor which affected directly the
success of this agreement. In 1975, the Brazilian government imposed a 50% tax
(raised from 7%) on imported small-size aircraft, and it also required the full deposit
price of each plane for one year without interest. This agreement effectively closed
the door to further impo^ts^^ In 1974, the Brazilian market for light aircraft was the
^At that time Cessna held over 60% of the Brazilian market.
^'Cavu, Cessna's Brazilian distributor, reacted with a proposal to the
government to assemble two Cessna models plus their engines, but it was turned
down [Ref. 9:p. 185].
^®ln 1973, Cessna sold more than 400 aircraft in the Brazilian market, but sold
only 5 in 1976.
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single largest export market for U.S. general aviation manufacturers. This fact,
established as result of a market study by the Brazilian government, was sufficient
to justify the import substitution of these aircraft.
The Piper case is considered to have one of the best transfer
environments, although the technology involved was not very significant. This
variable is graded as high .
Q3) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
In 1974, EMBRAER had six years of operation and It had three lines of
aircraft production: the Bandeirante (EMB-110), the Ipanema (EMB-201) and the
Xavante (EMB-326). At the end of that year the company employed 3500 people
and had a total capitalization of about $41.6 million [Ref. 10]. The only previous
experience in licensing agreements was then with the Italian company, Aermacchi,
to produce the Xavante. The international market at that time was not the main
concern, because the company was overloaded with domestic air force and civilian
airline orders. During this period of the company expansion, it was clear that the
Piper agreement was one more challenge but required more labor-intensive work
than research and development.
Since March 1980, EMBRAER has shifted the Piper models to its
subsidiary Industria Aeronautica Neiva SA (Neiva) in Botucatu, Sao Paulo. The
company was formed in 1954 and has a factory area of 23,515 sq mt, a work force
of 516, and completed the 2000th aircraft in November 1987. Neiva which had
been producing the fuselage for the EMBRAER's Ipanema, assumed complete
control of that program in the second half of 1981. The company also has been
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entirely responsible for Ipanema engineering, manufacture, and assembly and for
the production of subassemblies for the EMBRAER Tucano [Ref. 10:p. 17].
The fact of EMBRAER shifting the responsibility for Piper models appears
to be strategically important for the company in order to execute other programs
more effectively. The divisionalization approach has been a constant in EMBRAER's
strategy, which leads to decentralization without losing control.
EMBRAER capacity to technologically manage the Piper program since
the early years after its creation, and the actual capacity to technically manage
more complex programs, shows that the company takes a ranking of high on this
dimension.
Q4) What are the suppliers firm's characteristics?
Piper Aircraft Corporation is now located in Vero Beach, Florida^.
Besides the EMBRAER agreement. Piper has agreements with Chincul S.A.
(Argentina), PZL Mielec (Poland), and Aero-Industrial Colombiana - AISCA
(Colombia) [Ref. 11].
The relationship of Piper with EMBRAER has been excellent during more
than 15 years of agreement. Mutual respect, a frank approach, and flexibility on a
number of levels have been the main ingredients of this long relationship. For
instance. Piper readily agreed with the EMBRAER need for authority to modify the
chosen models for better fit into Brazilian airport conditions. At the same time, any
^In March 1984, the company became a subsidiary of Lear Siegler, Inc. The
previous manufacturing and R&D facilities at Lock Haven, Pennsylvania were
closed and a new manufacturing facility (1 2,077 sq mt) is now concentrated at Vero
Beach. In May 1987, the company was acquired by a California businessman.
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modification in its know-how for these models' production was automatically
transferred to the Brazilian partner through documentation sheets and
specifications. Two formal meetings are held annually in EMBRAER and Piper
plants alternatively, in which the problems are worked out.
The long-term relationship between Piper and the numerous other
companies besides EMBRAER is evidence of a good technology transfer strategy,
and the company managers' abilities in using this strategy to define markets in a
very competitive environment. Piper as a supplier was graded as high .
Q5) Will this technology be integrated?
Production capability for the Piper models has been transferred to
EMBRAER in three phases. During Phase I, completed structures such as
fuselage, empennage, and wings were shipped to EMBRAER for final assembly
and installation of all systems and components This phase was completed at the
first six months and included only single-engine aircraft. At Phase li, EMBRAER
received structured subassemblies for mating in jigs in addition to the functions
achieved in Phase I. Phase III was divided into three subphases: (1) to begin
replacement of Piper-supplied parts by Brazilian-made equivalents, including
interiors and 50% of both fiberglass and acrylics; (2) to complete replacement of
all remaining fiberglass and acrylics and produce all harnesses; and (3) to produce
the aircraft completely with Brazilian-manufactured parts and components, with the
exception of those that cannot be economically produced in Brazil. Upon the
completion of the last phase it was expected by EMBRAER that 66-70% of the
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Piper aircraft product would be made in Brazil. To support all these phases, Piper
engineers have provided on-site training and technical assistance.
Under the first stage of the agreement, Piper sent complete kits which
EMBRAER simply assembled and painted. During subsequent stages, EMBRAER
made some design changes and progressively substituted Brazilian-made parts for
the U.S. components. By the end of 1978, all the parts were of Brazilian origin
except those whose local production would have been "uneconomical because of
the small number involved" ^ [Ref. 4:p. 50]. Although EMBRAER at that time was
developing rapidly and very busy, the company was confident of its technical
capabilities. Therefore, the Piper aircraft series didn't seem so difficult at that time
to incorporate technologically.
One of EMBRAER's strategies was to incorporate technology through
subcontracting specialized work of other EMBRAER-affiliated aircraft companies.
It was reported that Piper also provided technical assistance to these component
supplier industries.
It was reported at the beginning of the agreement that EMBRAER
produced aircraft suffering from low-quality interiors. The materials utilized did not
hold up under hard use and to reach international markets it was necessary to
send the planes for U.S complementation. It was known that EMBRAER absorbed
technology and know-how very quickly. Although not fabricating many detail parts
such as the engine, propellers, radios, and instrumentations, EMBRAER has been
"°The uneconomical parts and components that were not made in Brazil were
acquired using Piper procurement from its own suppliers.
187
fully integrated into assembly of the aircraft kits, welding of airframe parts, some
acrylic forming, ail of the fiberglassing, all riveting, and nut and bolt assemblies. The
local content of EMBRAER models averaged 45-50% in 1981 , while Neiva averaged
40-45% [Ref. 13 and 3:p. 23].
The time element of technology integration was a very important
component of the import substitution policy. In terms of skills, the company had to
train new workers under the supervision of the more experienced people working
in the Bandeirante and Ipanema lines. The level of employment required for this
agreement was basically the assembly line laborers and the production engineers
and technicians needed to supervise the line. The relevant aspect revealed in
analyzing this variable is the economic feasibility of total integration in licensing
agreements. Some components and parts were not produced domestically
because of the insufficient market, and the option for buying them internationally
was more rational. Taking into account all of the above considerations, the value
assigned to the level of technological integration of the Piper agreement is medium .
Q6) Does this offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
The idea of reducing the drain of foreign exchange by a local production
of planes was the Brazilian government's main concern at that time. The agreement
was the best solution for entering into production quickly and to avoiding additional
development expenditures [Ref. 9:p. 185].
Between 1970 and 1974, Brazil imported 1900 small planes at a cost of
$150 million in foreign exchange. It was estimated that if imports had continued at
this rate, the country would have suffered an annual dollar outflow of $500 million
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by 1977 [Ref. 4:p. 50]. Approximately 5% of country's total expenditures in 1973
went to the U.S. aerospace industry and this figure was even higher in 1974^' [Ref.
1:p. 31]. At that time the country was severely pressured into foreign exchange
constraints due to this situation.
Under the agreement, EMBRAER was not allowed to export Piper models
directly. Restricted to the domestic market, EMBRAER Piper models produced in
Brazil in 1976 cost 50% more than those produced in the U.S. [Ref. 3]. This figure
dropped to 25% more by 1985. Table 14 shows the evolution of the Piper models
production in Brazil.
TABLE 14
PIPER MODEL PRODUCTION (annual)
YEAR 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 TOT
QTD 131 352 408 148 195 283 147 93 50 83 1890
Source: Moxon, Richard and others, Emerging Sources of
Foreign Competition of The Civil Aircraft
Manufacturing Industry , The U.S Department of
Transportation, June, 1985.
To complement the evidence of the import effectiveness substitution it
was found that between 1976-1985, the same U.S. manufacturers delivered only
43 aircraft to Brazilian customers. It was evident that the import substitution model
applied in this case to save foreign currency was successful. The foreign exchange
variable was graded as high .
Q7) Does this agreement create jobs?
"'In 1974, the U.S. manufacturers delivered 726 planes to Brazil at a total cost
of $600 million.
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It was difficult to access this variable because the company did not
divide its workshops by project, and the company was not able to provide detailed
figures. However, using Table 15 which shows the evolution of employment in
EMBRAER and Table 14 which shows the Piper model production, some estimates
may be drawn. In 1974, EMBRAER contracted for 702 new employees. At that
time, the company was working on the F-5 contract, the Bandeirante (production
rate 4 a month), Xavante (2 per month) and Ipanema production. The Piper
agreement started delivering only in the middle of 1975 [Ref. 12]. It seems that the
main employment impact occurred in 1975-76. The company hired 902 employees
(230 in 1975 and 672 in 1976)^"^. Considering that Phase I (6 months) and Phase
II just required assembling and installation of some models, it was estimated that
a great part of those new employees were hired for the assembly and material
support to speed up the delivery of planes. The exact level of the labor increment
is difficult to ascertain but the nature of the jobs conveys the conclusion that most
of the new employees were hired as production line workers, material assistants,
and mechanics.
Although this variable was not considered a fundamental motivation of
this agreement, it was clear that the production of Piper models employed an
amount of workers at the medium level.
^hese numbers increased in proportion to the volume production. The




YEAR 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
EMP. 2621 3323 3553 4225 4104 4300 4887 5957 5414 6732
Source: Moxon, Richard and others, Emerging Sources of
Foreign Competition of The Civil Aircraft
Manufacturing Industry . The U.S Department of
Transportation, June, 1985.
Q8) Does this offset Improve exports?
The Piper agreement did not allow EMBRAER to export Piper models
directly. However, Piper agreed to place its international marketing network at
EMBRAER disposal even for the Brazilian planes EMBRAER had modified [Ref. 4:p.
50]. Although EMBRAER might have used this facility to export planes, some
experts pointed out that because EMBRAER was highly engineering-intensive it
would be difficult to keep the costs down. Regardless of how well engineered an
aircraft is, unless it is price competitive in the international market, it would not be
a successful seller^.
At the time of the agreement EMBRAER was deficient in marketing
tactics, and this program was criticized by Brazilian dealers experienced in high-
pressure international markets for being insufficiently aggressive in marketing its
planes^. Besides, the Latin America market was sewed up by Cessna and Piper's
other assembly programs. Argentina and Colombia had been selling aircraft to
^he market at that time was dominated by Beech 100/200 and the
Swearingen Merlin. Retail base prices of EMBRAER's Piper models average 27%
above those charged by Piper in the U.S. Increases range from 17% from the
Chieftain to 40% for the Arrow II [Ref. 2:p. 38].
^he first export of two Bandeirantes occurred only in 1978.
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Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile^. The African market at that time
seemed too difficult to access. To market the Piper models abroad, the Brazilian
government would have to suspend the tariff barriers, which would have increased
the program's risk.
In May 1989 an agreement was announced between EMBRAER (Nelva)
and Chincul to unify markets and to divide the production of Piper models between
themselves. This accord would unify the Brazilian and Argentine markets and
divide the production tasks^ [Ref. 13].
Although EMBRAER has sold about 2000 Piper models in the domestic
market, the prices of the aircraft are still kept above U.S. levels, and this has made
further increases in local content uneconomical [Ref. 9]. The Brazilian market in
recent years has been depressed, as it has been in most of the world, and the
general aviation portion of EMBRAER business has suffered"^
Because of the commercial export restriction, which was different from
the "end-user" clause but with the same effect, and also because EMBRAER could
not reduce the Piper models cost for competitive marketing, this variable was rated
as low impact.
^^he Argentine's Piper distributor, Chincul Fabrica de Aviones SA (Buenos
Aires) was created in 1972 to assemble and gradually increase the degree of local
manufacture in some products. The company had incorporated more than 60%
local manufacture. All Piper kits delivered for several years have been for phase 3
completion. The company has a plant of 16,500 sq mt, a work force of about 300,
and had delivered more than 850 aircraft by May 1987 [Ref. 11].
^For example, the Argentine company would produce four-seats models and
Neiva those of six-seats capacity [Ref. 13].
"'By 1980, the Piper models accounted for 57% of EMBRAER's output [Ref. 9].
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not reduce the Piper models cost for competitive marketing, this variable v\/as rated
as low impact.
Q9) Does this agreement obtain financial Investment?
The financial part of this agreement is unknov^n . It appears that the
government financial participation v\/as only for purchasing some of the Piper
models in order to incorporate the Air Force transport squadron.
Q10) What are the internal and external political motivations for this
agreement?
When the agreement was signed, the major internal political motivation
was to promote foreign exchange savings due to the first oil shock in 1973 when
the imports burden increased fantastically. This motivation was observed mainly in
the Ministry of Economy. Other political motivation came from the Aeronautics
Ministry through its Department of Civilian Aviation (DAC). In 1974 the DAC enacted
legislation^ requiring that all requests for civil aircraft import licenses must receive
prior approval from the Aeronautics Ministry Committee for the Coordination of Civil
Air Transport (COTAC). The Brazilian government Foreign Trade Department
cannot approve an import request without the committee's prior approval, which
met once a month to examine such applications. The information required by the
government in this process included the price of the aircraft, financing terms,
delivery time, commission to be earned by the Brazilian agent, financial ability proof
by the buyer to make the purchase as well as a justification as to why he needs to
bring in an imported aircraft rather than using domestic airlines, air taxi or air
'""See Decree-law 74219 of 25 June 1974.
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charter services, affidavit from a Brazilian repair facility attesting that It can perform
the necessary aircraft maintenance to be purchased, and finally an explanation for
the reason why a comparable Brazilian-built aircraft was not being purchased, if it
already existed. Although this "law of similar" approach is very strict, the buyer
could still justify a small aircraft acquisition instead of the Bandeirante which Its
regulation basically tried to protect^^. Because of the role of the legislation, the
Aeronautics Ministry was looking for some effective way to cover this gap. The best
solution to definitively close the alternatives in this legislation was the domestic
production of small aircraft. The above explanation was provided to show one
isolated motivation from the Aeronautics Ministry, but except for the technocrats
from the economic sector, the other sectors seem to have had little participation.
This variable was graded as medium .
Q11) How did this government act in this offset?
This cooperation agreement has been characterized as an illuminating
example of how much a recipient company with strong government support can
negotiate for better terms on technology transfer. Since the beginning, the
government had been deeply involved in this agreement. The negotiations were
originated in a Brazilian government mission when they came to the U.S. in order
to attend a series of meetings with all the major small aircraft producers, and to
solicit proposals for a production program. At the second phase of the
negotiations, including just EMBRAER and the three U.S. companies, some
EMBRAER officials explained only their technical, managerial, manufacturing
,
and
^he legislation excluded all aircraft under 15,400 kg.
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marketing needs, since the bidders had a clear notion of the "rules of the game"
established by the Brazilian government^'".
The other great Brazilian government intervention was on the market
protection implementation erasing the import tariff of small aircraft and creating the
compulsory deposit. Another specific Aeronautics Ministry intervention can be seen
in the aircraft import licenses approval process (see Q10).
In terms of technical support, the CTA has performed training and
technical support in quality assurance through its fostering of the IF! institute.
Although the Government has not been directly active in this case, its
intervention through issuing legislation for market protection, increasing the import
tariffs, and also acquiring some aircraft units, provided enough support to rate this
variable as high .
Q12) What are the political and social pressures of this agreement?
To adequate assess this question, the political and social pressures
towards this agreement requires a detailed research of Brazilian sources and is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some conclusions may be summarized
from the secondary sources. The relevant and singular political pressure found in
this agreement was the union between the technocrats from the economic sector,
the obvious incentive of the industry, and the military, responsible for nurturing its
infant aircraft industry. The sharing of the same objectives by these actors was
^**1"he basic rules were to reserve the Brazilian domestic market exclusively for
Brazilian-produced aircraft (industry protection) to create foreign exchange savings.
Implicit in this rule was the eventual outcome that only the foreign firm prepared to
enter into an agreement with EMBRAER would be permitted to participate in the
large Brazilian market.
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one of the main reasons for the creation of an integrated strategy. The technocrats
were concerned with the balance of payments for the first time being tremendously
affected by increasing oil prices. The Aeronautics Ministry was concerned about
using all possible ways to protect the industry. As a result, the Piper agreement
came to fulfill these needs. Acknowledging the lack of complete and revellent data,
it would be safe to assign a medium grade for this variable.
MILITARY FACTOR (Industrial defense, International prestigious,
military capability, an Independence and non-vulnerability)
The analysis of the military factor in this case is not applicable .
OFFSET OUTCOME
The outcomes of the Piper case show interesting findings related to the
technology transfer through commercial licensing agreements. In this case, the
most important variables are the foreign exchange savings, the government action,
and the transfer environment. These variables suggest that this type of offset is
efficient in obtaining technology fast to reach the market, even if this market would
be restricted to domestic sales. The Piper general results are shown on Table 19.
018) Does this agreement provide independent technological
capabilities?
Although the type of technology transferred through this licensed
production agreement had been considered relatively unsophisticated in relation
to other EMBRAER agreements, this overall outcome is high because of the
transfer environment, recipient characteristics, and supplier characteristics. Due to
the medium level of the technology involved, both recipient and supplier were
196
perfectly compatible with this technology transfer process. Again, because of the
level of the technology and its civilian characteristics, the transfer environment
seems to be more commercial than political, making the process more flexible. The






Q17) OFFSET TYPE LICENSED PRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT HIGH
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY HIGH
Q19) Does this offset improve Brazilian national security?
Because the Piper case is a civilian case it was not analyzed under the
military factor. The socio-political factor, even partially evaluated, showed the
integration of two different government sectors' goals into one overall strategy.
Perhaps this may be one of the reasons why this variable deserves more emphasis
in relation to the others. The result of the national security outcome for this





QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVES MEDIUM
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES MEDIUM
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE N / A
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGIOUS N / A
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY N / A
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY N / A
OUTCOME
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY MEDIUM
Q20) Does this offset improve Brazilian balance of payments?
Almost all the sources that cite the Piper case emphasize this outcome
as the main reason why the Brazilian government entered into this agreement with
the U.S. company. The ability of this agreement to promote savings in foreign
exchange, as it was demonstrated, is unquestionable. However, because of other
factors such as the general aviation market, the prohibition of export, and the
fierce competition in this sector, the result of this outcome was averaged as





Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS HIGH
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION LOW
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY UNKNOWN
OUTCOME





Q17) OFFSET TYPE LICENSED PRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT HIGH
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS HIGH
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION LOW
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY UNKNOWN
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION MEDIUM
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES MEDIUM
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE N / A
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE N / A
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY N / A
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY N / A
OUTCOME VARIABLES GRADE
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY HIGH
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY MEDIUM
Q2 0) ECONOMIC BENEFITS MEDIUM
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2. The Aerospatiale Military Helicopters Case
The Aerospatiale military helicopters case is a very recent offset
agreement which involves the French and Brazilian governments and little informa-
tion has been released by the companies involved^^'. The case is an example of a
licensed production offset involving a government-to-government agreement*'*^. The
case is about the Brazilian Army acquisition of 52 military helicopters to equip the
first airmobile battalion. The French Aerospatiale and its Brazilian partners
HELIBRAS and ENGESA will be responsible for the equipment supply. Two things
make this case different from other cases. First, this case is handled by the Army
Ministry instead of the Aeronautics Ministry as the major government agency
participant in this agreement. Second, there is a difference between HELIBRAS and
EMBRAER related to their government support.
Q17) What are the offset agreement characteristics?
The Brazilian Army acquired 52 antitank and assault helicopters to
operate in its first airborne cavalry unit in Taubate, in Sao Paulo state. The contract
awarded in February 1988 with the French company Aerospatiale was estimated
at $246 million, and it included 16 AS-350L1 Ecureuil light helicopters, which are
^^'A questionnaire was sent to a HELIBRAS's manager, who is responsible for
the office inside Aerospatiale that establishes the connections between the Brazilian
and French companies. The answers of this questionnaire has not returned yet,
which is assumed that the content was considered proprietary. The information
used to analyze this case was obtained by telephone conversation and periodical
articles.
^"^According to the definition in Chapter Two, the government-to-government
licensed production agreements are classified under the coproduction offset type.
The decision to insert this case under the licensed production group is to facilitate
the comparison between a civilian case (Piper) and this military one.
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used for fire support and antitank missions, and 36 SA-365FK Dauphins for small
commando team transportation [Ref. 1]. The first helicopter was scheduled to be
delivered in November 1988, but it was only officially received on April 21, 1989^"
[Ref. 3].
It is not possible to ascertain the entire offset package for this agreement
but it seems to have basically three parts. First, it includes the technology transfer
of some components to various Brazilian companies. Second, it includes the
assembly and test of the helicopters by HELIBRAS, the same company that has
been assembling Aerospatiale helicopters in Brazil since 1978. Finally, the French
government promises to buy at least 50 Tucano trainers for the French Air Force
worth about $125 million [Ref. 4]. Although these three parts are all important, the
discussion of this case will emphasize the HELIBRAS part which refers to the
license itself.
The offset percentage is 100%. The time for implementation is 10 years
[Ref. 5]. The method of enforcement is "best effort" [Ref. 4]. The financial
arrangements and the inclusion of the "end-user" clause is unknown.
In summary, the Aerospatiale military helicopters case is basically a
licensed production offset agreement which includes the transfer of some
component technology. It also includes a countertrade package of EMBRAER
planes, but this is not the focus of this analysis.
^**rhe first airborne battalion is located in Taubate, Sao Paulo. The battallion
is divided in three units based on the three types of helicopters: the troops
transport unit, the reconnaissance and attack unit, and the instruction unit [Ref.
2].
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Q1) What type of technology is being transferred?
The technology transferred under this agreement is divided in two types:
the component technology and the assembly and test technology. The
component technology is described in a "list of preferences" that seems to be
included as an annex in the main contract. An example given was the components
transfer of the Omega turbine between the French Thomson company and one
Brazilian company not identified. Another example included the transfer of
simulators technology to the Brazilian company Aeromot^** [Ref. 5]. The assembly
and test technology transfer is directed to HELIBRAS, which is also responsible for
maintenance and technical assistance, because the Army does not have this
structure yet. This last part does include the transfer of a small amount of
production helicopter technology to HELIBRAS^''^
Summing up, the level of component technology is unknown because
the various subcontracts have still to be negotiated. The assembly and test
technology and the small share of fabrication technology transferred to HELIBRAS
is not considered as significant. The technology benefits of this agreement rest
on the future benefits in having various industries producing helicopter components
^*^Aeromot is a private Brazilian company group that is dedicated to the aviation
industry. The group is now active through its three companies: Aeromoto
Aeronautica e Motores S.A (complete service to general aviation needs), Aeromoto
Industria Mecanico-Metalurgica LTDA (structural components), and Aero-
Eletronica Industria de Components Avionicos LTDA (design, development, and
production of electrical and electronic equipment, with various made for EMB-312
Tucano and AM-X aircraft usage) [Ref. 7].
^"^he production share that will be undertaken by HELIBRAS is some 5% of
Dauphin fabrication [Ref. 6:p. 15].
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and parts and the relative low level of technology transferred to HELIBRAS. The
technology is graded as medium in this case.
Q2) What is the technology transfer environment?
The Brazilian government is investing once more in the transfer of
helicopter technology in Brazil. Since 1978, HELIBRAS has been the basis for the
national helicopter industry. However, the company has had problems and it has
not reached the expected objectives'"^. Although the Brazilian government has
applied similar methods of protection in helicopter imports as it did in general
aviation, the domestic market seems to require products with technical
specifications above the level that HELIBRAS can produce. The same kind of
problem seems to happen to the service orders. The Brazilian Air Force (FAB),
followed by the Brazilian Navy and recently the Brazilian Army, has specified
military helicopters with technological requirements greater than the actual
equipment which has been manufactured by the domestic company. The external
market has been restricted to a very few sales to neighboring countries'"'. In terms
of protection and support by the Brazilian government, no direct evidence was
found, but because HELIBRAS has not been under the federal government's arm
but under state government support since its creation, and with strong foreign
''^he first agreement estimated that the level of domestic content would reach
70% and HELIBRAS has only incorporated 30% of local manufactured items and
the majority of the company work involves pure helicopter assembly kits imported
from France [Ref. 6:p. 15].
'"'HELIBRAS has sold a total of 21 helicopters to Latin American countries
such as Bolivia (7), Chile (1), Argentina (1), Bolivia (4), Venezuela (3), and
Paraguay (5) [Ref. 8].
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participation^'^, it seems that the federal government is giving this company different
treatment than the rest of the aircraft industry.
Another important point to be discussed under this variable is the
competition generated in the Brazilian Army international bid. The competitors
include Italy's Augusta^*^ (with A109), Bell (Supercobra) and Sikorsky (Black Hawk)
from the U.S., Germany's Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB - with BO-105) and
Britain's Westland (equipment unknown) [Ref. 10]. The Brazilian Army technical
and offset requirements are unknown, but it seems that Aerospatiale exerted a lot
of influence in this selection process. Since the company has worked for a long
time to expand its market in South America, this agreement sounded like a
"premium" opportunity to work with HELIBRAS for many years to come. Other
evidence that showed this competition was fierce is the impressive number of
helicopters required by the Brazilian Army. The Army estimated 260 helicopters to
outfit three airmobile battalions, a significant number which would cause
disturbance in the helicopter market^. It becomes easy to see the influence of this
^'^Aerospatiale still owns 45% of the HELIBRAS shares since the creation of
the company in 1978.
^"^his company has signed on 23 July, 1989 a license agreement with the
Argentina government and Fabrica de Argentina de Materiales Aerospatiales
(FAMA). The agreement is worth $120 million and it includes the construction of
the fuselage and the final assembly by FAMA. The helicopter is the same A-109
offered to Brazil, and the production run is estimated to be 600 units [Ref. 9].
^he overall long term requirement was estimated at 500 helicopters. This
was to equip several battalions each with 36 troop carrier helicopters, 16 armed
scouts, and an unspecified number of trainers and utility units [Ref. 11:p. 47].
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competition in improving the offset package, certainly the main consideration in
making this agreement.
The last point viewed in this question is about the previous technology
transfer process offered by Aerospatiale. Based on the previous agreements, It is
estimated that the transfer environment would much influence in improving the
technology transfer. The level of technology content that Aerospatiale promised in
previous agreements has yet to be completely implemented.
In conclusion, the Aerospatiale and Helibras problems in fulfilling previous
agreements, the insufficient market, and the apparent difference in government
support leads to a pessimistic technological environment. However, it is expected
that the Brazilian Army has a strong interest in succeeding in its first initiative to
become more independent from the Air Force in a operational sense. The best
evidence of this Army motivation has been the offset package obtained through a
very structured international competition. Another favorable point in this case is that
ENGESA now holds 55% of the HELIBRAS shares, which may improve the
technical and administrative development of the company ^\ It seems fair to
assume this variable as of medium influence in this case.
Q3) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
HELIBRAS has had a turbulent development since its creation. The
company constant changes and the lack of commercial ability to select helicopter
models more adequate to Brazil's conditions and needs are the main weakness.
^'This is a new factor in relation to the previous contract when the Government
of Minas Gerais was the major shareholder. ENGESA is also a major armored cars
supplier for the Brazilian Army [Ref. 12].
207
The lack of credibility held by various government sectors made the company
mainly responsible for the lack of domestic helicopter production in Brazil.
HELIBRAS, since its creation in 1978 has assembled about 100
Aerospatiale helicopters, most for sale in Brazil. The technical absorptive capacity
of the company seems to present some problems such as the lack of R & D
connected with the transfer of French technology. Recent articles show that the
company is not doing well in having some of the components nationalized. It was
not possible to ascertain the level and make-up of its production and R&D force,
but it seems to emphasize technicians more than engineers, because of the
assembly work that is being done.
The domestic market for helicopters has been affected by the economic
situation. HELIBRAS helicopters have been sold mostly to the Air Force, Navy, and
Brazilian Police evidence that the helicopters produced are sophisticated in relation
to the private companies' needs^. The international market also presents a
pessimistic picture for a developing country's industry to compete worldwide.
The HELIBRAS technical absorption problem seems somewhat complex
to be solved in a short term. The domestic and international market shares seem
constant. This realistic picture leads to evaluating the recipient company
characteristics as an unfavorable low .
Q4) What are the suppliers firm's characteristics?
^he helicopters produced by HELIBRAS are relatively larger (e.g., Ecureuil
has six-seats) than for a normal customer [Ref. 2].
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Aerospatiale is a French government-owned company formed in January
1970 as a result of the merger of Sud-aviation, Nord Aviation, and Sereb. The
company covers an area of 2,005,674 square meters and has a staff (including
subsidiary companies) of 38,800 persons as of 1 January 1987. Its activities are
devoted 32% to fixed-wing aircraft, 19.3 % to helicopter, 32% to tactical missiles,
16.4% to ballistic missiles and space, and 0.3% to other works. By December 1987,
the helicopter division had delivered 7,476 units of French design plus 328
assembled under license. Besides the financial participation in HELIBRAS, the
company also takes part in Samaero (Singapore) and Maroc Aviation (Morocco).
The company has a tradition of being aggressive in exports and has developed
considerable expertise in handling offsets^. Specifically in Brazil, the company has
won contracts based on its offset packages^".
Aerospatiale has worked long and hard and with considerable French
government help since its first contract. In 1978, it became an expressive
shareholder (with 45% of the shares) in the Brazilian company in order to have its
proposal approved. The financial investment made by the company in Brazil has
suffered from continuing lean sales, which seems the company offset for this big
^In 1985, Aerospatiale was the world's leading helicopter exporter. In this
same year, the Brazilian government bought the Super Puma for the Air Force
and Navy and some Ecureuils for the Navy. At that time, the Super Puma was the
largest and most expensive machine of the company [Ref. 13].
^In 1978, Aerospatiale sold helicopters to the Brazilian Navy in exchange for
foreign investment and for the French government acquisition of Bandeirantes. In
1985, it sold the Super Puma helicopters in offset for 41 EMBRAER Xingu. In 1988,
once more the company used the French government's promise to buy 50
Tucanos as an offset package.
209
contract. In this agreement, which involves as many as 370 transports, armed
scouts and training utility helicopters, it seems that the company really put a lot of
efforts into sustaining its position in Brazil^. France has an important presence
throughout South America but in no single foreign country does it have a foothold
as the major aerospace supplier. One of the main reasons for this success has
been the constant U.S. embargoes that have stymied the U.S. helicopter industries
in marketing products, due to a belief that available funds in South America should
not be spent on arms^.
The capacity of Aerospatiale to utilize offset as a tool for negotiating
export sales is counterbalanced by the lack of rigor in implementing them. The
Brazilian government has various motives for negotiating a new agreement with its
old supplier, but for the purposes of this analysis, Aerospatiale is graded as
medium contributor to this agreement.
Q5) Will this technology be integrated?
There are two views in analyzing this variable, one optimistic and the
other pessimistic. The optimistic sees HELIBRAS as a completely different
company than in the first agreement. The main considerations are the ENGESA
factor and the Army factor. The ENGESA factor is evidenced by the technological
level and the diversification strategy of this company. ENGESA is known worldwide
^he exact total number required is controversial. Some sources include the
total acquisition of 254 utility and 112 reconnaissance/attack helicopters [Ref. 14].
Other sources estimate an overall requirement of 500 helicopters [Ref. 11:p. 47].
^his has not been a general rule. Many Latin American countries have U.S-
made helicopters. The Brazilian Air Force has purchased helicopters from Bell and
Sikorsky.
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to carry a label of simplicity in the operation of its equipment. This company's
philosophy may help HELIBRAS to find out a way for simpler and cheaper
helicopter production. The ENGESA diversification is a lesson of surviving through
a difficult economic situation in Brazil. ENGESA, manufacturer of armored vehicles
such as Cascavel, Urutu, and Osorio, is now investing in helicopters (HELIBRAS)
and in rockets and missiles (ORBITA). HELIBRAS has also diversified into other
fields such as the agriculture application of helicopters. The Army factor is also
important, since it results in more governmental support for the industry.
The pessimistic view results from analyzing other factors in the
framework such as: time, skills, and the service sector. The time for integration in
this case is important to show the company's responsibility in following the agreed
upon schedule. The skills required for the integration of this technology are another
critical point. The company has the huge task of training the Army personnel in
different levels of maintenance and material control, but the company does not
seem to be prepared for this task since its staff is constituted basically by
technicians and laborers. The performance of the service sector is also a
consequence of the skills. This time the company will certainly require both
technical and administrative personnel to support this agreement. Splitting the
difference between these two views results in a value of medium .
Q6) Does this offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
The conservation of hard currency in this case is very complex if all three
types of offset components packages are considered. It is clear that the $125
million purchase of Tucanos will be considered as a counterpurchase by the
211
French Air Force instead of a simple barter, without any exchange of money. The
other option that includes the gradual substitution of foreign for indigenous
components may be classified as a long term savings. Finally, some contract
arrangements may be agreed between the parts and would include the payment
for the assembly and test in cruzados which would save some hard currency. The
last hypothetical situation also seems rational, that the French Banks avoid
financing the acquisition under a countertrade condition like this.
The real terms of the offset package exchange implementation are
unknown but the assumptions above support a low grade being given to this
variable.
Q7) Does this agreement create jobs?
The creation of new jobs motivated by this agreement is expected to be
great. The first impact will be in HELIBRAS. In 1987 the company employed 350
people. The second impact will be in the component suppliers. It will be a slow
process because of the willingness of the private company to invest in an increase
in its capacity just for one government contract that may be cancelled unilaterally
without compensation. The last impact will be in EMBRAER, but in this company
the sales of Tucanos will only represent the support of the personnel capacity
already installed. These considerations result in this variable being rated as
medium .
Q8) Does this offset improve exports?
Based on the first agreement and the actual situation of the international
market of helicopters, it would be assumed that this variable won't lead to good
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export results. Historically, HELIBRAS has demonstrated a low market penetration
even in the Latin American countries. The African market seems to be dominated
by the Europeans and also by the U.S.. One possible strategy would be dedicated
to making tough, cheap, and a high payload capacity type of helicopters. This
would expand the market to customers interested in carrying offshore oil rigs or
transporting goods to isolated mines scattered in dense forests [Ref. 2]. The
international market is very competitive and entry in this market may occur through
reducing the production costs where the Brazilian companies have economies of
scale. There is no multinational helicopter manufacturer in the Latin America market
and this may lead to the creation of "an EMBRAER for helicopters" [Ref. 2].
However, the reality is very well expressed by a comment from the EMBRAER's
chairman, Ozilio Carlos Silva, "the market does not justify the investment in
helicopters in Brazil". This perhaps is the reality of what the helicopter industry has
to deal with in the future.
Because of the weak helicopter market conditions this variable is graded
as low .
Q9) Does this agreement enhance the financial viability of the
project?
The financial arrangements of this case are unknown. However, it is clear
that the French government has used its government and commercial banks to
finance this entire project. The countertrade of Tucanos may provide some interim
finance and payments spread out for a certain period.
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Q10) What are the internal and external political motivations for this
agreement?
The political motivations of this case were not completely assessed but
some assumptions may be drawn. The internal political motivations of this
agreement have come from various levels of the Brazilian government and society.
Since the creation of HELIBRAS, the company has been under the control of the
state government of Minas Gerais. This condition has exposed the company to
more political maneuvers and influences than if it had been under the military
ministers. The commercial and technical failures of HELIBRAS have instigated a
new federal government policy to establish definitely, according to the Aeronautics
minister Brigadier Octavio Moreira Lima, an "EMBRAER for helicopters". It means
a new company, a new plant, and also a new structure. The new company would
have a "tripod" structure, with share control divided equally among the government,
private Brazilian capital, and a multinational company^^ [Ref. 2].
The external political motivations of this agreement refer to the difference
between the French and the U.S foreign policy in arms transfers. The argument
that U.S restrictions on arms sales is contributing to other suppliers such as France
expanding their market share in countries previously under U.S influence. This case
is the third bid in 10 years that the U.S. company is not the winner, which caused
^^This structure is very common in the Brazilian petrochemical industry which
avoids the danger of domination either by the State or by a foreign company [Ref.
2].
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a furor among the U.S. industries, because of the "surprises" that happened in
these competitions^.
This variable may be discussed more deeply, supported with more
research, but the facts are sufficiently evident that there is a high political motivation
in this agreement.
Q11) How does this government act in this offset?
In this particular agreement, the government has been very active. The
Brazilian Army apparently conducted all the negotiations actively. Some evidence
shows that the Aeronautics Ministry had supported the Army in establishing the
technical requirements because of the Brazilian Army inexperience with the
equipment and its logistics [Ref. 5]. The Brazilian government had put pressure
during negotiations for the technology transfer, which probably handicapped Black
Hawk (Sikorsky) due to the Pentagon's restrictions on re-export of American
weapons [Ref. 10]^. The other kinds of government support for this agreement
are unknown in detail, but it seems that the government may use resources such
as GFE, facilities, transportation, etc as an incentive for this agreement.
^In 1985, when the U.S. companies Bell and Sikorsky were still negotiating
the agreements, the Planning Minister Antonio Delfin Neto, unexpectedly
announced a $170 million deal for the purchase of 40 Aerospatiale Super Pumas.
This fact had caused a lot disagreements, which only subsided later in the year
with a renegotiation of the deal during the French President's visit to Brazil in
October [Ref. 2]. Other comments brought up related to the previous position of
the minister Delfin Neto as Brazilian Ambassador in France.
^he French bid was supported by a total absence of limitations on the re-
export business, according to Jose Luiz Whitaker Ribeiro, president of ENGESA
[Ref. 10].
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Because of the special Brazilian Army interest in the success of this
agreement, which means the success of the first airborne unit, this variable is rated
as high .
Q12) What are the political and social pressures of this agreement?
The political and social pressures in this agreement also were only
partially known. The leverage power of ENGESA and EMBRAER companies, the
two "big ones", in this agreement is the main factor that might exert some pressure
towards the choice of Aerospatiale. The companies' interests, although different,
coincided in this agreement. EMBRAER's interest is expressed by the opportunity
to sell Tucanos. ENGESA's interest is expressed by the opportunity to continue to
survive financially, when the armored vehicle business shows signs of slowdown
with the cease fire between Iran and Iraq, directly affecting the sales of the other
part of the company. ENGESA particularly used its relationship with the Brazilian
Army to influence this solution. Another factor which may have exerted
considerable influence was the Aeronautics Ministry losing its supremacy in air
support since its creation in 1941^.
Even partially evaluated, this evidence point to the political weight that
pressured the decision-maker toward the Aerospatiale option. Because these
pressure factors had the leverage to shift the decision-making process in this case,
the grade attributed to this variable is high .
Q13) What are the benefits of this agreement for defense industry?
^he Aeronautics Ministry was formed from an aviation division of the Brazilian
Army.
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The helicopter ventures in Brazil have been adding very little to the
Brazilian defense industry. For many reasons pointed out before, HELIBRAS is
criticized as mainly responsible for this failure. Although applying some of the same
procedures previously applied to EMBRAER, other considerations such as
insufficient markets and administrative problems have prevented this company from
reaching the established objectives. Although this contract has a different
environment in relation to the first one, it seems that the structural problems such
as overemphasis of service equipment requirements and the relatively simple
civilian company requirements for operating in Brazil still affect the value assigned
to this variable. Assuming that this agreement may bring new results, the variable
is graded as medium .
Q14) Does this agreement bring international prestige?
If Brazil were successful in the export of the military and civilian versions
of the Aerospatiale helicopters, it would have been easy to assume a high value
for this variable. But this has not happened. The production of helicopters under
license in Brazil definitely has brought a bw psychological perception of the
prestige for the Brazilian aerospace industry.
Q15) How does the technology embodied in this offset improve the
national military capability?
The operation of helicopters by the army is a concept that has been
successful in numerous battles in Korea, Vietnam, Middle East and Malvinas.
These conflicts demonstrated the importance of the helicopter as a factor which
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can multiply the force of commandos and serve as an option for troop tactical
transports or as an important arms platform [Ref. 15].
Considering the importance of the Brazilian Army innovative airmobil
concept and its contribution to the military capability, especially the jungle units,
this variable is considered as high .
Q16) How does this agreement contribute to the country's
independence and non-vulnerability?
The independence goal is reflected in this case as the capacity to
produce helicopters with 100% of domestic content. In vulnerability in this case is
intended by obtaining the capacity to maintain the supply of helicopter spare parts
in cases of conflict or embargoes of any nature. The Aerospatiale agreement does
not seem effective to attend the independence goal, but it seems to attend the
vulnerability concept, considering the relationship between Brazil and France and
the French foreign policy in arms transfers. The superficial analysis of this variable
shows that a medium grade is warranted because of the intermediate position
between these two concepts.
OFFSET OUTCOME
The outcome variables of this case are very important in demonstrating
the importance of government-to-government agreements in relation to license
agreements between companies.
These kind of licenses are ones in which the governments are deeply
involved in most of the process, the criterion for decision-making in recipient
countries being driven by the political and national security concerns instead of
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economical ones. The technological capability is also a secondary variable which
most of the time is considered irrelevant by the recipient government but is heavy
considered by the recipient countries. The case general results are presented on
Table 23.
Q18) Does this agreement provide independent technological
capabilities?
The Aerospatiale case is marked by a relatively good transfer
environment and supplier characteristics, but less variable because of the recipient
characteristics and its relatively low capacity to integrate the technology transferred.
Although Aerospatiale had the capacity and interest as owner to transfer the
technology to Brazil, HELIBRAS has not responded well to this initiative. The same
structural problems existing since the first agreement in 1978 seem to continue in
this agreement. The new ENGESA factor may ameliorate the technological
conditions of this agreement with its expertise and philosophical concepts towards
the simplicity and inexpensive equipment that have contributed to its success in the
third world market. The technological capability outcome of this case is graded as
medium , considering that this intermediary position is prevalent in most of the





Q17) OFFSET TYPE LICENSED PRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS LOW
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) Does this offset improve Brazilian national security capability?
The national security outcome is always expected to be as high in
government-to-government agreements that include the transfer of military
technology. This case is a good example of the significant political maneuvering
and influence attempts in cases of this type. Aerospatiale's influence on the
Brazilian government decision is obtained through methods such as direct
investments and offsets, the influence from industries such as EMBRAER also
played a role. The new military airborne Brazilian Army concept seem in this case
represents an evolution of the Brazilian military, perfectly adapted to the external
threat perception in place of the idea formerly prevalent of combating only the





QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVES HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES HIGH
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE MEDIUM
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGIOUS LOW
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY HIGH
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q20) Does this offset improve Brazilian economic capability?
The economic analysis of this kind of offset which involves serious
national security aspects is very difficult because of the lack of information about
funds and financial credit lines available for the purchaser country. This secrecy
does not allow a cost/benefit analysis by the public to justify the choice made
among the various proposals. This case is evidence that a low economic impact
is expected, based on the four independent variables partially analyzed. The





Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LOW
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION LOW
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY UNKNOWN
OUTCOME





Q17) OFFSET TYPE LICENSED PRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS LOW
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LOW
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION LOW
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY UNKNOWN
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES HIGH
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE MEDIUM
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE LOW
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY HIGH
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME VARIABLES GRADE
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q2 0) ECONOMIC BENEFITS LOW
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D. COPRODUCTION
This last section shows two examples of coproduction/codeveiopment offset
agreements. The first agreement is the international coproduction agreement
between Brazilian and Italian governments, involving various industries in both
countries, to jointly develop and produce the AM-X, a subsonic combat aircraft.
The second agreement is also an international commercial agreement between
EMBRAER and FAMA (Argentina) to jointly develop and coproduce a 19 seat
commuter aircraft. Both examples illustrate the difference between civilian and
military agreements, focusing on the government participation and technology
transfer process.
1. The CBA-123 PARANA Commuter Plane Case
This case describes an example of coproduction between the Brazilian
and Argentine governments to codevelop and coproduce a 19-seat commuter
aircraft^'. The CBA-123 Parana case involves the Fabrica Argentina de Materiales
Aerospatiales (FAMA) and EMBRAER^. The case shows a very interesting
phenomenon of aerospace technology transfer between two developing countries.
The information collected for this case came from various articles of specialized
aviation magazines, Latin American studies periodicals, and also from telephone
261-
This case was difficult to classify under the 0MB definitions in Chapter Two
which emphasize military offsets. The author assumed that this classification may
be used considering that the aircraft could have a military version.
^he acronym CBA means, "Cooperation Brazil-Argentina". The aircraft is
named Parana for the river flowing through both countries [Ref. 1].
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conversations with EMBRAER staff. Some answers include a short background
about the Argentine arms industry, with special focus on FAMA^.
Q17) What are the offset agreement characteristics?
Brazil and Argentina are due to begin production of the CBA-123 19 seat
commuter aircraft in 1991. The aircraft is the subject of a collaborative agreement
signed by EMBRAER and FAMA in January of 1986. The agreement gives
EMBRAER a 70% share in the project and the FAMA 30%"*". The official contract
for the whole project was signed on May 21, 1987 by Argentine Air Force Chief of
Staff Brigadier General Ernesto Crespo, Brigadier Ruben Corradetti, the director of
the Cordoba Air Force plane factory, and EMBRAER President engineer Ozilio
Carlos Silva [Ref. 9]. The project's development cost is estimated to be about $300
million [Ref. 10]. According to the previous plan, the first flight is expected in
December 1989 and the first deliveries start in 1991-2'^[Ref. 12]. The EMB-123^
is a twin-engine (1200 HP) turboprop aircraft projected to have a range of 600
nautical miles, a practical ceiling at 35,000 feet, a speed of 650 Km/hour, and a
maximum payload of 2,160 kg [Ref. 13]. The suppliers that participated in the bid
^he main information sources about the Argentine arms industry, foreign
policy, and national security were Katz [Ref. 2], Milenky [Ref. 3 and 4], Hilton [Ref.
5], Millan [Ref. 6], and Selcher [Ref. 7].
^Some sources estimated that the Brazilian Air Force has a 40% share in this
project, which narrows the EMBRAER participation to only 30% [Ref. 8]. However,
this information was not confirmed by EMBRAER.
^According to an EMBRAER estimate, the date for the first flight was extended
to March 1990 [Ref. 11].
^he aircraft has two designations. For EMBRAER it is called EMB-123, and
for FAMA it is known as IA-70.
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for the engine were the Canadian Pratt & Whitney (with the engine PW400/1), the
U.S. Garret (TPE331-16), and General Electric (CT9) [Ref. 14]. The Garret engine
was selected because it can afford the aircraft a high rate of climb and altitude
performance in addition to other technical advantages [Ref. 15]. EMBRAER and
FAMA forecasted a market for 500-600 aircraft and an estimated price of $3-3.5
million'''[Ref. 18].
Q1) What type of technology is being transferred?
The EMBRAER-FAMA worksharing negotiated is also divided Into 30%
for FAMA and 70% for EMBRAER"^. The companies agreed that EMBRAER will
design, develop, and manufacture the forward fuselage, a portion of the center
fuselage, wings, flaps, ailerons, ground spoilers, spoilerons, and rudder. FAMA will
furnish parts of the central and rear fuselage including dorsal fin and vertical fin
fairings, the tail cone, vertical fin and fairings for the horizontal/vertical fin junction,
stabilizers and elevators, and engine pylons [Ref. 20]. The aircraft is a shortened
version of the EM B- 120 Brasilia fuselage, and will share approximately 60%
commonality of components, including almost the same flight deck, as well as
common maintenance and cabin crew procedures. The technological innovations
of this plane are a new supercritical wing, a T tail, and two rear mounted propfans
with scimitar propeller blades. Because of this combination of new features, the
267-
The companies are also expecting that the Brazilian and Argentine
governments will acquire 36 units each [Ref. 16]. Another source has presented
an estimated price of $4-4.5 million, based on options already received [Ref. 17].
'^"It is supposed to have two assemble lines, one in an EMBRAER plant and the
other in a FAMA plant [Ref. 19].
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CBA-123 is expected to offer fuel efficiency and speed, as well as an extremely
smooth and quiet ride. There will be three prototypes constructed, two by
EMBRAER and one by FAMA [Ref. 19].
The technology innovation applied to the design and production of the
aircraft has been basically generated by EMBRAER. FAMA, although responsible
for a small part of the production of the aircraft, already has the capacity to
produce its share alone, which means that very little transfer of technology would
occur from EMBRAER to FAMA and vice-versa. Considering the balance between
the technological level of both companies and their experience in the production
of turboprops, and the little amount of technology that would be exchanged, the
grade for this variable is medium .
Q2) What is the technology transfer environment?
In order to answer this question some background is needed. The
Argentine aircraft industry has been the most important arms production sector
from the military, technological, and industrial point of view [Ref. 6:p. 40]. During
the Peron era (1950s), an ambitious aeronautical programe was started. For a
short period, the Air Force attempted to design and fly several types of jet fighters
using British Rolls Royce engines made under license^ [Ref. 4]. However, by the
1960s, the "fighter policy" changed to concentrate on transport and
^he most ambitious projects, involving plans for quantities of jet fighters and
large transport aircraft, were headed by foreign designers: Italian, French and West
German [Ref. 6:p. 41].
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counterinsurgency aircraft^'". Before the Malvinas war Argentina was hoping to
arrange future aerospace technology transfer arrangements with the U.S. But
when the U.S. sided with the United Kingdom, this hope was at least temporarily
dashed. When the war finished, Argentina looked for European assistance, but the
war caused European countries to continue constraining the transfer of technology.
This put the Argentine aircraft industry in a position farther behind than it was
before the Malvinas war. Like Brazil, Argentina's aircraft industry also has
deficiencies in technologies such as avionics and jet engine design and
production^^'[Ref. 2:p. 65]. However, the Argentinians seem to have implemented
some technology in composite materials and production management^^^ In
summary, Argentine technological transfer in the aeronautical environment has
been affected by constant governmental policy changes, ranging from strictly
^^^he change in policy was due to inter-service rivalry after the military junta,
dominated by the Army and Navy, seized power in 1955. It abandoned many of the
Air Force's fighter projects to concentrate on transport and smaller aircraft. The Air
Force requirements for fighters would be fulfilled through purchases abroad. During
the period 1955-78, the most important aircraft designed and produced were the
IA-50 Guarani II light (early 1960s), twin-engine transport and the IA-58 Pucara
counterinsurgency plane [Ref. 4].
^^^An interesting point that is not covered in the literature is the destiny of the
Rolls Royce engine production, mainly after the Malvinas war. One source shows
that the last production of Rolls Royce engines was in 1953. After that, Argentina
produced turboprop engines under a license from Turbomeca (France) in 1974
[Ref. 6:p. 43].
"^FAMA bought five computer-controlled milling machines from FR Germany
and composite material technology has been introduced for use in the engine
intakes and wing tips. Also a large U.S. computer has been bought to manage
the production of the IA-63 and future aircraft [Ref. 6:p. 42].
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indigenous production to licensed production dependence. Today, the aircraft
industry seems to suffer from the many changes during its development.
The aeronautical cooperation agreement between Brazil and Argentina
is seen as a way that both industries can survive economically. Not only this
agreement but other agreements in different sectors are facilitating the trade of
commercial and military products^^^ These cooperation agreements have also
provided an environment favorable for future mutual transfer of technology between
the countries.
The Argentine aircraft industry background and tradition may be
combined with the recent Brazilian aircraft industry technology development for the
joint production of various new aircraft. The author estimates that this variable may
be graded as having medium impact due to the equilibrium that is obtained
between the FAMA historical background and the present EMBRAER technology.
Q3) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
Although EMBRAER in this agreement seems to be more of a supplier
than a recipient company, it is analyzed under this heading because the impact of
the offset agreement in a Brazilian company is the ultimate objective. After 20 years
since its first project Bandeirante, EMBRAER today has significant experience in
the design and production of turboprop planes. According to EMBRAER, the CBA-
^^*The Argentine Air Force sought a contract for 40 EMB-312 Tucanos to
integrate into its fleet. The contract asked for manufacturing parts in addition to the
assembly of the kits. This acquisition was to provide an interim replacement for the
old Mentor and Paris aircraft prior to full-scale production of the indigenous FAMA
IA-63 Pampa. The cost and the poor delivery schedule were the main reasons for
the rejection of the EMBRAER option [Ref. 21].
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123 will be a substitute for the Bandeirante. Therefore, many changes are not
expected inside the EMBRAER production plant for this manufacturing project,
since the same Bandeirante production installations will be used for the new
aircraft [Ref. 11]. The project also has great commonality with the EMB-120
Brasilia, and new technology innovation will not be necessar/^\
Considering the technological level and evolution of EMBRAER turboprop
aircraft, as seen in the EMB-110 Bandeirante, the EMB-120 Brasilia, and now the
EMB-123 Parana, and its significative share in this agreement, the company
characteristics variable is evaluated as high .
Q4) What are the suppliers firm's characteristics?
Although FAMA in this agreement is not really a supplier, it is evaluated
for the same reasons EMBRAER was evaluated as a recipient. Argentina's defense
sector^^^ specifically FAMA is well known as being under the strict tutelage of the
military. However the government has observed the successful Brazilian model and
began a "five year" privatization plan of this sector^'^ Sharing the same economic
problems as Brazil, such as inflation, high-debt, and unemployment, the Argentine
aircraft industry also has been severely tested by constant policy changes. In terms
of aeronautics research and development capability, the company has been not
"'See The EMB-120/123 equation" [Ref. 12] for more information about these
two related projects.
"^See a description of the Argentine arms industry in Milenky [Ref. 4] and Forth
[Ref. 2].
"*The "five-year" plan means a gradual shift from a military controlled
organization to a private enterprise [Ref. 2:p. 66].
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well supported because of government priority given to space and nuclear
technology research. The Institute of Aeronautical and Space Research (Institute
de Investlgatione Aeronautica y Espacial) has conducted its efforts more in
space, rockets and electronics technology than in aircraft development^^. FAMA
is comprised of two large divisions. The Institute de Investlgatlones
Aeronauticas y Espaclais (IIAE) is responsible for the design, manufacture and
testing of rockets, sounding equipment, and the aircraft manufacturing facilities
(Grupo Fabricacion) situated in Cordoba. FAMA also controls the Centre de
Ensayos en Vuelo (Flight Test Center) to which all aircraft produced in Argentina
are sent for certification tests. The laboratories, factories and other aeronautical
division buildings occupy a total covered area of 253,000 square meters. By 1980,
the Area de Material Cordoba employed more than 5,300 people of whom 2,300
are in the Grupo Fabricacion [Ref. 6:p. 40].
Although the Argentine aircraft industry started producing aircraft before
Brazil, today FAMA has a technological level below that of EMBRAER^'^ The
coproduction of a civilian plane together with Brazil will provide FAMA production
and marketing expertise needed by the company to start competing internationally.
Factors pointing to a low value on this variable include FAMA's actual technological
level being below EMBRAER, the company's political instability, and the lack of R
^^The lack of Air Force aircraft projects is very curious considering the Air
Force power and influence after the Malvinas war because of its bravery and
inventiveness in combat [Ref. 2:p. 57].
^^^FAMA has worked on 56 aircraft types since its creation in 1927 of which 24
(including civilian types) have entered production [Ref. 6:p. 40].
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& D applied to the aircraft industry. These may be balanced by the traditional
success in some indigenous projects in the past and the expected changes that
would be provided by the "five-year" plan towards privatization. FAMA is graded as
medium .
Q5) Will this technology be integrated?
The Argentineans have been successful in aircraft overhaul work and
also with reverse engineering, eliminating expensive R&D and production costs
and cutting down on lead time [Ref. 2:p. 67]. But, as in Brazil, the industry is still
hampered by the fact that many of the parts needed to produce completed
systems must be imported (e.g., engines).
Both FAMA and EMBRAER are endowed with production and assembly
experience. EMBRAER seems to have more expertise in design and composite
materials technology. What seems be happening in this case is a complementary
division of labor between the two companies in which each one will produce
components in which they have more experience and technological background.
Assuming that both companies will add a small amount of new technology to their
existing capacity, and the evidence that they have shown a high absorption
capacity in previous transfers of technology, this variable rests between these two
extremes. The technology from the new aircraft appearss to have a medium
integration value in both companies.
Q6) Does this offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
One of the main reasons for the economic alliance between these two
countries is the possibility of hard currency savings. This aircraft, being produced
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in the same region, will bring similar benefits as the European countries have
experienced with their common market. Neither Brazil nor Argentina will need to
expend "dollars" in the acquisition of foreign made aircraft in a developed country
market, where they may find a lot of financial obstacles with international banks
because of their foreign debt. The new commercial cooperation between two
developing countries may be a potential source of large offset agreements,
including not only aircraft but a great variety of products^™.
Because this agreement represents a great incentive for potential
generation of offsets through coproduction agreements, which improve the
countries' capacities to save hard currency, the foreign currency savings variable
is considered to have high impact.
Q7) Does this agreement create jobs?
The Argentine government "five-year" plan in which FAMA intends to
replace the military personnel by civilian personnel, is by itself, a great initiative for
creating new jobs in that country. To develop its aircraft industry, the presence of
skilled and trained personnel is crucial. Today, the constant turnover of military
personnel (normally two years) has been contributing to discontinuity in the work
plans. Also the fact that most of these military officers are taking these decision-
making positions at the ends of their careers and are relatively inexperienced in
particular plant problems may not be the best solution for the industry. As a result,
^^^his commercial tendency has been observed in other industry sectors such
as automotive. The new conglomerate called Autolatina is formed by Volkswagen
from West Germany and Ford from the U.S., which combines their Brazilian and
Argentinean plants to improve the exchange of mechanical assembly and
components, and consequently allowing higher production volumes [Ref. 22].
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the arms industry in Argentina has been losing many of its civil engineers and
scientists in a classic brain drain [Ret. 2:p. 67]. It is evident that this agreement for
Argentine would provide FAMA more motivation for profits and efficiency, which
would provide the incentive for the definitive implementation of the "five-year" plan.
In the case of EMBRAER, the situation appears to be different. This
agreement will absorb the work force of the Bandeirante production line, so there
will be little real job creation. In terms of employment, the importance of this new
project is the support of existing workforce [Ref. 12].
Because of the partial impact expected with the real jobs benefits for
Argentina and the maintenance of employment capacity in EMBRAER, this variable
is rated as having medium impact.
Q8) Does this offset improve exports?
Although the general export objectives of Argentina's defense industries
are different from the Brazilian defense industries, Argentina's wish to develop a
viable arms industry is increasing its attention towards the international market. As
in Brazil, Argentina found that their own military services cannot absorb the
production and they must resort to export markets. One example illustrating this
change was the recent sale of six Pucara aircraft to Uruguay. The production
aircraft reportedly cost $3 million each and were sold for only $1.8 million. As a
result, other countries became interested in the same aircraft in a highly
competitive market. The Argentineans' success in arms export has been limited to
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South American countries The industry is striving to build better products at
lower cost to gain a solid export market for its equipment, but it faces some
problems in meeting its export goals. Assembly lines are not always able to meet
export requirements which can cause delays in delivery schedules. Another
Argentine defense industry deficiency is the overall marketing plan. Some people
may explaining this by saying "military people don't make good marketing people"
[Ref. 2]. Another problem is that the final price is also driven up by short
production runs. This could encourage buyers to find other better-established
export possibilities and lower prices in another countries.
The CBA-123 is being designed and developed to cover a gap in the
market. A common 19-seat aircraft occupies 36% of the regional airline international
market now and will continue to hold 30% up to the year 2005. There is also a
useful fill-in market for a corporate version for eight to 1 2 passengers [Ref. 23] . The
EMBRAER commercial director Serra said that the specific marketing strategy for
this aircraft forecasts 10 year sales of 400-500 aircraft with the possibility of
reaching 600 airplanes. The break-even point will be reached with the sale of the
400th airplane. The corporate market for this aircraft will be 25%. The U.S.
represents 50-60% of the estimated CBA-123 market, Europe 15-20%, South
America 15%, with Australia and Southeast Asia the remainder [Ref. 24]. The
marketing will be executed jointly by both Brazil and Argentine, although each
country will have exclusive sale territories [Ref. 10]. EMBRAER and FAMA plan to
^^he IA-58 Pucara aircraft has been sold to Uruguay (8), Venezuela (24), and
El Salvador (unknown) [Ref. 6:p. 49].
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deliver 15 aircraft in 1991, and 26-28 in 1992. The production schedule calls for a
five per month rate by 1993. At that time, the planned production split will be 3.5
aircraft per month by EMBRAER and 1.5 by FAMA [Ref. 10]. The CBA-123 is not
a low-priced aircraft and EMBRAER is making special efforts to ensure that its
operating costs will offset its initial cost [Ref. 23].
The lack of FAMA marketing expertise will be complemented by
EMBRAER's experience and commercial network to implement aggressive sales
worldwide. The division of the world market in two proportioned shares will give
EMBRAER certain advantages in sales in relation to FAMA. The success of
EMBRAER exports is evidence that its market planning has been accurate and
well developed. Based on the expected success of EMBRAER exports, even in
developed countries markets, this variable is graded as having high impact in the
CBA-123 case.
Q9) Does this agreement obtain financial investment?
As in Brazil, Argentina's lack of funds to finance aircraft projects is the
bottleneck for more development in civilian programs. However, in the military
programs the situation is somewhat different. Although after the Malvinas war the
Argentine armed forces budget was cut, important projects such as the IA-63
Pampa advanced trainer seem to have sufficient momentum and commitment to
continue regardless of economic conditions^' [Ref. 2:p. 59]. The same lack of
281-
This aircraft is being produced in conjunction with the West Germany
company Dornier. The Argentina Air Force has a requirement of 250 of these jet
trainers [Ref. 6: p. 42]. For more information about this project see "Argentina's
IA-63 stepping stone to 1990s technology" [Ref. 25].
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funds to develop new civilian projects is present in Brazil, and funds directed to
projects such as the AMX seem to be the government priority. Because the CBA-
123 is more for civilian application than military, it follows different government
rules. The Brazilian government now invests solely in military programs, leaving
civil ventures to be financed by commercial loans and the sale of equities. The
other successful way of getting financing for this project is through options [Ref.
23]. According to reports, this plane has already received 127 options for Its
purchase [Ref. 26].
Although it seems that one of the main reasons why EMBRAER invited
FAMA to engage in this agreement was to partially finance the project, EMBRAER
president Ozilio Silva said that the company "could find money almost anywhere",
which means that this was not the main reason for the agreement. He said that the
market potential was the main reason that drove the agreement [Ref. 12].
The specific capacity of the CBA-123 to generate funds to partially cover
the estimated $300 million ($200 million for EMBRAER and $100 million for FAMA)
is considered high , even with these companies financing their shares by
themselves without governmental financial participation.
Q10) What are the internal and external political motivations for this
agreement?
The external and internal political motivation for this agreement is one of
the most important variables influencing this agreement. Offset agreements
between these two nations have been motivated by strong political forces inside
these two countries. Both nations are crossing the political transition from a military
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rule to a democracy^^. They are suffering a similarly dramatic economic crisis, and
are trying to negotiate for better terms to pay back international loans. Finally, both
countries are experiencing similar social problems. Due to their common problems,
they both decided to join forces to establish democracy and political stability, to
negotiate with international banks, and to improve the social conditions of their
people'" [Ref. 429].
The small scale of the CBA-123 case is useful to show characteristics
of the political motivations in defense industries projects of both countries. Against
all expectations, the civilian presidents that are seizing power in these countries are
continuing to provide incentives to the defense industries, because of their
importance as a generator of jobs, as an increasingly important participant on the
balance of trade, and as a tool for foreign policy. The military will continue to
administer the defense industry, particularly the aircraft industries, though they
have lost to the Congress some of the budget power to finance projects'^".
'^Argentina elected a civilian president in 1983, and Brazil is electing directly
its first president in November 1989, both after a long period of military rule.
'"The most important event in politics in the Southern Cone of South America
in the past several years was the visit to Argentina by Brazilian President Figueiredo
in May 1980. Coming at the end of a turbulent decade in Brazilian-Argentine
relations characterized by intense and often shrill verbal warfare, keen politico-
economic competition in adjacent countries and atomic rivalry with ill-concealed
military overtones, Figueiredo's trip possessed unusual significance. At that time
it was proclaimed that the two governments were abandoning "competitive
schemes" in order to forge "a zone of peace and security that embraces an entire
fringe of the South Atlantic" [Ref. 5].
'"Much focus in this transition of political power rests on the control of the arms
industry. The military still retain power over the defense industry. The new
governments' options to leave the military with the industries is one way to keep
them concerned with defense matters instead of politics.
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Brazil and Argentine both have great need to cooperate politically,
because they have the same motivations. The political motivation variable in this
case is considered as of high impact in the socio-political factor.
Q11) How does this government act in this offset?
Both governments have similar interests in any commercial agreements.
Besides economic gains, they represent the exchange of technology, jobs, exports,
and political influence. The Argentine government is the primary actor in this
agreement. As a negotiator, the only previous experience of FAMA in dealing with
coproduction and licenses came from the 1970s Europa Plan where the effort was
to find European defense firms and generated German assistance. After that only
small agreements, including some transfers of technology, have been signed with
Germany's companies. The Argentine government was more directly involved in
this agreement because FAMA is one the defense industries still under a military
rule. The Brazilian government has been active in most of the coproduction
agreements and its last experience was the negotiation with the Italians for the
AMX aircraft program. However, in this agreement, the Brazilian government shifted
the responsibility of negotiation to EMBRAER, which shows the maturity of the
company in conducting international negotiations.
The governments' capital participation in this program seem to be
restricted to the purchase of 36 aircraft units each which will improve the minimum
number of options to launch the project into production. The Brazilian government
action in this agreement is considered more political than as a capital investor
such as using GFE, machines, tools, etc. These two extremes of government
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level of interference provide the basis to assign a medium level of influence of the
governments in this case.
Q12) What are the political and social pressures of this agreement?
The similarities in the political and social evolution in these two countries
have caused a polemic discussion about the role of the military in remaining in
control of their defense industry. Although the process of these socio-political
changes seems identical, the governments have been applying different problems
toward their aircraft companies.
In Argentina, aircraft production has been insulated from politics. In its
earlier years there were some political leaders such as President Juan Peron that
particularly supported the aviation industry. At that time, some political conflicts
ensued as military officers were interested in creating an extension of their job
opportunities after retirement, instead of genuine patriotic motives. Today, the
defense industries are not affected by the politics simply because it is managed by
professional military heads who are on active duty. Before assuming these
positions they are trained in management and decision-making functions which
help to improve their skills to handle long-term projects. But this could change
suddenly as the government "privatization" takes effect [Ref. 2:p. 59].
In Brazil, the tendency towards privatization has been smooth and more
effective. Little by little, EMBRAER has been gaining experience as a multinational
company, and the government support has been restricted only to financing
military programs.
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Both countries participating in this coproduction agreement are
experiencing dramatic changes in their socio-political environment. Some evidence
of these changes are the new Congressional "power of the purse" and the labor
unions legal right to strike in Brazil. It is obvious that all levels of the Brazilian and
Argentinean society will participate more in any international agreement which will
involve large amounts of public funds. This variable is graded as medium because
of the difference between the political and social pressures between these two
countries in their aircraft industries.
Q13) What are the benefits of this agreement for industrial
defense?
Brazil and Argentina are among the leading third world arms producers.
The constant embargoes by developed countries in the delivery of weapons
developed the ambition in these countries to be independent from arms suppliers.
The military, supported by the political power that gave them the government
direction during long periods, found the opportunity to implement the infrastructure
for a large industrial defense base. Today, the political situation of these countries
is changing and the military is transferring the power back to elected civilian
presidents. Contrary to expectations, the arms industry complexes still remain
under the military rule. Most of these industries are state-owned and very
dependent on government funds and orders. The future of these industries is
unknown but each government is trying to find solutions for their continuity
regardless of their economic situations.
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The CBA-123 case is an example of one of the solutions found by both
governments to make a project viable and to continue to support a competitive
level of employment, investment, and technology. In this case, because the
governments are in a difficult financial situation, the responsibilities of funding the
project were shifted to their industries, which increases the risk of the projects.
One way that these industries found to decrease this risk was through the
development of a basic civilian aircraft design with the possibility of deriving military
versions. The government contribution in this sense is in being flexible regarding
technical requirements. The strategy was successful in previous projects, like the
Bandeirante aircraft, and probably will be again.
The benefit of developing new projects within these economic limitations
shows how developing countries defense industries survive in the international
market. The enforced government position to shift heavy responsibilities to their
industries and their capacity to overcome these barriers through cooperation
agreements such as this is enough to sustain a high grade in this variable.
Q14) Does this agreement bring international prestige?
The commercial cooperation between Brazil and Argentina has been
recognized by the other Latin American countries as an important step for the
development of a "Latin America common market". The CBA-123 aircraft certainly
will be sold in various Latin American countries because of the numerous facilities
that would be provided to the operators, since financial arrangements (or offsets)
are available to maintain these facilities. The aircraft will be considered a symbol
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of the technological level of these two countries and certainly will bring high
prestige.
Q15) How does the technology embodied in this offset improve the
national military capability?
Both Argentina and Brazil have shrunk their military budget to the
minimum necessary to maintain operations and revitalize old equipment. The
Argentine government cut its military budget after the Malvinas war. However, one
of the primary goals has been to revamp the military organizational structure and
rebuild its inventory through foreign acquisition as well as local production. Brazil
has engaged in a recent plan of modernization where some second-hand fighters
from France and U.S. were bought just to replace losses. Both countries are trying
to maintain the military balance of their forces.
The CBA-123 aircraft military application will be very similar to the actual
light transport aircraft existing in both air forces. This plane is designed to replace
the EMB-110 Bandeirante series in its variety of missions such as troop transport,
maritime patrol, and cargo aircraft in the Brazilian Air Force; and the IA-50 Guarani
II in photo reconnaissance, navigation aid calibration, and light transport roles in
the Argentine Air Force [Ref. 28:p. 20].
Because of the weak military budget of these two countries and the
necessity to reequip the light transport aircraft in a relative short time, the CBA-
123 may be considered as of medium contribution for Brazil and Argentina military
capability.
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Q16) How does this agreement contribute to the country's
independence and non-vulnerability?
Another common factor between Brazil and Argentina is the idea of
dependence and vulnerability. Both countries have been motivated to develop
indigenous arms production to prevent developed nations arms embargoes^*^. The
military governments in these nations have promoted an expansion of local
weapons industries that has served to improve civilian industrial development and
to guarantee the armed forces some security of supply of basic items such as light
aircraft.
In Argentina, the foreign-affairs community has developed two general
approaches: the classic liberal and the statist nationalist schools. There is
substantial disagreement between these two groups in questions related to arms
production. The nationalists, particularly in the armed forces, have supported
indigenous arms production and basic industry as directly relevant elements in the
creation and maintenance of national power and independence. In general, this
approach is supported by the majority of intellectuals, urban professionals, union
leaders, and members of the Peronist and Radical political parties. The liberals are
inclined more toward negotiating for technology transfer and arms in the context
of a long-term drive for independence in which the private sector has the primary
role. Today, Argentine arms production seems to follow a liberal approach, where
^*^he case of Argentina has been more serious because of recent wars. During
the "dirty war" (the military government against the guerrillas), President Carter's
administration embargoes arms export to Argentina because of human rights. In
1982, During Malvinas war, U.S and West European supplies were cut [Ref. 2:p.
61].
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the classical liberals would negotiate international economic relationships to
improve prospects for foreign-exchange earning and would seek to import foreign
weapons systems and technology where cost advantages outweigh domestic
production [Ref. 3]. Specifically in the case of the CBA-123, Argentina is applying
the liberal approach although the advantages are more commercial than technical.
The negotiation of coproduction agreements between two third world
countries for the production of turboprop aircraft may be the beginning of a new
era for these nations. The division of labor between Brazil and Argentina is an
important strategy towards a market expansion, which consequently would improve
the leverage to negotiate better technology transfer terms with developed
countries.
In summary, because both countries have experienced constant
embargoes in arms transfers, they have decided to be independent in arms
production. The level of contribution of this agreement for lessening dependence
and vulnerability in relation to developed countries is considered medium , due the
low level of technology exchanged in balance with the facilitating access of
transfers created by these countries because of their geographical situation.
OFFSET OUTCOME
The results of the analysis of this agreement shows interesting findings
from a case in which the transfer of technology is between two developing
countries. Because of the similarities of economico-political problems, Brazil and
Argentina became allies through various commercial cooperation agreements. The
economic aspects of this agreement are in obtaining finance, improving exports,
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and providing some foreign exchange savings. The political aspects of this
agreement are to improve the defense industries, consolidate the democratic
regimes, and create the perception in Latin American countries of the leading role
these two countries play in the continent. Table 27 shows the general results of the
CBA-123 case.
Q18) Does this agreement provide independent technological
capabilities?
The transfer of technology between two third world countries is a recent
phenomenon which requires additional study in order to better understand the
impact of this process in these nations' development.
The CBA-123 may be a limited case which shows the dimension of these
transfers, because it involves two countries that historically have competed for
leadership of the South American continent, and it includes a low portion of
technology transfer. The difficulty in the exchange of high technology between
these two nations is yet to be demonstrated due to their political instability.
However, as these countries become more structured politically and economically,
the cooperation and offset agreement environment will improve and technology
certainly will flow normally.
The independent variables analyzed under this outcome show that better
results may be obtained when the transfer environment between two countries
accommodate more equitable worksharings. Another observation is when there is
a difference between recipients and suppliers in coproduction agreements, the
type of technology transferred is not so significant.
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Although it would be more interesting if the case would have involved a
fighter aircraft instead of a turboprop, this case allowed some superficial
conclusions about the medium level of technology exchanged between Argentina





Q17) OFFSET TYPE COPRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) Does this offset improve Brazilian national security?
Both countries involved in this coproduction agreement are motivated by
similar approaches of national security which involves economic development and
the military defense. For a long time, the Brazil - Argentina rivalry did not allow any
attempt at cooperation. Today, they recognize that they have a "common enemy",
underdevelopment, and they decided to join forces to become less vulnerable, with
enough power and courage to fight against this situation.
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The CBA-123 coproduction agreement is evidence that flexibility and
innovation should be used wisely against not only the economic anomalies like
external debt, inflation, and unemployment but also to solidify political and social
positions. The case is one of the first steps toward major economic and political
understanding between the two countries. The case also shows the offset potential
if an agreement is negotiated adequately.
The socio-political and military independent variables analyzed in this
case point to important conclusions. The internal and external democratic political
motives are beginning to motivate different kinds of commercial cooperation
agreements that are not possible under military regimes. The defense industrial
base is a very important factor in making the agreements financially and
technologically viable. Finally, the cooperation between two third world countries
is creating a psychological perception of prestige even on the part of developed
countries. Because these variables are very important in the outcome of this case,
the final grade attributed to this outcome variable is high . Table 25 shows the





QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVES HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION MEDIUM
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES MEDIUM
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE HIGH
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGIOUS HIGH
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q20) Does this offset improve Brazilian economic capability?
Brazil and Argentina have similarities in having their armed forces as a
significant factor in the political and economic processes of the countries. Even
with dramatic economical problems the arms industry grew, closely associated
with industrial cycles of these nations. They have been applying the same import-
substitution models and hoping that national arms industries would create spin-
off effects for other industries.
The CBA-123 case shows on a small scale the potential of third world
countries to operate using offset arrangements and the additional economic
benefits that this type of agreement may provide in dealing with developed
countries.
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The independent variables demonstrate that agreements like this offer
a relatively high savings of foreign currency, export expansion, and capacity to
finance projects. The savings of hard currency may be an indication of the benefits
of these arrangements for countries which have a high debt level. The cooperation
agreements may cancel the import barriers or activate existing networks, and
provide great benefits in incrementing export levels and market shares. Finally, the
financial capability may be multiplied with the share of funds appropriations.
Besides these benefits, varying case-by-case, these coproduction agreements may
support the workforce or generate new jobs. As an average, the economic
capability outcome for the CBA-123 coproduction agreement is high . Table 26




Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS HIGH
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION HIGH
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY HIGH
OUTCOME





Q17) OFFSET TYPE COPRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY MEDIUM
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS HIGH
Q7) JOBS CREATION MEDIUM
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION HIGH
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY HIGH
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION MEDIUM
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES MEDIUM
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE HIGH
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE HIGH
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY MEDIUM
OUTCOME VARIABLES GRADE
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY MEDIUM
Q19) ENAHNCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q20) ECONOMIC BENEFITS HIGH
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2. The AMX Fighter Aircraft Case
The AMX fighter aircraft case is an example of a coproduction type of
offset agreement between the Brazilian and Italian governments which includes
other aerospace companies within both countries. The project attempts the
production of a high technology fighter aircraft and it is making major changes in
the evolution in both the Brazilian Air Force and the aircraft industry. The basic
information for this case was collected from various specialized aeronautics
periodicals and personal correspondence with EIVIBRAER^.
Q17) What are the offset agreement characteristics?
AMX is the Italo-Brazilian dedicated attack aircraft which resulted from
a codevelopment and coproduction agreement between the Aeronautica Militare
Italiana (AMI) and the Ministerio da Aeronautica (MAER) who have as partner
companies Aeritalia Societa Aerospaziale Italiana p.A. (Aeritalia) and Aeronautica
Macchi Spa (Aermacchi) from Italy, and EMBRAER from BraziP*\ The AMX aircraft
is a product of many years of research and study, and it is the first multinational
modern military fighter development program involving Brazil. The aircraft is
capable of operating at high subsonic speed (0.86 mach), very low altitude, by day
or night. It is expected to provide some improvement for all weather operations,
and if necessary, it operates from bases with poorly equipped or partially damaged
runways. Its primary missions are to perform ground attack, low level armed
^^he author of this thesis worked in the AMX program for 3 years. Due to
security reasons of both countries involved, neither personal experience nor
confidential information acquired during this assignment is used in this thesis.
287.
The agreement was signed in march 27, 1980 [Ref. 1].
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reconnaissance, as well as anti-ship attack and coastal patrol missions^**. Work on
the two-seat version, with improved combat capability, began in mid-1986 and it
will have additional capabilities such as operational conversion and advanced train-
ings^. The aircraft has a weapon load capacity of 8,500 lb (3800 kg), is powered
by a Rolls Royce Spey RB 168-807 turbofan engine, and has a highly integrated
ECM (Eletronic Counter Measure) self-protection system together with excellent
self-defence capabilities [Ref. 2].
The bi-national agreement requirements call for a total of 31 7 aircraft, 238
(187 single-seat and 51 two-seats) for Italy and 79 for Brazil (65 single-seat and 14
two-seat)^ [Ref. 3:p. 111]. The respective companies share of design,
development, and production of the aircraft is Aeritalia (46.7%), EMBRAER (29.7%),
and Aermacchi (23.6%). Each country has a separate assembly line. Each of the
countries is also responsible for the assembly's performance, execution, and
financial burden as divided along the management lines [Ref. 5:p. 83]. The Rolls-
Royce engine is built under license by Fiat Aviazione (major contract) and CELMA
(22% of total man hours required). The engine is a two shaft turbofan of modular
s^he prime features of the AMX are readiness, low vulnerability, high
survivability and safety, and in-flight refueling [Ref. 2].
*®®EMBRAER is undertaking design of the dual controls, canopy, and integration
of the Ferranti rear cockpit HUD (Head-up display) monitor; and redesign of the
environmental control and oxygen systems [Ref. 3:p. 11].
^he joint program has a basic aircraft but each country has its own version
with different equipment and weapons (e.g., the Italian AMX has a single GE Vulcan
20 mm six barrel Gatling gun, while the Brazilian version has a twin DEFA 30 mm
cannon to give more punch against air-to-ground targets. Also, the Brazilian
version requires VOR/ILS whereas the AMI uses TACAN) [Ref. 4].
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design and CELMA will produce twelve components, including the compressor
entry, guide vanes, the compressor casing, the intermediate casing, the casing of
the accessory gearbox and various parts of the ducting [Ref. 6].
The total investment of the Brazilian share of the AMX (30%) was
estimated at $600 million, but recent estimates show that the Brazilian government
investment will be about $2.85 billion, including the 79 aircraft. The reason for this
difference is the capacity required for industry and the numerous changes made
by the Brazilian Air Force in the initial project [Ref. 7]. The program is divided
basically into two major phases; the development phase, initiated in January 1981,
and the production phase, initiated in the late spring of 1987 [Ref. 3:p. 111]. During
the development phase, seven prototypes were built (three by Aeritalia, two each
by Aermacchi and EMBRAER), plus one airframe (by Aeritalia) for static testing. In
addition, selected components for fatigue testing were completed by each of the
three companies^'. The production phase is expected to continue until 1994 when
both countries air force requirements should be met (See Table 28). The AMX
program financial arrangements and "end-user" clause are unknown^.
^'The first EMBRAER prototype (A-04) flew on 16 October 1985 and the final
one (A-06) made its initial flight on 16 December 1986 [Ref. 3:p. 111].
^One source concludes there will be export restrictions due to the engine
origin. For instance, the Rolls Royce engine may restrict the sales of the aircraft
to Argentina [Ref. 8:p. 10]. Other sale restrictions to the Arab world may result




YEAR AMI FAB TOTAL
1988 6 6
1989 33 11 44
1990 41 16 57
1991 39 16 55
1992 39 16 55
1993 29 16 45
1994 4 4
TOTAL 187 79 266
Source: "Esta Chegando a Hora" Seauranqa e Defesa . no. 20,
,293
p. 8, 1988'
Deliveries were expected to begin to the Italian Air Force in June 1988
and the Brazilian Air Force in May 1989^. The organization of the program is
shown on Table 29.
^he Table 28 figures do not include the 51 two-seats for the AMI, and
considers the FAB 14 two-seats aircraft included in the 79 total Brazilian
requirement.
^he program schedule was delayed at least one year. The Italian Air Force














CDC: Comitato Diretivo Congiunto
JPMG: Joint Program Management Group
ITG: Integrated Technical Group
Source: Brian Wanstall, "Production-line AMX",
Interavia . June 1989, p. 582.
Q1) What type of technology is being transferred?
The AMX fighter is the most advanced military fighter in which a South
American country has had a production share, and a large amount of technology
transfer is expected to occur under this program [Ref. 10]. The worksharing was
carefully divided among the contractors. Aeritalia is responsible for the fuselage
center-section, nose radome, fin and rudder, elevators, flaps, ailerons and spoilers.
Aermacchi was given the forward fuselage, including gun and avionics integration,
canopy and tailcone. Finally, EMBRAER is being involved in the air intakes, wings.
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wing leading-edge slats, tailplane wing pylons, external fuel tanks and
reconnaissance pallets.
The companies marketing this aircraft have emphasized the survivability
as the main characteristic of the aircraft. The AMX has triple wing spars and
duplicate fly-by-wire flight control systems. The prototypes have been tested in "get
home" mode successfully, simulating both electrical and hydraulic failure [Ref. 4].
The specific terms of product design and production techniques
transferred to EMBRAER are unknown, but the company has published in its
annual reports the acquisition and expansion towards new developments in design
(CAD-CAM - Computer-Aided Design, Computer-Aided Manufacturing),
manufacturing (Numerically controlled milling machines), and composite material
technology which are assumed to be related to the AMX program needs [Ref. 1
1
and 12]. The engine technology transferred to CELMA seems to be old, but the
engine is considered robust, reliable, and very economical [Ref. 4]. A factor that
improves the value of this engine technology for Brazil is the fact that this project
is the first CELMA experience in manufacturing engine components and certainly
represents a significant step in the developing of the engine industry in Brazil.
Considering the AMX as the most advanced subsonic fighter already
coproduced in South America, and the impact that the AMX development and
production is having on the EMBRAER and CELMA technology environment, this
variable is graded as high .
Q2) What is the technology transfer environment?
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The technological environment for this agreement is very complex
because it includes many companies not only inside both countries but also
outside them. Besides the main contractors in each country (e.g., EMBRAER),
other subcontractors are developing and producing different components and parts
as a sole source for the common version (e.g., Fiat FA 150 Argo APUs - Auxiliary
Power Unit for engine starting are common for both versions), or as dual-source
for each country version (e.g., FIAR is producing radar just for the Italian aircraft).
The contribution of this variable to the AMX technology transfer environment is
analyzed on three dimensions; a "mutual need" environment, government-industry
relationship, and the specific changes in the Brazilian companies required to
accommodate the program requirements. Regarding "mutual need", both Italy and
Brazil have been looking for a partner to share the program, since it was not
possible to develop it alone. Sharing the work will help finance, keep the risk lower,
increase the number of orders to spread the costs, and promote exchange of
design technologies and know-how without spending funds on licenses fees and
royalties. The Brazilian government had been paying attention to the AMX program
since 1977, when the Italian companies began its development. Only three years
later, in 1980, did the Italian government invite the Brazilian government to
participate in the program^[Ref. 13]. The division of labor gave each company a
^One important detail that should be observed is the past relationship between
EMBRAER and Aermacchi for the Xavante trainer production under license in the
period of 1970 to 1982. This relationship seems to have helped the preliminary
understandings between the companies which consequently might have
contributed to influencing the Italian government toward the Brazilian option.
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fair share, according to their technological capability. The entire program seems
to be well integrated and balanced to obtain maximum mutual benefits.
The integration of government and industry objectives into a very
complex program created conflicts of interest and behavior. Problems included
different languages (the official language of the program documents is English),
different concepts of quality control (the NATO specifications were a new barrier
for Brazilians accustomed to U.S. patterns), and legislation in each country (both
countries have different procedures of procurement and acquisition).
The third dimension is that most of the Brazilian industries which
engaged in this program have been making specific changes to accommodate all
the bi-national requirements. The dimension of these changes is demonstrated by
the relatively large amount of funds invested in the acquisition of new equipment
and tools, personnel training in production and material handling, and financial
controls improvements to attend to joint programs requirements. These changes
represent not only the transfer of technology but a huge exchange of managerial
concepts and techniques.
in the AMX technology transfer environment three basic points were
identified. The "mutual need" factor, and the significative changes provided in the
AMX related Brazilian industries are the positive points. The complexity presented
by the exchange of various types and levels of technology and program
management seems a challenge to be overcome. Because of these "pros and
cons" this variable is rated as medium .
Q3) What are the recipient firm's characteristics?
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Because Brazil is a minor partner in this program, EMBRAER and other
companies involved in the AMX program were considered recipients. The recipient
companies under this agreement may be divided in four main groups, according
to their production specialty: airframe, engine, avionics and communications, and
armament. Most of the firms of each group have specific tasks to manufacture the
different components and parts specified by the MAER^. For example, TECNASA,
a Brazilian electronic company, is producing the SMA SCP-01 radar specifically for
the Brazilian version, instead of the Grifetto that will be produced by the Italian
FIAR. Another example is the Brazilian specification of the MAA-1 Piranha infra-
red air-to-air missile instead of the AIM-9L Sidewinder^'[Ref. 3:p. 112].
The analysis of the impact of the AMX on recipient industries is very
complex and requires information that is not available for public release. EMBRAER
is the major contractor for the Brazilian government and is receiving considerable
governmental funds to develop its part of the program. Other companies function
as EMBRAER subcontractors or as contractors directly with the Brazilian
government (e.g., CELMA is directly contracted by the government). The focus of
this analysis rests on the major contractor. Evidence of EMBRAER's technical
^he quantity of Italian companies subcontracted to supply components and
parts for the basic version is infinitely bigger than the Brazilian companies. This
demonstrates the technological gap between the two countries and a certain Italian
"supplier power" in specifying domestic equipment for the basic version. The only
alternative for the recipient government is to specify different major sets for its
particular version, according to the technological level of its industrial base.
^^The production of this missile is under a Brazilian government contract with
ORBITA. This contract was seriously affected by the 1988 Brazilian government
budget cuts [Ref. 14].
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absorptive capacity of AMX technology is the delivery of the first production kit
in August 1987 [Ref. 15]. The company's potential in competitive markets for
this aircraft is unknown because no additional orders outside the participant
countries has been made for this aircraft, although some countries have already
expressed real interest in buying the product. Other challenges that EMBRAER has
worked with are keeping the costs down to be more competitive in the international
market, and maintaining the market share negotiated with the Italians.
The role of the recipient in the AMX case is a mixed picture. The
EMBRAER subcontractors and other companies directly contracted by the Brazilian
government have been participating marginally in relation to the Italian industries
because of the worksharing negotiated, which was conditioned on the limited
technological level of the Brazilian aircraft industry in general. Keeping the program
costs down and expanding the market share will be difficult. This pessimistic
picture is being offset by the government specifying domestic components to equip
the Brazilian version and the EMBRAER success in meeting deadlines in the
production of the aircraft sets. Due to this imbalance between negative and positive
points, this variable is graded as medium .
Q4) What are the suppliers firm's characteristics?
The supplier's companies of this agreement are many and may be
divided in the same four groups as in the recipient variable. Because EMBRAER
is mainly an airframe manufacturer and most of the flow of technology that comes
from Italy is being directed to that company, this analysis focuses on the airframe
suppliers group.
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The suppliers of the airframe technology are basically Aeritalia and
Aermacchi. Aeritalia is a joint stock company formed on 12 November 1969 by an
equal shareholding of Fiat and IRI - Finmeccanica to combine both companies
aerospace activities. In 1976 IRI-Finmeccanica purchased stock owned by Flat,
thus acquiring complete control of the company's stock capital. Since 1981, the
company has decided to invest by buying other companies' stocks^. The
organization is based upon a centralized general management and seven
operational groups. The combat aircraft group, located in Turin, is responsible for
working on the AMX combat aircraft and other combat aircraft as well^. The
combined Aeritalia workforce is approximately 14,500 [Ref. 3:p. 142]. Aermacchi
is the aircraft manufacturing company of the Aeronautica Macchi group. Its plants
in Venegond airfield occupy a total covered area of 33,000 sq mt. The company
actually produces the two seat trainers MB-339A, manufactures the wings for the
Aeritalia G-222 and underwing pylons for the Panavia Tornado. The company is
also active in the field of aerospace ground equipment (AGE), with a complete line
of hydraulic, electric and pneumatic ground carts for servicing civil and military
aircraft. Total workforce at the beginning of 1988 was approximately 2,500.
^In 1983, it bought 25% of Aermacchi. In 1988, it acquired a certain
percentage share in FAMA (Argentina) [Ref. 3:p. 142].
^Besides the AMX, the Turin group is responsible for outer (movable) wings,
final assembly and flight testing of the Panavia Tornado; definition, design and
development of the Eurofighter; space vehicles; carbonfibre ailerons and rudders
for the Boeing 767; and an improved weapons system for the F-104. Other
activities include extensive research in various fields of aerodynamics and
advanced technologies, and repair, overhaul and maintenance of aircraft [Ref. 3:p.
142].
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In summary, the suppliers in the AMX agreement are divided similar to
the recipients, which enhances technology flow not only to EMBRAER but also
directly to other Brazilian components producers. The participation of these Italian
companies in various international and NATO agreements is proof of their high
technological capacity in receiving and transferring technology. The Xavante
experience and the actual level of cooperation among the governments and
companies assured that the transfer of technology between these two countries is
effective. The above analysis of the airframe suppliers produces a conclusion that
the Italian companies are well prepared technologically to design and develop the
AMX, and also reliable in the transfer of technology to Brazilian aircraft industry.
This variable is graded as high .
Q5) Will this technology be integrated?
The integration of the technology provided by the AMX program was not
evaluated in quantitative terms (e.g., percentage of domestic content), but some
assumptions can be made based on the recent benefits obtained by EMBRAER
due to the incorporation of new technologies. These benefits are basically from the
technology spinoffs from other programs.
In early-1983, EMBRAER signed a cooperative agreement for transfer of
composite materials technology with Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. This has
brought a lot of technology in this area [Ref. 16]. Although not directly motivated
by the AMX aircraft, EMBRAER has been successful in the composite material
technology integration. The company has applied this technology in numerous
surfaces of its airplanes (e.g., Brasilia and Parana) and in the production of parts
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as a subcontractor (e.g., MD-1 1 flaps). A key piece of information is the company's
intention to use these composite materials on the AMX, but there is no confirmed
evidence of this utilization [Ref. 16].
The spinoffs benefits of the AMX technology to other programs such as
Brasilia, Tucano, Parana and others seems to be great [Ref. 17]. One example may
be the improvement in the airframe design and airframe technology of the T-X
design project, the new Brazilian advanced fighter to be totally designed by the
company*" [Ref. 19].
Because it was not possible to ascertain the integration of the AMX
technology (based on time, skills and service sector factors) or any evidence of
spinoffs in other programs, this variable is graded as medium , based just on the
EMBRAER integration of other technologies.
Q6) Does this offset agreement conserve foreign exchange?
The data required to evaluate this variable completely is unavailable.
What is the difference between the price to just buy 79 fighters and the total cost
to produce them? Is this difference, obviously favoring the buy option,
compensated for by the benefits obtained through the technology acquired in this
agreement?
Since 1983, due to Brazil's foreign debt increasing (at that time $80
billion), the Brazilian government has been pushing to reduce imports by various
'measures. EMBRAER, trying to accomplish its development and the government
300 iAn examination of the feasibility of a codevelopment and coproduction
agreement between the U.S and Brazil for a fighter was done by Reyners [Ref. 18].
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policies, has placed more of its subcontracting work within the country. This
initiative, though bringing a lot of benefits, has been only partially successful, since
the majority of larger components for its aircraft are still imported from either the
U.S. or Canada [Ref. 16].
If one looks at the impact of the AMX coproduction on the Brazilian
balance of payments, the disadvantages of expenditures to equip the industry with
machines, tooling, and raw materials does not seem to be compensated for in this
program^'. But programs in the future would use the same infrastructure to provide
real savings.
Because of the heavy investment made by the MAER to enhance and
equip the aircraft industry, the benefits of this investment would not be expected
to be reached in this agreement, and this variable is graded as bw.
Q7) Does this agreement create jobs?
Although it was difficult to ascertain precise data to analyze the AMX
impact on employment some estimates can be made.
Despite the end of the Xavante production line in the early 1980s, the
EMBRAER level of employment has continued to rise (see Table 15, Piper case).
During 18 months (January 1982 to July 1983) the majority of those added were
technical workers. The engineering department, including quality control, expanded
from 800 to 2000. It was reported that the AMX program was demanding twice as
^'The first estimate for the break-even point of this aircraft was 250 units.
According to the president of the commission that coordinates the project.
Brigadier Ajax Barros de Melo, now it is necessary to sell between 500 and 600
units to break even [Ref. 17].
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many hours for R & D and engineering, compared to the Brasilia program, showing
some evidence of the improvement in employment quality and quantity because
of the program [Ref. 16].
The employment impact of the AMX has also been large in other
industries such as CELMA and other subcontractors.
A program with the dimensions of the AMX causes a great impact in the
creation of specialized personnel in Brazil. Most of the employment benefits are
obtained in qualitative and quantitative terms. This variable is graded as high .
Q8) Does this offset Improve exports?
The future sales of the AM-X fighter in the international market is another
difficult variable to estimate^. Although some countries have already demonstrated
interest in the program, no order or option had been accepted^. Besides this,
some potential customers such as Argentina and Arabian countries would not
abide by "end-user" clause restrictions^. One evaluation of the future AMX market
was found in a citation of the EMBRAER president Osiris Silva:
"^AGDA suggests the AMX and the new British Hawk 200 to serve as the "low
end" of a relatively well equipped Third World air force, or the "high end" of one
less well off [Ref. 20:p. 23]. British Aerospace figures as the main competitor for
the AMX [Ref. 8].
^he Spanish CASA is offering some participation in offset terms [Ref. 4].
Saudi Arabia included the AMX in the military-industrial cooperation negotiated
with the Brazilian government who has agreed to accept oil in payment [Ref. 21].
China was considering purchasing 500 AMX [Ref. 22]. Argentina was studying
participation in the AMX program [Ref. 23].
*^An interesting fact concerns the choice of the engine by the Italians. When
Italy tried to sell its Aeritalia G-222 (with engine GET-64, General Electric) to Libya,
the U.S government put restrictions for export because of the engine. This was one
reason why the Italians has chosen Rolls-Royce engines for the AMX [Ref. 8:p. 10].
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Everybody has been attempting to build a new technology light attack aircraft
that would replace the McDonnell Douglas A-4 for performance and cost. The
AMX will do just that and be a better aircraft with new technology and not a
trainer aircraft adopted for the attack role^[Ref. 16].
These words predict a good prospective market for the AMX, although
one of the clauses of the agreement preestablished a market share between Italy
and Brazil that probably would restrict EMBRAER to expanding markets only in
Latin America leaving Italy with a big share of Europe, Africa, and Asia **[Ref. 24].
It is too early to forecast the AMX exports. It is even early to fix its
price^^ but the aircraft may fit into a niche. One advantage of the
commercialization of this aircraft is the series of options posed in various
components to overcome the "end-user" restrictions. For example, the Saudi
Arabian AMX may be offered with Tecnasa radar instead of one made by Fiar
under license from Israel^.
*^he intention of this citation was to compare the AMX with its main
competitor. The British plane was designed for training and was adapted to
combat, while the AMX was designed specifically for combat [Ref. 16].
^In 12 May 1984, Aeritalia announced that it plans to sell the AMX "to several
Latin American countries" thus entering on a collision marketing course with
EMBRAER [Ref. 24].
^'The Brazilian AMX expected cost at the beginning of the program was $8
million. Today this figure has increased to $18 million [Ref. 17]. Most of the sources
cite a $10 million (in 1983 values) price tag, which is the competitive price of this
aircraft [Ref. 9]. A third estimate gives the flyaway cost as $13 million [Ref. 4].
According to EMBRAER officials, this will bring serious problems to marketing the
aircraft (this price is 60% of the total cost of a supersonic F-16, close enough to
direct the customer towards buying a more effective plane) [Ref. 17].
*^he only exception to this rule is that the engine remains the same for both
versions.
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In summary, the positive aspects are the relatively good potential market
of the aircraft, and the alternatives in including different components to overcome
the "end-user" clause. The negative aspects are the market share constraints,
estimated competitive price that covers the costs, and the application of "end-user"
clause restrictions to two (Saudi-Arab and Argentina) of four interested customers.
The grade of medium is because the variable rests somewhere between these two
points.
Q9) Does this agreement obtain financial investment?
Because each country's government has been responsible to finance its
own part of the agreement, it is concluded that this variable may be graded as low
since the agreement does nothing to enhance the financial viability of the program.
Q10) What are the internal and external political motivations for this
agreement?
The political factors have been extremely important in the AMX case. The
local production of weapons is frequently a politically feasible way to achieve some
technical, economic or military goals. If instead of producing the AMX, the Brazilian
Government had just bought the aircraft, this would not have the same political
implications. The principal external motivation of working with the Italians has been
its neutrality and its alliance with NATO countries. The same occurs with the
engine. Both the Italian and British options (European option) have been
reciprocated because they are interested in extending the market to South
America, and Brazil figures as the most technically prepared partner in the region.
The internal motivations of this agreement are complex, but basically the military
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and defense industries figure as the most motivated sectors for this program.
Recently, this program has been criticized in political debates by the PT (Workers
Party) candidate Luis Inacio da Silva, which proposed the application of the funds
to social investments [Ref. 25].
Because this agreement was signed when the Brazilian military was in
power, few of these internal and external motivations were expressed by
government officials. Other sectors have shown some reactions in the recent
presidential campaign related to criticism of the previous military regime. The AMX
program has been surviving the political transition from the military regime to
democracy and certainly will continue to survive, even if future presidents will be
against this position, because of the importance of this program for technological
evolution, employment generation, exports of high-tech equipment, and other
benefits for the national security. This variable is graded as high .
Q11) How does this government act In this offset?
The Brazilian government participation in the AMX program has been
similar to developed countries' participation in the development of new weapons
systems. This participation has been through negotiating, controlling, and
financing. In terms of negotiating, the government has been an active negotiator
in all phases of the program and on two basic fronts. First, the government
negotiates with the Italian government before the start of each phase of the
program. Second, the government has negotiated with the Brazilian companies for
the Brazilian share of the work and also for the components produced for the
Brazilian version. The government has also been an active comptroller, through the
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establishment of contract offices inside the contractor's plant to supervise the
contracts of that firm. As they are developed in the U.S., the Grupo de
Acompanhamento e Controle (GACs) are responsible to technically and financially
certify the overall contract. To finance the contracts, the government has been
using similar cost-plus with fixed fee agreements as in the U.S. for the
disbursement of funds. Also similar to the U.S., the government has been
furnishing GFE equipment and providing facilities for testing of the equipment.
Summing up, the Brazilian government, through the Aeronautics Minister,
has been very active in negotiating, controlling, and financing the AMX program,
and this variable is graded as high .
Q12) What are the political and social pressures of this agreement?
This coproduction agreement permitted the use of local political
pressures to achieve mutual defense goals. The main political pressures of this
agreement came from the military and the defense industries. At the time of the
agreement, national security related topics and the funds allocated to the program
were not presented for Congressional approval. However, as the country is
returning to democracy, the Congress and other civilian Ministries have been more
active in influencing the program^.
The social pressures related to this agreement have been increasing
since 1980. Today, the AMX program involves various Brazilian industries and
**One example of this power given in part by the new Brazilian Constitution
enacted in October 1988, refers to the federal budget. In 1988, the MAER ask for
$150 million for the AMX program. The Planning Ministry, responsible for the
implementation of the budget cuts, only agreed to $70 million [Ref. 17].
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employs lot of workers. Pressure from the people and from the labor unions has
been increasing not only in the defense sector but also in all sectors of the
Brazilian industry. The evidence of this ascension is the recent position of the
Workers Party candidate in the second round of the presidential election.
Because of the increasing political and social pressure on programs like
the AMX, this variable is graded as high .
Q13) What are the benefits of this agreement for industrial
defense?
The benefits of the AMX program for the Brazilian aerospace industry are
relatively high because of the industrial base and the technology that is flowing
within the country. EMBRAER has been one of the main companies to benefit from
this agreement. For the first time, the company really has a technologically
developed combat aircraft and this has inaugurated a new phase of development
for EMBRAER. With experience obtained with the Tucano commercialization, the
company engages now in one market that was before dominated only by
developed countries companies. EMBRAER has demonstrated itself to be fast and
aggressive in using offsets as a marketing tool, as was demonstrated with the
Tucano sales to Egypt and U.K. air forces. Other characteristics that are
emphasized is the company philosophy in transferring technology. There is nothing
better for a third world country than to receive technology from another third world
country that has knowledge of the difficulties in the absorption and integration of
this technology.
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The benefits of the AMX technology are evident in this agreement. The
Brazilian companies have been gaining technological known-how, marketing and
management expertise. The Brazilian government is obtaining expertise in
negotiating large international agreements and in managing large projects. The
AMX industrial defense benefits are high .
Q14) Does this agreement bring international prestige?
The Brazilian government is passing through a very turbulent phase, with
political changes and serious economic constraints. Although various studies have
shown that the new Latin America civilian presidents elected after military regimes
did not affect any previous military programs (e.g., in Argentina, the President Raul
Alfonsin did not interfere with the Fabricaciones Militares), it seems that the AMX
budget program will be affected in the near future, and this may bring serious
consequences for the entire program. If this happens, Brazil will lose some
international prestige, mainly with its favorite aerospace partner. This will bring
serious repercussions for future programs. On the other hand, if despite these
problems Brazil continues to produce this fighter, this will bring considerable
international benefits and certainly will open the doors for future coproduction
agreements such as for the new generation of supersonic aircraft. Even with this
uncertainty, Brazil seems to have obtained considerable prestige due to the
increasing volume of sales of other equipment. Between the uncertainty of a
positive future success of the aircraft and the negative failure of the entire program,
medium value is assumed for this variable.
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Q15) How does the technology embodied in this offset improve
the national military capability?
The incorporation of the AMX fighter in the Brazilian Air Force will
represent a new technological level, not only in improving the equipment but also
for the combat efficiency of Brazilian military personnel. Fighter pilots, ground
support personnel, and supply and administration personnel are being trained to
assimilate this new technology. Although the FAB has had some previous
experience with Mirage ill and F-5E, the AMX is relatively more developed
technologically, and the large number of aircraft (79) and the various avionics
resources will need more know-how. This probably will require, like EMBRAER, the
application of the same step-stone method to prepare the Air Force to receive this
advanced equipment^'". Considering the probability of the expansion of the number
of aircraft produced and also the numerous versions estimated for this aircraft
(carrier operation, anti-submarine patrol, two-seats) it is easy to assume a high
value of contribution of this program for the Brazilian Air Force capability.
Q16) How does this agreement contribute to the country's
independence and non-vulnerability?
The AMX program is very powerful evidence of the value of the
independence and non-vulnerability concepts. The technology, general expertise,
and funds obtained by the aerospace industry to produce the aircraft emphasizes
^'^"he first 9 AMX (in the FAB denomination will be A-1) aircraft will be delivered
in 1990 and will be included in the second fighter group in Santa Cruz Air Force
Base, Rio de Janeiro. The AMX is the first combat fighter specified by the Air
Force.
273
the importance of the domestic production of military equipment. The vulnerability
of Brazil is expressed by the diversification of the suppliers ("European choice"
instead of the unfeasible U.S. choice) in supplying critical equipments where the
indigenous production is technically and economically unfeasible. Independence
has been demonstrated by the numerous Brazilian companies that are directly and
indirectly connected to the program. The diversification of domestic industries such
as airframe, aeronautical engines, avionics, communication, electric and
electronics, and missiles is a significant step towards the last stage of the
technological independence. This program has a high value in terms of contributing
to the overall Brazilian independence and non-vulnerability.
OFFSET OUTCOME
The AMX case is a very important example which demonstrates the
evolution of the benefits acquired through the different types of offsets. The
technology transferred in this agreement has been a function of the government
participation, the level of technology, and the leverage of the supplier in relation
to recipients in negotiating better terms. The economic benefits of government-to-
government agreements are difficult to measure because of the data secrecy, but
externalities such as the increasing of employment and exports performance are
evidence of the benefits of this program. Finally, national security figures as the
most important outcome in military coproduction agreements. Due to the
representative amount of funds allocated to these programs, they are exposed to
various political and social influences. Table 33 shows the AMX general results.
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Q18) Does this agreement provide independent technological
capabilities?
The decreasing supremacy of the U.S. as the main supplier of
technology is proven by this case. As the transfer of technology becomes tied to
strict restrictions, the recipients turn to other options to have flexibility when
negotiating the future sales of products. The AMX case is one more step in the
new third world country evolution towards independence. The outcome of this case
is related to the level of technology as a function of government participation and
the existence of the various political and commercial limiting factors (e.g., "end-
user" clause) that restrict the maximum technological benefit. Although some of the
variables had medium values of contribution, the overall average of this result is
considered high , due to the importance of the technology and the tradition of Italy






Q17) OFFSET TYPE COPRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY HIGH
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
OUTCOME
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY HIGH
Q19) Does this offset improve Brazilian national security?
The national security results are always emphasized in coproduction
agreements between two governments. The AMX is not an exception. The benefits
of the AMX program to industrial defense, military capability, and to independence
and non-vulnerability prove the success reached by recipient countries. Table 31





QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVES HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES HIGH
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE HIGH
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE MEDIUM
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY HIGH
Q16) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY HIGH
OUTCOME
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q20) Does this offset improve Brazilian economic capability?
The results obtained concerning economic benefits are tentative due to
lack of accurate data in government agreements involving the transaction of high
technology weapons. Most of this secrecy is due to the internal political reaction
if these data were to be published. The IMF has been very critical of military
expenses in countries with high external debt, and certainly this is one more reason
to keep the data from becoming public. The most important economic benefit of
the AMX has been the creation and improvement of the aerospace industry worker
in Brazil, one of the most important industries in terms of technology level. Other
benefits such as export expansion are seriously challenged by the restrictions
imposed by the suppliers and the economic situation of the country in general. The
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overall impact of this variable is medium . Table 32 shows the economic benefits




Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LOW
Q7) JOBS CREATION HIGH
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION MEDIUM
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY LOW
OUTCOME





Q17) OFFSET TYPE COPRODUCTION
Ql) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY HIGH
Q2) TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT MEDIUM
Q3) RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS MEDIUM
Q4) SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HIGH
Q5) TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MEDIUM
Q6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LOW
Q7) JOBS CREATION HIGH
Q8) EXPORT EXPANSION MEDIUM
Q9) ENHANCE FINANCIAL VIABILITY LOW
QIO) INT/EXT POLITICAL MOTIVATION HIGH
Qll) GOVERNMENT ACTION HIGH
Q12) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES HIGH
Q13) INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE HIGH
Q14) INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE MEDIUM
Q15) MILITARY CAPABILITY HIGH
Q16 ) INDEPENDENCE/NON-VULNERABILITY HIGH
OUTCOME VARIABLES GRADE
Q18) INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY HIGH
Q19) ENHANCEMENT NATIONAL SECURITY HIGH
Q20) ECONOMIC BENEFITS MEDIUM
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VI - CASE STUDIES ANALYSIS
The technological, socio-political, economical, and military factors that
motivate recipient countries to participate in offset arrangements were analyzed
applying six case studies from the Brazilian aerospace industry. The methodology
applied was a focused comparison (case study methodology) which consists of
asking a set of standardized questions for each case. This procedure assures that
the data obtained from various cases are comparable. This chapter provides a
general analysis of the foregoing case studies including an examination of the
hypotheses previously established and makes some generalizations based on the
four headings described in Chapter One.
A. GENERAL ANALYSIS
The results of the case studies are summarized in Table 34 through Table 38.
The tables show an overview of different relationships between offset cases and
their independent variables (Table 34), offset cases and their outcomes (Table 35),
offset types and their outcomes (Table 36), offset cases and general outcome
(Table 37), and an additional time period and case type variables (Table 38). Based
on these tables' results, some valuable findings were obtained through the test of
hypotheses established in Chapter One. All the cases were grouped in four types
of offsets (countertrade, technology transfer, licensed production, and
coproduction) and each of the hypotheses are examined under these groups. At
the end of this section, Table 39 will summarize the results of the hypotheses tests.
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1. Hypotheses and General Analysis
This thesis examines six hypotheses:
H1: IF variance in experience in negotiating offsets affects the offset
outcome, THEN there is a learning process in recipient countries offset
negotiations, which will result in increasingly beneficial offsets over time.
H2: IF variance in types of offset agreements affects the offset outcome,
THEN there is a trend that shows an evolution among different agreements.
H3: IF variance between military and civilian offsets affects the offset
outcome, THEN the government should give different treatment to civilian and
military offset policy (different legislation, assistance, financial support, etc.).
H4: IF variance in level of technology affects the offset outcome, THEN
there is a hierarchy among different offset agreements (i.e., some offset
agreements are able to transfer technology better or more efficiently).
H5: IF variance in government support affects offset outcome, THEN
defense industries should search for offset agreements with government
support (i.e., there is some suspicion that recipient industries have more
leverage in negotiating offsets if they have their government involved).
H6: IF variance in supplier countries and industries affects offset outcome,
THEN recipient governments and industries should develop "supplier scores"
to improve decision making (e.g. a databank with previous information by
country and by industry, about implementation, policies, trade barriers, etc.).
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TABLE 34
VARIABLES/CASES MD-11 BRASILSAT PIPER AEROSPATIALE CBA-123 AMX
OFFSET TYPE CT TT LP LP CP CP
TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY LO MD MD MO MD HG
TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT NG MD HG MD MO MO
RECIPIENT'S CHARACTERISTICS MD MD HG LO HG MD
SUPPLIER'S CHARACTERISTICS HG MD HG MD MD HG
TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MD HG MD MD MD MD
FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS LO MD HG LO HG LO
JOBS CREATION LO MD MD MD MD HG
EXPORT EXPANSION MD LO LO LO HG MD
ENHANCE FIN. VIABILITY LO MD UN UN HG LO
INT/EXT. POLITIC MOTIVATION MD HG MD HG HG HG
GOVERNMENT ACTION MD HG HG HG MD HG
SOC/POL. PRESSURES UN HG HD HG MD HG
INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE NA MD NA MD HG HG
INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE NA HG NA LO HG MD
MILITARY CAPABILITY NA MD NA HG MD HG





NA : NOT APPLICABLE
CT : COUNTERTRADE
TT : TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER




CXJTCOMES/CASES MD-11 BRASILSAT PIPER AEROSPATIALE CBA-123 AMX
TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH
ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM HIGH
ECONOMIC BENEFITS LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW HIGH MEDIUM
TABLE 36
OUTCOMES/OFFSET COUNTERTRADE TECH .TRANSFER LICENSED PRODUCT I ON (•) COPR00UCTION(**)
TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM
ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY MEDIUM HIGH HIGH HIGH
ECONOMIC BENEFITS LOW MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM
(*) SELECTION CRITERIA BETWEEN THE PIPER AND AEROSPATIALE CASES, LOWEST GRADE
(•*) SELECTION CRITERIA BETWEEN THE CBA-123 AND AMX CASES, LOWEST GRADE
TABLE 3 7
OUTCOMES/OFFSET COUNTERTRADE TECH. TRANSFER LICENSED PRODUCTION COPROOUCTION
GENERAL OUTCOMEC*) LOW MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM
(*) SELECTION CRITERIA, LOWEST GRADE FROM TABLE 3
TABLE 3 8
CASE STUDIES ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
VARIABLES/CASES MD-11 BRASILSAT PIPER AEROSPATIALE CBA-123 AMX
YEAR 1987 (1990) 197A 1988 1987 1980
CASE TYPE CIVILIAN CIV/MIL. CIVILIAN MILITARY CIV/MIL. MILITARY
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2. Countertrade
This offset group is represented only by the MD-1 1 case, thereby limiting
the generalizations which can be made. The following findings summarize the
examination of the various hypotheses under this offset group:
(1) H1 is partially supported in the MD-11 case. It seems that there is a
MAER learning process when offset negotiations involve commercial jet
acquisitions for airlines. This evolution is demonstrated in the specific government
offset policies for countertrade negotiations. However, the legislation enacted by
the MAER is finding a lack of support because the offset benefits are not
completely understood within the government. As a result, the DAC has been using
small requirements (e.g., 10% of percentage of offset) to test the acceptability of
this policy by the suppliers as well as other government agencies.
(2) Countertrade agreements are the weakest in terms of obtaining
technology, supporting hypothesis 2. The MD-11 is a good case to show this
effect. Because of the Brazilian aircraft industry's technological and production
limitations and McDonnell Douglas' high technological level requirements, the
countertrade agreement seems to be the best arrangement that could have been
made. The small Brazilian component producers cannot technically compete to
supply equipments for a MD-11 aircraft. EMBRAER is working close to total
capacity filling aircraft orders and cannot incorporate new component jobs to
support offset implementations. With this limitation, the Brazilian government
cannot negotiate to improve the amount and the level of technology transfer to
higher levels such as coproduction. Considering just countertrade, there is an
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evolution from barter (practically no technology transfer involved) to buy-back
(maximum of technology transfer under the countertrade group) agreements. The
MD-11 represents the upper bound of this evolution, because it includes a small
portion of technology transfer to produce components for the same aircraft (buy-
back arrangement), instead of a simple barter or counterpurchase transactions.
The utilization of direct offsets (flaps are related to the MD-1 1 acquisition) increase
the probability of obtaining better terms in technology transfer. H2 is strongly
supported by the MD-1 1 case.
(3) The military and civilian offset agreements are commonly not well
distinguished under countertrade agreements because of the variety of forms that
these arrangements may assume. Offsets being linked to items not related to the
equipment sold is becoming very common (e.g., the acquisition of F-16 by Greece
which includes Greek tourism as offset). In fact, the MD-11 is easily identified as
a civilian case, which is regulated in Brazil by a completely different set of
government regulations. The case shows the importance of distinguishing between
military and civilian offsets and the government's need to apply different policies for
each case. The Brazilian government recognized this difference, publishing civilian
offset policy guidelines and keeping a "case-by-case" approach for military
decisions. H3 is supported in this case.
(4) Countertrade agreements usually involve a low level of technology
which directly affects the technological independence and economical benefit
outcomes. In this case, the technological independence does not assume an
extremely positive value because EMBRAER already had the capability to produce
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flaps using composite material technology. It does not seem that a higher level of
technology would be obtained through a countertrade agreement negotiated for
only 10% of the requirements of the total value of the acquisition. The economic
benefits expected in this negotiation offer evidence that this limited requirement
negatively affects the economic outcome. In summary, because of the low level of
technology transferred and the weak economic benefits obtained due to low offset
requirements, H4 is supported in the MD-11 case.
(5) Although the Brazilian government has been deeply involved in offset
arrangements, its participation in the countertrade transactions has been somewhat
limited. It seems that the government only partially participated in the negotiation
of this agreement and has been controlling just the formal process of this offset
agreement according to the respective legislation. H5 is not confirmed in the MD-
11 case, because EMBRAER and VARIG companies had acted independently
without government support.
(6) The actual level of fierce competition in the international aerospace
market is increasing the number of offset proposals among different suppliers. It
is assumed that one of the main reasons McDonnell Douglas won this competition
and sold the aircraft was due to its position in having already contracted with
EMBRAER, fulfilling a previous offset requirement. It does not seem that McDonnell
Douglas had presented significative proposals in relation to other companies'
proposals (e.g., Boeing). Hypothesis 6 is not supported by this case.
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3. Technology Transfer
BRASILSAT agreement is the only case in this offset group. However it
is a very powerful case of technology transfer and it becomes very relevant to most
of the hypotheses of this thesis since it is a civilian and a military case at the same
time.
(1) H1 found in this case its strongest support. The evolution from the
first generation BRASILSAT negotiation in 1982 and this case in 1989 is very clear.
This evolution demonstrates the increasing level of technology transfer involved in
offset proposals. However, this intended outcome has been seriously challenged
because of numerous restrictions placed on the transfer of missile technology to
Brazil. With the results obtained in this offset agreement negotiation, Brazil may be
engaged with countries having strict offset requirements which will positively reflect
on the learning process in future negotiations.
(2) H2 is strongly held by this case, due to the satellite portion of the
offset proposal which includes offers for the counterpurchase of auto parts or
Tucano aircraft. If the acquisition remains divided into two agreements there will be
a technology transfer agreement for the rocket technology and a countertrade
agreement in exchange for auto parts and Tucanos. As mentioned in the MD-11
case, what constrains the evolution from technology transfer to license and
coproduction agreements is the low level of technological capability of the Brazilian
rocket industry. Because of the different outcomes that may be obtained through
the signature of the contract, even with this technology limitation, this case strongly
supported H2.
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(3) The dual military and civilian objectives of the satellite and rocket
technologies make this case particularly relevant to Hypothesis 3. The political and
military influences are balanced in this case due to the Brazilian space program
division of labor. The same occurs in other programs such as the Brazilian nuclear
program where the power plants share the same nuclear weapon laboratory. It is
obvious that for a government, it is very hard to give different treatment to these
programs, establishing different civilian and military offset policies. However, the
BRASILSAT case demonstrates the constant conflict between these two groups
with opposing views for the same objectives, which support the hypothesis that
different treatment should be given to military and civilian offsets.
(4) The level of technology that would be transferred through the
BRASILSAT agreement will determine the validity of hypothesis 4. The choice of old
rocket technology from France instead of the U.S. know-how will produce intense
variances in the technological independence and national security outcomes. This
difference in outcomes is the evidence that H4 is true.
(5) The BRASILSAT case shows an impressive participation of the
Brazilian government due primarily to the wide variety of political motivations and
pressures. The huge responsibilities of civilian and military ministries in supporting
this agreement are of fundamental importance for the implementation of the entire
program. Because of the vital government support in this agreement, hypothesis
5 is supported for this type of offset.
(6) H6 also found in this case significative support. The difference
encountered between the French and the U.S. offset proposals certainly will affect
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the technological independence and national security outcomes and indirectly may
affect the future economic benefits through the foreign exchange savings. Because
of the difference in the outcomes as a function of probable suppliers for this
agreement, hypothesis 6 is supported in this case.
4. Licensed Production
The utilization of two important licensed production offsets from the
Brazilian aerospace industry were carefully planned to allow adequate testing of the
proposed hypotheses.
(1) Both cases show mixed results regarding H1. The Piper case
demonstrates a significative evolution from previous agreements such as the
Xavante licensed production with the Italian Aermacchi. The prohibition of royalties
and the authority needed to make changes in the product for better adaptation to
Brazilian conditions are evidence of an evolution of better terms in the transfer of
technology. The Aerospatiale military helicopters case seems to show just the
opposite, since the first agreement which resulted in the creation of HELIBRAS in
1980 had better terms than this case. Very little experience seems to be have been
incorporated in the second agreement. Because of these opposite views, H1 is
considered true only in some cases and further testing is required.
(2) Both cases of licensed production strongly support H2. Because of
the strict technological and market limitations required by licensed production
agreement clauses, the outcome is always exposed to some limitations. For
example, the Piper commercial clause which restrict export certainly negatively
affects the economic benefits outcome. The same occurs with the Aerospatiale
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case where HELIBRAS shows deficiencies in absorbing the technology. These
limitations also will affect negatively the technological independence outcome.
Although the technology independence outcome obtained in licensed production
is higher than countertrade and technology transfer agreements, the overall results
show that this type of agreement is still lower than coproduction. Because of this
variation in the offset outcome caused mainly by various limitations under these
agreements, H2 is strongly supported by both case studies.
(3) The two cases under the licensed production were carefully chosen
to show the variance between the civilian and military offset agreements to support
H3^'\ The Piper case is a typical civilian case of licensing between firms and it was
affected by the Brazilian technology transfer and trade regulations (e.g., the
Brazilian government had established tariff barriers for import of general aviation
planes and prohibition of royalties payments). Instead, the Aerospatiale case
seems not be affected by the same policies and regulations^'^ It is obvious that
each case shows completely opposite outcomes (Table 35) because of some
variables such as transfer environment, recipient characteristics, and domestic
political motivations (Table 34). The difference between the two government
treatments offered to civilian and military cases supports H3.
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The reader should remember that under 0MB definitions, the Aerospatiale
case is considered as coproduction because it is a government-to-government
agreement.
312r
^For example, the same trade barrier used to general aviation planes is used
for helicopters, but the enforcement seems more flexible, allowing Brazilian
purchasers to specify helicopters above the technological level of HELIBRAS
production to justify the equipment import.
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(4) The level of technology transferred through licensed production
agreements does not seem to be a factor that largely contributes to support H4.
Most of the technology transferred through these offsets refers to assembly, test,
maintenance, and a very little portion of production. The Aerospatiale case shows
that even if the level of equipment technology improves, little W\\\ be added to the
general outcome. However, the Piper case shows that if variables such as transfer
environment, and recipient and supplier characteristics have a positive values, the
consequent technological outcome will be as expected. Because of these two
opposite situations, H4 is true only in certain types of cases.
(5) Although recipient governments have distanced themselves from
civilian offsets, these case studies show an opposite picture. The case of Piper
illustrates the indirect way which governments may act to improve the offset
outcome. These methods include the establishment of protectionism laws ("law of
similars"), tariff barriers, and even through the acquisition of some products (e.g.,
FAB bought some Piper models to incorporate in the fleet). These types of "little
help" from the government may improve the offset outcome. Since the Aerospatiale
case is a military case, the Brazilian government has been deeply involved and the
outcomes will be positively increased compared to the first HELIBRAS agreement.
The "Army factor" in this case is a proof of this new relationship. Another important
point under this hypothesis is the political influence of the industry involved In the
license production. The best example of this point is the "ENGESA factor" and Its
power to have the government act as a partner. In summary, the case studies
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show the importance of the government in supporting the agreements, even the
civilian related ones.
(6) H6 is strongly demonstrated through the two examples of licensing.
It is clear that there are differences between government and industry suppliers
from different countries. Under this offset group, two different technology transfer
policies may be ascertained. First, there is U.S. technology for general aviation
planes production. This technology is commercially restricted (and most of the time
restricted for national security reasons) but represented the most advanced
technology available in this area. The French technology for helicopter production
comes free of political ties but it is not a leading-edge technology. These variations
suggest a constant trade-off in recipient country decision making and shows H6
to be true.
5. Coproductlon
Coproduction agreements are different from other types of offset
because of the mutual benefits provided to both partners. The two cases selected
for study under coproduction support some of the hypotheses of this thesis,
although the lack of available information restricted most of the AMX case analy-
sis.
(1) HI is not well supported by this group of cases. Although EMBRAER
and the Brazilian government agreements have been evolving from license
agreements to coproduction, it cannot be assumed that coproduction agreement
terms will continue to improve in future coproduction arrangements (e.g., the new
fighter agreement may be successful in obtaining an increase of worksharing or
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more sophisticated technology, but there is no basis to assume this evolution).
Another approach may be analyzing the terms which have evolved from the AMX
agreement (1980) to the CBA-123 (1987). It seems that the main lesson learned by
EMBRAER during this time period was the importance of having a large share in
coproduction agreements. Because of this lack of basis to assume future
evolutions under coproduction agreements and the difficulty in comparing the two
cases due to their differences (e.g., in AMX case, EMBRAER is the recipient and
in the CBA-123, it is more of a supplier), H1 is only partially supported.
(2) The two cases seem to partially support H2, because of the high level
of benefits obtained through these agreements. From the point of view of a
recipient country, coproduction is the best approach in receiving high technology
(see Table 36), which effectively contributes positively to the other outcomes. The
AMX case is very rich in showing the importance of the worksharing participation
in improving variables such as transfer environment and technology integration.
Although the CBA-123 has a different prospective because Brazil is more of a
supplier than a recipient, the same worksharing principle is applied to assure at
least some flow of technology from Argentina, establishing a "two-way street". The
evolution observed in these agreements cannot be compared because of the
differences existing between them such as military and civilian, government
support, and level of technology. Because of the infeasibility of comparing these
two cases, H2 is only partially supported.
(3) The selection of two coproduction cases with different civilian and
military objectives has been successful in showing support for H3. The differences
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observed between the two cases show a technology and economic benefits trade-
off (Table 35). It means that with the AMX program Brazil has benefited more with
technology and less with economic outcome while the CBA-123 has an opposite
picture. These differences are enough to support hypothesis 3.
(4) The difference between the level of technology of the two
coproduction agreements cases (Table 34) produced different outcomes (Table
35). The technology transferred through the AMX case is higher than in the CBA-
123 case, which positively affects the technological independence outcome. This
variation in the outcome is proof that hypothesis 4 is true.
(5) H5 (government support) variance between the two cases is once
again supported through these two examples of coproduction offset. The difference
between the level of government action (Table 34) in the CBA-123 and AMX cases
directly affected the outcome results (Table 35). Although the CBA-123 was
considered partially a military agreement, the government involvement has been
restricted to acquisition of some units to guarantee the launch of the program.
(6) Argentina and Italy and respective companies engaged in both
coproduction agreements figure as examples of the effect of variance in supplier
countries and industries on the outcome, showing H6 to be true. The CBA-123
case is somewhat weak because FAMA is not totally a supplier in this agreement,
and this may have influenced negatively the outcome. However, the AMX case
shows the importance of the supplier in positively affecting the technological
independence outcome. Because of the difference in the role of the suppliers in
these cases, H6 is considered supported by both agreements.
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6. Summary of the Hypotheses Results
Table 39 provides a summary of the hypotheses test results by type of
offset. A plus (+) indicates the hypothesis was strongly or simply supported. A
minus (-) shows that the hypothesis was only partially or not supported by the case
studies.
Table 39
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES RESULTS
OFFSET/HYPOTHESES HI H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
COUNTERTRADE - + + + - -
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER + + + 4- + +
LICENSED PRODUCTION - + + - + +
COPRODUCTION - - + + + +
The general hypotheses results offer important findings of this thesis
which are listed below:
- Technology transfer cases, represented basically by the BRASILSAT case,
supported most of the hypotheses previously posited. The hypotheses were
generally not true for the countertrade cases.
-- The hypotheses H2 (type of offset agreement), H3 (military and civilian
offsets), H5 (government support) and H6 (supplier countries and industries) were
supported in more than 75% of the cases (more than three pluses (+) in Table 39).
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B. GENERALIZATIONS
The foregoing case studies provide some findings regarding the technological
impact of offset agreements in recipient countries. The generalizations relate to four
significant issues: the determinants of offset requirements, the relationship of
different factors, the link between offsets and technology transfer and effective
policies for a recipient developing country.
1. What are the determinants of offset requirements?
The first set of generalizations suggested by this thesis is related to the
question: What are the principal factors that motivate recipient countries to set
offset requirements? The relationship between the supplier and recipient in
negotiating offsets does not seem to be random. The operating decisions about
the best offset proposals also seem to obey a certain framework. A systems view
of the major factors in this decision-making, which emerges from the case analysis
is helpful in analyzing future cases. The four factors involved in every offset
decision making for a recipient country are: technological, socio-political,
economical, and military. These factors influence three main outcome dimensions
which represent the value of these offsets to the recipient country. The outcome
dimensions are technological independence, economic benefits, and the
enhancement of national security.
The first outcome, technology independence, as was proposed at the
beginning of the research, is considered the most important one, although the
case studies have proven that enhancing national security has been the emphasis
in the Brazilian aerospace offset cases. This thesis concludes that the most
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important variable considered under this outcome is the type (or level) of the
technology included in the transfer of the technology.
The second outcome is economic benefits. This is an important outcome
for countries that have high external debt, but in this study was not considered so
important to Brazil. However, recipient countries recognize the importance of future
exports and seek to turn the technology obtained through these offsets into
commercially viable exports. The difficulty in obtaining information about the
financial arrangements included in offsets was one aspect that may have
contributed negatively to this outcome.
The last outcome is the enhancement of national security. The
combination of the socio-political and military factors as predictors of one broad
outcome called national security was due to the similarity of these two factors. The
flexibility of the model allowed the analysis of cases with both military and civilian
characteristics. The results demonstrate that this outcome has been obtained in
most of the offsets agreements in Brazil.
2. What is the relationship of different offset factors?
The role of these four main factors in offsets were studied in detail in this
thesis. The variables that constituted these factors were sometimes difficult to
differentiate. For example, it is difficult to differentiate industrial defense from
military capability because these concepts are interconnected through
"mobilization". The same occurs with the internal and external political
motivations and socio-political pressures where external politics have been
strong enough to influence internal politics (e.g., the IMF exerts influence in
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national decisions about investments). The following list summarizes some of the
relationships identified through the research on these main factors.
- Supplier characteristics are related to the type of technology. It means that
some suppliers are allowed to transfer technology more easily than others. The
U.S. and French cases were the most evident in arriving at this finding.
-- Government action is related to the level of technology that is transferred
to the recipient country. Coproduction agreements which involve strong
government participation are more flexible and more likely to improve the quality
and quantity of technology.
3. What is the link between offsets and technology transfer?
The role of technology in offset agreements was the main goal of this
thesis. The conclusions of this research indicate that offsets are an efficient way for
recipient countries to obtain high technology. It was observed that there is a
hierarchy among offset agreements in their capacity to acquired technology. From
the four offset groups analyzed, countertrade had a low capacity, technology
transfer and licensed production medium capacity, and coproduction high capacity.
This hierarchy suggests that recipient countries should start their technological
development through offsets that bring low technology and improve the level of the
agreements as their technological level improves.
Another point emphasized in the offset and technology transfer
relationship was the importance in having a propitious technology transfer
environment and a previously established recipient firm technological capacity.
Offset agreements are inefficient if they do not have these favorable aspects.
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Finally, it was observed that a successful level of technological
independence depends basically on other key variables such as government
support, socio-political pressures, and jobs creation. The results from the case
studies proved the importance of the government participation in the process to
coordinate offset negotiations because of various impacts of these agreements In
other sectors of the society.
4. What are effective policies for developing countries?
This study about recipient country motivations towards offset agreements
suggests a set of general policies that may be used by developing country
governments to increase the benefits of these agreements.
It was identified that there is a definite difference in recipient countries
offset objectives. Developed countries have strong concerns about employment
and technology transfer while developing countries are always concerned with the
financial viability and increase of the balance of payments position. Developing
countries are also constrained in entering in these kind of negotiations due to
financial institutions such as the IMF. However, the research suggests the following
developing country offset policies.
-- The recipient government should emphasize direct offsets because they
improve the level of technology transfer and are easier to follow.
-- The government should issue general guidelines to direct supplier and
recipient firms about the level of desired impacts in the recipient economy. The
establishment of details such as the percentage of offset obligations does not
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seem to be adequate policy. These general guidelines should contain the
government sectors responsible for supervising these agreements.
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VII - CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis about offset agreements was to further identify
what kind of factors affect decision-making involving technology transfer in recipient
countries. In addition, this research was undertaken in order to determine the
impact of offset agreements on the technological process of developing countries
and to draw from the analysis of some cases broader theoretical implications about
technology transfer for explaining and predicting future offset negotiations. These
statements and goals led to the development of an analytical model which identifies
economic, socio-political, military, andtechnological factors (independent variables)
that influence three main outcomes: technological independence, national security,
and economic benefits.
The Brazilian aerospace industry was an appropriate source of case studies
which provided relatively rich analysis within the constraint of a lack of accurate
data. The cases also offered interesting findings and supported most of the six
hypotheses previously established. Finally, they provide a basis for formulating
generalizations which may be applied to other recipient countries.
The theoretical framework based on the focused comparison method
demonstrated the efficacy of the empirical inquiry method in handling very complex
issues related to contemporary phenomena. The method based on formulating
standard questions for each of the cases assured that similar criteria would be
used to analyze cases with different characteristics such as: type of offsets, military
or civilian related, government support, level of technology, and supplier origin. The
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utilization of a system of grades (low, medium, and high) attributed to each variable
helped to ascertain the extent of their contribution to the outcomes.
This chapter concludes the thesis. It provides a summary of findings,
recommendations to improve the Brazilian government offset policy, and
suggestions for further research in this area.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This thesis produced some important findings that will contribute to further
experiments into the offset agreements area. The following list summarizes these
main findings:
-- Offsets have become an efficient way to bring high technology to
developing countries .
The Brazilian government has utilized offsets in a large scale in the aerospace
industry to facilitate and to improve the transfer of advanced technology. This is
what its industry needs to continue being competitive in international markets.
-- The level of technoloav transferred to recipient countries is related to the
type of offset arrangement used .
The utilization of four different groups of offset agreements in this thesis
demonstrated that there is a hierarchy of offset types and their capabilities for
acquiring technology. This thesis also showed that the level of technology acquired
depends also on the level of the recipient industrial base. It means a recipient
country can obtain technological benefits from an offset agreement only If it has the
technological capacity already installed. The thesis also suggests that developing
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countries should start with countertrade, moving to licensed production, and
coproduction as the level of its industrial base improves.
-- Offset acreements have been used successfully in Brazilian aerospace
programs and they have had a major impact on the technological status of the
Brazilian industry .
Despite numerous controversial opinions about offsets not only inside the
Aeronautics Ministry but also in the other government sectors such as CACEX,
these kind of negotiations have been very common in the majority of recent big
aerospace contracts. Most of these agreements have been used as an efficient
v^ay to get technology and to finance production. The technology obtained through
these agreements has been transferred to other industries with tremendous
spinoffs effects, causing multiplier effects such as creation of jobs, increasing
exports, and distribution of technology.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE BRAZILIAN OFFSET POLICY
Because offsets are elaborate, inventive, and extremely diverse, they allow an
infinite combination of different policies which make a recipient country's national
offset policy somewhat complex. However, if experiences from other countries are
studied adequately, they may offer excellent guidelines to be applied in identical
situations. The recommendations from this thesis are divided into two levels, which
include a national policy for the Brazilian government and a sectoral policy for the
Aeronautics Ministry. Both groups of recommendations are related to the main
findings of this research.
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1. The National Policy Recommendations
Some governments have promulgated regulations requiring offsets in
certain circumstances, but most of the recipients are confused with the more
appropriate approach. Proposing a Brazilian national offset policy is a somewhat
complex task given the limited observations offered by these case studies. There
is currently no Brazilian offset policy in place, and a case-by-case approach is used
in most of the negotiations. Various specialists criticize this policy because it does
not allow the supplier and recipient industries to forecast what will be the next
"surprise" of the Brazilian government. Each agreement is completely different from
each other, and this contributes to creating an environment of uncertainty which
increases the risks and consequently the price of doing business in Brazil.
Although it has numerous drawbacks, this policy may not be totally wrong. Based
on the analytical observations of this thesis, a list of general recommendations is
produced.
(1) The Brazilian government should issue or announce through its
embassies a "Brazilian National Offset Policy" containing general guidelines relating
to such topics as technology transfer, financing arrangements, minimum
employments benefits, and import and export objectives. Following these
guidelines, government agencies should be identified to provide supplier and
recipient industries assistance and advice;
(2) The coordination of this policy should be under a Commission
represented by the ministries of Technology, Commerce and industry. Economy,
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and Foreign Affairs, besides the Military ministries when offsets were military
related;
(3) The Brazilian government should recognize that offsets are a force
in the world today that cannot be ignored. If they are not considered, Brazil would
have a risk of losing important opportunities to improve its position as an important
arms supplier, in spite of the its actual economic position.
2. Sectoral Policy Recommendations
The sectoral policy recommendations focuses on some general
guidelines suggested to the Aeronautics Ministry which are divided in civilian and
military offset agreements.
a. Civilian Offsets Guidelines
The civilian offset guidelines focuses on the acquisition of civilian
aircraft to equip the Brazilian airlines. This part is also under the responsibility of
the Aeronautics Ministry (MAER).
(1) The MAER should restrict its participation in controlling offset
Implementations through a debit/credit account system, functioning as a main
source of information and advice about suppliers government and industries offset
and technology transfer policies. It should be clear to the recipient firms that the
MAER interference is only to give more flexibility to the process and improve their
leverage in negotiating better offset terms;
(2) The offset program should be recognized as a part of the long
term aerospace industrial policy and not just a short term commercial policy. This
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means that special focus should be given to agreements which improve the
technological and production level of the aerospace industry;
(3) The MAER should establish a division of labor vy^ith other
Brazilian government sectors based on specialization of each sector and their
offset implementation goals. For example, the MAER may use the marketing
network and commercial expertise of INTERBRAS;
(4) A smart offset policy could employ a mixed portfolio approach
to offsets that would have a combination of some with immediate impact, some
middle-range advantage, and some long term growth. Another possible
combination is by mixing direct and indirect offsets to maximize the benefits that
offsets can provide;
(5) The sec (DAC) should provide a "list of preferences" to
suppliers as a suggestion for offset obligations, based on the hierarchy of benefits
previously forecasted. This list would include not only the aeronautical products
but also other kind of services (e.g., VARIG may sell tourism packages in offset for
aircraft acquisition). A dollar-for-dollar offset credit relationship should be adopted
because this will give more flexibility and open up potential gains in more than just
one factor (e.g., foreign exchange savings and technology may be combined as
the main objectives in one offset agreement); and
(6) Offsets in the international aerospace sector are a common way
of doing business and widely practiced. Instead of fixing a 10% minimum
requirement while other countries are operating above 100% figures, an open offset
amount may be negotiated or dictated on a "case-by-case" basis. Offsets are a
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rapidly growing phenomenon in the international political economy and the MAER
civilian offset policy should follow this rapid evolution closely.
b. Military Offset Guidelines
The military offset guidelines are suggested to improve some offset
negotiations involving the acquisition of new weapons systems or transfer of
military-related technologies.
(1) Military offsets are not being used to improve the Brazilian Armed
Forces military capability because of the lack of budget funds allocated to improve
the arsenal. Because of this, coproduction of high technology weapons has been
the best approach. However, these programs are restricted to producing a limited
number of weapons, which increases the unit price to uncompetitive levels for
export. Future agreements should emphasize larger workshares based on
technologies which the industry may use for competitive advantage in potential
exports;
(2) Military offset programs should be negotiated into ones that
require less foreign exchange, quicker return on investment, and mainly, offer
potential export earnings. These requirements may improve the technological and
economical benefits to justify the investment and make the program politically
viable;
(3) The MAER expertise in negotiating offsets within the aerospace
area seems to be now very useful to the Brazilian Navy and Army as they start
creating airmobile and tactical capability into their services. The MAER advice to
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other services will contribute to increasing their bargaining power and directly
improve the aerospace industry;
(4) Offsets could allow the recipient industries to engage in
programs above their capacities and this may increase the risks. Offsets can
finance ambitious programs of industrialization without bankrupting the recipient
economy or destabilizing its government. However, as the political support
changes, these unrealistic programs may be considered an unnecessary burden
and be cancelled if the technological and economical justifications won't support
them;
(5) The MAER should continue looking towards offset as one of the
ways to stay technologically afloat in the current doldrums of international trade,
technological evolution, and military defense.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Potential topics for further research stemming from the analysis and limitation
imposed by time in this thesis include the following:
1. To improve the technological impact of offset agreements assessment, it
may be necessary to extend the data access and the analysis to specific points
such as spinoffs, R&D investments, employment qualitative effects, etc;
2. An analysis applying linear programming models may help recipient
countries decision-making related to technology transfer packages. This could
provide an optimization of available resources and technology limitations;
3. Technology forecasting models may be applied to estimate future recipient
countries' decisions related to offset requirements;
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4. Risk assessment models may be used by recipient countries to estimate
the risk in obtaining a certain technology and completely integrated, using different
types of offsets agreements;
5. Specifically in Brazil, similar research may be conducted on other industries
such as the nuclear industry, which also shows mixed civilian and military
objectives, offering options to compare different types of offsets;
6. There is a hypothesis not tested that recipient government participation in
offset negotiations may provide an increase in the percentage obtained by these
countries in offset obligations. If this hypothesis could be statistically tested, it will
contribute significantly to recipient government policies towards offset agreements.
The major conclusion of this thesis is that developing countries have a limited
capability for diagnosing the problems and benefits of offset agreements and little
understanding of how the transfer of technology can be implemented through
these arrangements. This thesis concludes that offset is a complex issue coupled
with a turbulent environment in which countries such as Brazil must operate. This
scenario may explain why some recipient countries have a weak commitment to
planning and setting long range offset and technology transfer goals. After this
extensive research, one question still remains to be further explored. How does
technology relate to offset arrangements in the arms trade?
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APPENDIX A - ABREVIATIONS
ACDA - U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CACEX - Brazilian Trade Department
COPAC - Commissao Organizadora do Program Aeronave de Combate
COTAC - Comissao de Coordenagao de Transporte Aereo
CTA - Aerospace Technical Center
DAC - Department of Civilian Aviation
DOD - U.S. Department of Defense
EMBRAER - Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica
FAB - Brazilian Air Force
GAC - Grupo de Acompanhamento e Controle
GATT - General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade
GFE - Government Furnished Equipment
lAE - Institute of Space Activities
lEAv -Institute of Advanced Studies
IFI - Institute of Industrial Foster
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INPE - National Institute of Space Research
INPI - National Institute of Industrial Property
IPD - Institute of the Research and Development
ITA -Institute of Technological of Aeronautics
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MAER - Brazilian Aeronautics Ministry
MCD - McDonnell Douglas
MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
0MB - Office of Management and Budget
OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
R&D- Research and Development
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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APPENDIX B - BRASILSAT BIDDERS PROFILE"'
HUGHES
Hughes Aircraft Company, specifically the Hughes Space and
Communications Group, located in El Segundo, California is specialized in the
development and production of Earth satellites for telecommunications, Earth
observation and meteorology, and vehicles and payloads for space exploration.
The group also manufactures Earth terminals and related communications
equipment. Hughes has been involved in many of the domestic and overseas
satellites programs, starting with Syncom 2, the world's first geosynchronous
communications satellite. The most purchased commercial communications
satellite series, the HS376, is an advanced two-axis spin-stabilized satellite which
has been supplied to the USA, UK, Canada, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and
Australia. A newly developed communications satellite, the HS393, will become
operational in 1989. The company is also developing the high-power HS601, its
first three-axis stabilized craft. Approximately 50% of all current commercial
communications satellites have been built by Hughes. In addition to commercial
communications satellites, Hughes also designs and produces military
communications, meteorological, and scientific satellites (GOES and Leasats). To
maintain contact with its commercial satellites, Hughes designs, develops, builds
^'*rhis appendix information comes from the "Jane's Space Flight Directory,"
Jane's Information Group
. 1988 [Ref.10]. The following references are listed in the
Chapter Five, BRASILSAT Program Case.
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and commissions telemetry, command and satellite control ground terminal
facilities on a worldwide basis. The company also supplies components to
organizations building their own ground stations.
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company is located in Huntington Beach,
California. The company is deeply involved in the NASA Space Transportation
System and plays a multiple role with the production of Shuttle hardware, flight
training and mission programming and payload integration. This includes building
the aft and forward skirts, frustrum and other structures for the solid rocket
boosters, and the aft propulsion system consisting of an orbital maneuvering
system and reaction control system. MacDonnell Douglas builds the DELTA launch
vehicle and has supplied large numbers of these to NASA, the 179th launch
occurring in September 1986, with nearly 200 satellites being placed in orbit over
the past 25 years. NASA restarted the production line in September 1986 in
response to the need for expendable launchers recognized in the wake of
Challenger's accident. Several launches are scheduled in January 1987 as the
USAF Medium Launch Vehicle. The company has also designed and produced the
Payload Assist Module (PAM) to launch unmanned satellites towards higher orbits
from the cargo bay of the shuttle vehicle. This module, which has also been used
as the upper stage of the later DELTA rockets, was developed as the world's first
commercial space launch vehicle and has already placed about 30
communications satellites into high orbit.
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SPAR AEROSPACE LIMITED
Spar Aerospace Limited, specifically Its Satellite and Aerospace Systems
Division, located in Ste. Anne de Bellevue, Quebec, is a prime contractor for
NASA's Remote Manipulator System (Canadarm), Telesat Canada's
Communications satellites, and the communications satellite system for Brazil. As
a prime contractor, Spar leads a team of Canadian aerospace companies in
developing and building the Mobile Servicing Centre, Canada's contribution to
NASA's International Space Station. In its plant. Spar designs and manufactures
subsystems, including a range of antennas such as C and Ku-band, TT & C, VHF,
X-band telemetry and Ku-band reconfigurable antennas. Transponder subsystems
include search and rescue transponders, 4 GHz transmitters, linear high power
amplifiers, input filters, band pass filters and 6/4 GHz communications filters. Other
products include on-board microprocessors, thermal actuators, converters, povy^er
conditioners, filters and duplexes.
ARIANESPACE
Following the collapse of ELDO and the failure of the Europa rocket based
upon Blue Streak, France launched the Ariane program in 1972. The Ariane
program was declared operational on 25 January 1982. It is developed by 10
European nations as a French insistence that Europe should have the ability to
launch its own satellites and not rely upon the U.S. or the Soviet Union.
Arianespace was formed in 1980 by 36 European aerospace companies and 13
banks to take over production and launch operations as soon as ESA (European
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space Agency) had completed four test and six production launches^'*.
Arianespace continued to benefit from the ever longer NASA delays resulting from
the Challenger disaster'''. By 1987, the company had 42 satellite launch contracts
worth about $2,000 million, in addition to the 14 already successfully launched. By
October 1987, Arianespace had ordered 39 launchers (17 Ariane Is and 2s and
21 Ariane 4s) plus long term supply for 6 more. The increased production rate was
expected to lead to the total of 6,000 European workers at Ariane rising to 10,000
by the end of decade. All Ariane launches are from French Guiana Space Center,
Korou.
''"By 1981, Ariane was ESA financed and managed by CNES (Centre National
d'Etudes Spatiales) with industrial facilities by Aerospatiale; the Ariane final
production, marketing and launching were the responsibility of Arianespace [Ref.
10:p. 436].
'^^india was among customers which apparently felt that NASA, with vague
offers of a Delta launch if the Shuttle was not available, had ceased to be reliable.
With the Challenger out of business, it would capture 50% of the estimated 20
satellites launches per year [Ref. 10:p. 436].
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